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L INTRODUCTION 
Countless rimes a day, wilnesses in court are sworn to tell "me wholie 
truth." 1 But do we mean it? The simple fact is that our adversarial legal 
culture condones a large measure of selective reporting by witnesses as weB 
as selective presentation of doclilllentar<; or real evidence. This tolerance 
for partial truths is premised on the theory that the partiality of one side 
will be offSet by the partiality of the other. Amid this adversarial dash, one 
wonders whether the mandate to tell "the whole truth," as distinct from 
the mandate not to lie, has any practical significance.2 
Of course, the adversarial contest is governed by a variety of 
procedural rules that regulate the partiality of the evidence introduced. 
The most significant are rules of discovery, which allow parties access to 
the information needed to supply that which their adversaries omit, and 
rules requiring wilnesses to submit to cross-examination. Collectively, these 
mles enhance and protect the capacit'f of the system to provide adversa..vial 
cures for adversarial partiality. Also of considerable importance, though 
less so since the expansion of discovery rights, are the rules of admissibility. 
Many of these rules control partiality more directly by exerting pressure on 
parties to present preferred forms of evidence, such as assertions subject to 
cross-examination and documents subject to direct inspection.3 
The so-called "rule of completeness" is different It constitutes the 
most direct way that the law of evidence rro~nifests a commitment to 
override adversarial partiality in the presentation of evidence. Whereas 
most acLrnissibility rules are exclusionary, operating against a badcground 
preference for the admissibility of relevant evidence! the completeness 
rule is explicitly inclusionary. It affirmatively provides for the admission of 
evidence needed to understand other evidence already admitted.5 The 
1. The language appea.rs in Lhe familiar requirement of a.'l oath "to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, a.11d nothing but the truth." See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 13-90-117 (1987); Fla. Stat. 
Ann.§ 90.605 (West 1979); Ind. Code§ 34-1-14-2 (1986). 
2. The problem of selective questioning of witnesses is exacerbated in this country by 
the fairly peiV<ISive practice of coaching witnesses. See generally John S. Applegate, Witness 
Preparation, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 227 (1989). 
3. See generally Dale A. Na.1ce, The Best Evidence Principle, '73 Iowa L. Rev. 227 (1988) 
[hereinafter Best Evidence]. To be sure, the exclusionary rules sometimes generate their own 
distorting side effects. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: 
Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1011 
(197ll) (discussing problem of jury discounting f01 fuilure to produce evidence 1·1hen, 
unbeknownst to jury, party who would be expected to present such evidence has tried 
unsuccessfully to introduce it). 
4. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 402 (providing that all relevant evidence is admissible except as 
limited by explicit rule). See generally James B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at 
the Common Law 253-'70 (1898). 
5. See generally Charles T. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 56 (3d ed. 1984). 
Besides the completeness rule, the only general inclusionary rules, other than constitutional 
limitations on the e.xdusion of reliabie evidence, are the doctrine of curative admissibility, id. 
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former "completes" the latter. 
This root idea-favoring the "whole" evidence, if not the whole 
truth-provides a potentially wide open door to the admission of evidence, 
since relevant evidence will almost always aid in understanding other 
information presented on the same material issue. It thus carries the 
potential to undermine the entire system of evidence rules. If one side 
introduces evidence E1 on some material issue, an adversary may want to 
introduce evidence E2 that affects what the trier of fact infers from E1 about 
that issue or about other issues in the case. If the presentation of E2 is 
blocked by some exclusionary or regulatory evidence rule, the adversary 
may appeal to the principle of completeness in an effort to override the 
obstruction. And if this is to be allowed, what evidence rule could remain 
intact? 
Not surprisingly, the completeness principle has been constrained so 
as to apply only in certain special contexts. For example, the most 
commonly encountered codification of the doctrine is Federal Rule of 
Evidence I 06: 
When a writing or -recorded statement or part thereof is 
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the 
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or 
recorded statement that ought in fairness to be considered 
contemporaneously with it. 
On its face, this provision limits the completeness idea to assuring the 
presentation of the entire relevant portion of a writing or recorded 
statement. Still, the rule applies quite broadly in certain respects. Unlike 
most other rules that affirmatively provide for the admission of evidence, 
the rule of completeness is not tied to a particular exclusionary rule:6 
Therein lies both its potential power and its realized ambiguity. 
On the one hand, the completeness rule might operate across 
admissibility rules, trumping any that would otherwise require the 
exclusion of potentially "completing" evidence. Alternatively, it might be 
subordinate to such exclusionary: rules, having only some narrower 
§ 57, and the doctrine of waiver of objections, id. § 55. The relationship of curative 
admissibility to completeness is discussed infra Part ill.B. 
6. Given the presumptive admissibility of relevant evidence, most other inclusionary 
rules are simply exceptions to exclusionary rules that would otherwise apply. Usually, the 
status of a rule as an exception is obvious, especially under modern codifications. However, 
some rules require closer inspection. For example, Fed. R Evid. 609 mandates the 
admissibility of certain evidence that a witness has been convicted of crime, but it is clear 
from the context that the ruJe operates as an exception to the otherwise applicable exclusion 
of character evidence. See Fed. R Evid. 404, 608(b). Yet Rule 609 also operates as an 
exception to the hearsay prohibition as it would apply to a report of the conclusion of a 
separate trier of fuct. Cf. Fed. R Evid. 803(22). 
It should also be noted that there is a much narrower completeness provision in the 
Federal Rules that is tied to a particular exclusionary rule. See Fed. R Evid. 410(i) (providing 
for admissibility against defendant of statement made in plea negotiations when necessary to 
understand another admitted statement from same discussions). c 
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procedw.-al effect indicated by the "at til.at time" language. Modem case 
bw and commentary are split on fuis question, .reflecting substanti.all 
confusion about the .rationale of the rule.'' In thls Article I wiH endorse the 
view that the most important modern function of the completeness rule is 
to trump oLhenvi_se applicable exdusionar1 rules, though not ever/ rule in 
every instance. I will also offer the general proposition that it should 
almost always trump one la:rge and important class of exclusionary rules, 
those based upon the "best evidence" principle, that is, the principle that 
parties should present to the tribunal the epistemically best evidence 
available to them on a given litigated issue.8 The trumping effect arises 
naturally from the fact that the completeness rule is itself an instantiation 
of that principle. 
Beyond these specific conclusions, this study of the completeness :n:ule 
is valuable for the light that it sheds on the complex ways in which the 
Anglo-American system of adjudication ~·esponds to partiality of 
presentations. It demonstcrates that we accept evidentiary partiality in orde:r 
to gain the benefits of an adversarial procedure. \1\T'nen those benefits a:re 
compromised, the commitment to adversarial procedure is weakened. lln 
particular, when accuracy of adjudication is at risk, the adversary system :is 
often modified to a.udio:rate the problem, even at the cost of some loss in 
party autonomy in the conduct of tria1s.9 
The analysis proceeds i.1 two stages. Part H of the .Article examines 
completeness under the common law of evidence, by which I shall mean 
evidence law apart from me Federal Rules of Evidence and sirnilar state 
codifications. This examination yields a mo.re precise picture of the 
common-!Lrw doctrine than heretofore available and identifies three 
distinguishable functions that it pe.rfo:rms. The discussion also establishes 
the importance of completeness in contexts noi limited to "writings or 
recorded statements," the language of Federal Rule 106. With this 
badcg:round, the more theoretical Part HI .relates the completeness 
doctrine to the best evidence prirrcip1e, ru;;ng the resulti.Dg Lnsights to 
distinguish completeness from the .related doctrine of curative admissibility, 
sometimes suggested as the source of the power to tiump otherwise 
applicable exclusionary :rules. Most importantly, this exawjnation allows us 
to identity a test for when the trumping of such exclusionary rules should 
occur. Part rv concludes with an indication of future work on the 
:implications of this study for the interpretation and evaluation of the 
treatment of completeness under the Federal Rules. 
7. This issue has been called "by fur the most intriguing" problem to arise in connection 
with Rule 106. Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence (2d ed.) ABA Sec. 
on Litig. 21 (West 1 99]). 
8. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 230-47. 
9. See id. at 234-39, 242-43, 263-70. 
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In order to understand" the modem completeness doctrine, a re-
examination of its common-law origins is indispensable. Indeed, this is a 
classic example of the importance of doctrinal history in the interpretation 
of codified rules. Unfortunately, though not surprisingly, that history 
reveals both complexity and confusion. Much of the difficulty arises from 
the brevity of judicial opinions on evidentiary questions generally, and 
completeness questions in particular. Cryptic opinions pose a serious 
challenge to interpretive efforts. And of course, even under the most 
careful scrutiny, the large number of opinions from courts at every level 
dating back over two hundred years cannot all be perfectly harmonized. 
What follows, therefore, is a necessarily brief summary of the mature 
common-law completeness rule, articulated with an unavoidable, yet 
historically sound, interpretive gloss. It is, however, much more than a 
mere restatement of the received wisdom. By exploring the rationale of the 
doctrine at greater depth than· previously attempted, the discussion dispels 
several confusions that have beset the doctrine, confusions that have 
appeared in both judicial opinions and academic commentary. 
A. Defining "Wholeness" 
Wigmore's synthesis of the common-law rule provides an excellent 
starting point, although it is not without flaws. What Wigmore called the 
doctrine of ''Verbal Completeness" 10 is triggered when a party (hereafter 
the "proponent") presents evidence of only part of a verbal utterance, 
written or oral, rather than the entire utterance. 11 The basic idea can be 
traced at least as fu back as a famous seventeenth century English trial in 
which the defendant argued against piecemeal use of passages from his 
allegedly seditious manuscript.12 Rather than simply leaving the adversely 
affected party (hereafter the "opponent") to complain of unfairness, the 
modern doctrine offers a more significant remedy, the exact contours of 
which will be addressed momentarily. In other words, the doctrine is a 
response to the advertent or inadvertent creation of false impressions made 
by taking language out of context, and it may be summarized in the 
principle that "the whole of a verbal utterance must be taken together." 13 
10. See7 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law ch. 73 (Chadbourn rev. 
1978). 
11. Id. § 2094, at 595-97. Wigmore's use of the term "verbal" is intended to embrace both 
oral and written communication. Id. at 595 n.l. The same convention is followed here. 
12. Id. at 601 (summarizing Algernon Sidney's Trial, 9 How. St Tr. 8.18, 868 (KB. 
1683)). 
13. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2094, at 601-07 (quoted language appearing at 604; 
emphasis in original). Wigmore distinguished two types of incompleteness, that arisin_g from 
imprecision of an evidentiary recounting and that arising from a lack of the entirety of the parts of 
the original event ld. at 597-601. We are here concerned only with the latter type. The 
former, concerning whether a witness may testify to the gist or net purport of an out-of-court 
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The expansive force of the completeness principle is t.h.us consttained 
by the idea of a verbal utterance, since ilie aff.t.rw..al:ive license or demand 
for the admission of evidence can extend no further !.han to the entirety of 
such an event This supposes, of course, the individuation of communica-
tions i..1to identifiable events that may qualify as "wholes," though it does 
not necessarily assume that such individuation is unique, that it can be 
performed ii"1 only one way. The common-law doctrine is thoroughly 
modern in that its point is to achieve an understanding of evidence based 
on wholeness of meaning, even if there is no "value-free" criterion of 
wholeness. Wigmore succinctly identified the resulting tension: 
But what is the whole of the utterance? No doubt this principle of 
entirety is flexible in its application. A simple thought requires 
but a simple utterance; a complex thought, a complicated 
utterance. When, therefore, we obey the canon that the whole of 
the utterance must be considered, the scope of our survey may be 
very variable, so fur as concerns the mere number of words, 
sentences, or paragraphs. The whole that is to be considered is 
obviously not the whole of a phrase or a paragraph, any more 
than it is the whole of the printer's line or page, but the whole of 
thought - that is, such a quantity of utterance as the utterer has 
indicated to be distinct and entire in itself, for the purpose of 
jcepresenting a distinct thought. . . . Thus t.i-}e possibilities are 
infinite and the boundaries indefmite in this search for entirety of 
utterance. It will be difficult for the law, in applying the principle, 
to employ any fJ.Xed test. Yet the law cannot be expected to be 
satisfied practically with the indefiniteness which in theory the 
conception of entirety involves; and therefore the application of it 
is full of difficulties. 14 
Although the identification of verbal events may present difficult problems, 
that :is not to say that it cannot practically be performed. As is often the 
case in handling such dilemmas, the key to an identification of whole 
verbal events will be context The practicol "bounda_ries" of t.he who!e -..vi!! 
be a function of both the purposes for which the original portion may 
legitimately lbe used aa>d the purposes seiVed lby invoicing the completeness 
doctrine. 
verbal event rather than its exact words, presents a problem the treatment of which has now 
largely merged with the lay opinion rules. See generally id. §§ 2097, 2098. A similar confluence 
can be seen with respect to the issue of precision of secondary evidence of the contents of a 
document or other recording and the rule preferring originals when trying to prove the 
contents thereof. Su; genemlly id. §§ 2105-11. Of course, the risks of each type of incomplete-
ness partly account for the necessity of all those rules that constrain the means by which one 
can prove out-of-court verbal events, including the lay opinion rule, the original recording 
rule, and the hearsay rule, a fuct that will prove to be of considerable importance. 
14. Id. § 2094, at 604 (emphasis in original). 
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1. The Relevance Test 
With resp~ct to the fanner, a substantial amount of case law addresses 
the standard by which one is to measure wholeness. Wigmore offered the 
following synthesis of the nann animating these decisions: "No more of the 
remainder of the utterance than concerns the same subject, and is explanatory of the 
first part, is receivable" under the principle of completeness.15 While this 
way of expressing the matter seems to depend upon a prior determination 
of what constitutes the "remainder" of a verbal utterance, one may take it 
to be the refinement of a pre-analytic notion. Such a broader notion of the 
whole--extending to all that the person said or wrote at that time on the 
subject-matter of the suit-is sometimes encountered, especially in 
questions about the entirety of a criminal defendant's admission or 
confession.16 Wigmore thought the narrower restriction necessary "so that 
the opponent shall not, under cloak of this conceded right, put in 
utterances which do not come within its principle and would be 
15. 7 Wigmore, supra'note 10, § 2113, at 656 (emphasis in original). Actually, Wigmore 
offers this as one of three restrictions on the use of the remainder, the other two being: "No 
utterance i=levant to the issue is receivab~" and "The remainder thus received merely aids in the 
construction of the utterance as a wlwle, and is not in itself testimony." ld (emphasis in original). 
The former might seem to be entailed by the restriction quoted in the text, but by reasserting 
t..~e overarc...~ing requirement of rele-vC.l'lCe, it affirms thai qualifications of admitted portions 
do not become admissible when they concern irrelevancies. See id at 656-57. The latter 
additional restriction does not address the boundaries of the verbal event at all, but rather the 
nature of the use of remainder evidence. See United States v. McCorkle, 511 F.2d 482, 487 n.4 
(7th Cir. 1974) (en bane) (endorsing the first two restrictions and distinguishing the third}, 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975). I argue later that Wigmore was wrong about this last 
restriction. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
16. Compare I Simon Greenleaf, Greenleaf on Eviden~:e § 218 (re~. ed. 1899) (noting 
early cases admitting remainder of confessions, the defendant "not being confined to so much 
only as is explanatory of the part already proved against him, but being permitted to give 
evidence of all that was said upon that occasion, relative to the subject-matter in issue"}, with J 
Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 N.E.2d 680, 686-91 (Mass. 1979) (holding that after 
prosecution used part of defendant's out-of-court statement to show defendant's conscious-
ness of guilt, the remainder was properly excluded as not relevant to the admitted portion), 
and People v. Ramos, 512 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that after partial introduction of 
defendant's prior statements to impeach defendant's testimony, defendant's completeness 
motion was properly rejected in absence of showing of relevance to rehabilitation by affecting 
understanding of prior inconsistent statement). The broader view of wholeness seems not 
even to have gained much of a foothold in this country with respect to utterances other than 
those of a criminal defendant. Compare Clark v. Smith, I 0 Conn. 1, 5 (1833) (applying broader 
standard to admissions of a civil defendant), with Commonwealth v. Keyes, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 
323 (1858} (applying narrower standard in rejecting completeness argument with respect to 
utterances of non-defendant in criminal case), and Rouse v. Whited, 25 N.Y. 170 (1862) 
(applying narrower standard in rejecting completeness argument with respect to utterances 
proved in civil cases). ·The same point is true under codifications of the completeness rule. A 
modern example is People v. Perry, 499 P.2d 129, 148 (Cal. 1972) (interpreting codification 
allowing admission of "the whole on the same subject" as "necessarily subject to the 
qualification that the court may exclude those portions of the conversation not relevant to the 
items thereof which have been introduced"). 
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otherwise ... inadmissible." 1•1 Conversely, a statement Lhat is not part of 
what was said or written at the same time is not ordinarily embraced within 
the rule, even if it qualifies the admitted statement, so Lhe pre-analytic 
notion continues to have bite.18 This collection of restrictions on the use 
of completing evidence will be called the "relevance test" for wholeness, 
even though it is obviously important to lceep in mi...1d that these 
.restrictions are tighter than one simply requiring the :remainder to be 
relevant to the material issues in the case. 
The application of the relevance test can be controversial even in 
those courts, the vast majority, that unequivocally endorse the narrower 
:restrictions advocated by Wigmore. The explanation for this lies in the 
variety of ways that the .remainder can serve to explain or qualify fue 
original part .i1Jthough :neit.~er piliuillt-f nor secondaJ-y authoJiities r.nalc.e 
any conscious effort to distinguish among these modes of completion, one 
ca..n readily illustrate the variety. In each of the following hypotheticals the 
whole of the statement is given, with the portion omitted by the proponent 
in italics: 
Evidence that a defendant, charged wiu'l a chainsaw slaying, 
said, ''Yes, I sawed him then, but I ain't seen him later thai 
day." 
Case 2: Evidence that a defendant, rharged 1vith murder, said, "I 
may have killed him." 
Case 3: Evidence that a defendant, charged -.vith murder, said, "I 
killed him, as I would kill any invader from Mars." 
Case 4: Evidence that a defendant, charged with murder, said, "I 
shot Iight at him, but I missed." 
Case 5: Evidence that a defendant, charged with murder, said, 
''You're damn right, I killed him; in self-difense." 
In Case 1, ihe omitted part qualifies the (grammatical) meaning of the 
utterance, in ibis particular case by indicating which of two possible words 
with the same or sin1ilar speHing or pronunciation, even if ungrammatical, 
the defendant intended in making the statement In Case 2, the omission 
reduces the probability of the partial utterance being true i.nsofur as t.he 
17. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2113, at 656. One should note, however, that Wigmore 
acknowledged the use of a broader idea in some C2Ses, and even conceded that no great 
harm comes therefrom. Id. § 2113, at 657-59. 
18. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2119 (noting general pattern as well as inconsistency 
in rulings). The most conspicuous exception routinely recognized at common law was when 
the part of the utterance introduced contained an explicit or implicit reference to another 
utterance. Id. §§ 2104, 2120. An occasional case can be found that for good reason extends 
the reach of wholeness to temporally separate utterances that, because of their circumstances, 
were understood by Lhe conversants as part of the context of the statement first introduced. 
See, e.g., West v. State, 37 S.E.2d 799, 800-01 (Ga. 1946) (holding that inculpatory statements 
made to sheriff on second interview presupposed the exculpatory statements made during first 
interview). And codifications of the completeness rule sometimes confirm a broader extension 
to at least some separate but gualifying utterances. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 356 (West 1967), 
Iowa Code § 622.20 (1950), Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Arm. art. 38.24 (West 1964). 
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warrant for its truth is the credit given the utterance, though of course the 
partial utterance could still be true.19 All common-law courts would 
concede the application of the completeness doctrine in Cases 1 and 2.20 
And only the fluky case can be found rejecting completeness in cases like 
Case 3, in which the probability of the truth of the partial utterance is 
affected, but not necessarily according to any assertive intentions of the 
speaker.21 
However, the omitted parts in Cases 4 and 5 qualify neither the 
meaning nor the probability of the truth of the partial utterance; rather, 
they qualify its significance in the case. More precisely, the remainder in 
Case 4 qualifies the factual inference to Jwmicide that the trier of :fuct has 
been invited to draw, while the remainder in Case 5 invites an inference as 
to a distinct ultimate fuct in the case, such as a justifying circumstance or 
the existence of malice.22 Here there is serious ambiguity due to the 
malleability of the "same subject" restriction articulated by Wigmore. For 
example, in Case 4 one can argue that the prosecution's evidence 
addresses only the mens rea of murder, not the "distinct subject" of an actus 
reus of homicide; and in Case 5 one can argue that the prosecution's 
evidence concerns only the homicide and not the "subject" of mens rea.2s 
19. In an extreme case, like, "I did wt kill him," the omission (of the word "not"} makes 
the whole logically inconsistent with the partial utterance, though once again the partial 
utterance could still be true. Incredibly, such deceitful redaction has actually occurred and 
not only in the distant past. See, e.g., Reece v. State, 772 S.W.2d 198, 202..04 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1989} (arising under state's version of the Federal Rules}. 
20. To be sure, the effect of the remainder on the probability of the truth of the partial 
utterance is not always recognized, but even then the principle of allowing the remainder if it 
does have such an effect is not questioned. See, e.g., Black v. Nelson, 424 P.2d 251, 252-54 (Or. 
1967} (reversing judgment for defendant in personal injury case because, inter alia, trial court 
wrongly admitted remainder of written statement by defendant which included opinion on 
the ability of plaintiff .. to avoid the accident; the appellate court was of the erroneous view that 
the opinion "in no way tends to explain or qualify the discrepancy between the defendant's 
testimony and the pretrial statement" as to the positions of the cars}. 
21. Compare Commonwealth v. Keyes, 77 Mass. (11 Gray} 323 (1858) (affirming trial 
court's rejection of completeness argument with respect to remainder of utterance that might 
have called into question the credibility of an unavailable hearsay declarant; the court 
strangely opined that since the hearsay declarant was not a witness, his credibility was not in 
issue}, with Tracy v. People, 97 Ill. 101, 105-07 (1880) (holding that trial court erred in 
excluding defendant's cross-exanJination of witness about whether dying declarant used 
profunity, a fact that would be relevant to the credibility of someone about to meet his 
maker). 
22. Certain assumptions are implicit in this analysis. For example, the remainder in Case 
3 may similarly affect the significance of the original proffer, as distinct from affecting the 
probability of the original part's being true, if the defendant's plea is not guilty by reason of 
insanity. And the remainder in Case 4 may affect the significance of the original part if the 
defendant is also charged with attempted murder; if the charge were only attempted murder, 
then the remainder would be irrelevant, despite its casting doubt on the accuracy of 
defendant's aim. (The remainder in Case 4 might also affect the probability of the truth of 
the proposition that defendant "aimed right at" the victim, assuming it is disputed that he 
killed the victim, for if he had so aimed, it is less likely that he would have missed.} 
23. The question of whether the identity of the subject matter is determined by the use 
834 80 IOWA LAW REVIEW [1995] 
The court can undoubtedly use this flexibility to reach the result it 
considers just or otherwise desirable.24 Nonetheless, the majority of 
decisions employ a relevance test broad enough to cover Case 425 and, at 
least as to the utterances of criminal defendants, Case 5 as well.26 
For the pragmatist, however, all this will seem rather amorphous 
without an understanding of the other aspect of context which seiVes to 
mark off meaningful wholes, namely the purpose or purposes of employing 
the notion of completeness. How, in other words, does the holistic demand 
arise in practice? In order to answer this question, careful attention must 
be directed to the procedural contexts in which the common-law response 
is invoked. 
which the proponent claims to w .. ake of the original part is addressed infra at notes 59-63 and 
accompanying text. 
24. Often the result is simply to affirm the trial court's judgment. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Watson, 388 N.E.2d 680, 686-91 (Mass. 1979) (holding that, after demonstrably false 
part of defendant's out-of-court statement was used to show defendant's consciousness of 
guilt, the remainder, which conceivably affected the various inferences to be drawn from the 
lie, was properly excluded as not relevant to whether defendant lied and therefore to whether 
he was conscious of his own guilt). One must be careful not to read from such cases the 
proposition that, so long as the remainder evidence affects neither the grammatical meaning 
of the proffered part nor the probability of its being true, there is necessarily a distinct subject 
matter, L."tus defeating a completetJess motion even if the suggested inferences from the 
proffered part are ·affected by die remainder. Watson seems rather to be based on the 
judgment that the inferences to be drawn from the defendant's lie were not significantly 
affected by the exculpatory assertions coupled with it. 
25. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Wittenborn, 3 Cal. Rptr. 459 {Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (affirming 
admission of remainder in personal injury case after police officer testified for plaintiff that 
defendant had admitted running a red light; cross-examination was allowed as to defendant's 
further statements to the officer about failure of his brakes); Rokus v. City of Bridgeport, 463 
A2d 252, 255-56 (Conn. 1983) (holding it error to reject remainder in a personal injury case 
after police officer testified for plaintiff that defendant's employee admitted not seeing 
plaintiff in time to avoid collision; trial court had precluded cross-examination as to 
employee's further explanations of collision); Brown v. State, 450 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 1994) 
(holding trial court's error in not admitting further portions of defendant's suppression 
hearing testimony was not harmless, when the state had introduced portions suggesting that 
earlier ext:£<9udicial statements by defendant were voluntarily made, and the offered further 
portions would suggest that they were coerced); Commonwealth v. Britland, 15 N.E.2d 657, 
658-59 (Mass. 1938) (holding it error to exclude remainder of defendant's statement 
qualifying admissions of involvement in crime by denials of knowledge or intent). 
26. See, e.g, State v. Menilla, 158 N.W. 645, 653 (Iowa 1916) (holding that codified 
rebuttal rule renders admissible the exculpatory portions of defendant's out-of-court 
statement that admitted the killing but justified it as in defense of her son); King v. State, 287 
S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Grim. App. 1956) (holding that codified rebuttal rule renders admissible the 
exculpatory portions of defendant's testimony at prior trial admitting killing in self-defense). 
This expands the test almost to the pre-analytic notion already mentioned, unless one limits 
the use of remainders to those which relate to the same causes of action, offenses, or defenses 
as the original part. Cf. Rouse v. Whited, 25 N.Y. 170 (1862) {allowing remainder of 
defendant's statement attributing principal debt to plaintiff, after plaintiff had introduced 
part of same statement attributing ownership of levied property to plaintiff). 
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2. Aggressive and Responsive Completeness 
One must first set aside what may be called an aggressive use of the 
notion of completeness, in which the proponent of the original partial 
utterance attempts to invoke the completeness principle in order to 
introduce a remainder that is otherwise inadmissible on his behalf. If this 
were allowed, it would invite abuse, as proponents would offer relatively 
unimportant parts of a verbal utterance for the purpose of bootstrapping 
the admission of the remainder. Not surprisingly, the courts have been 
careful to avoid such stratagems.27 The doctrine is thus limited for the 
most part to a responsive role. 28 So limited, there are two distinct 
common-law completeness rules, at least as delineated by Wigmore.29 
Distinguishing these rules and identifying their underlying functions are 
essential to understanding the common law and, ultimately, modem 
codifications. The next two sections undertake these tasks. 
B. The Rebuttal Rule 
The first rule, "universally conceded" in the common law, allows the 
opponent to place in evidence, during either cross-examination or the next 
major phase of the trial, those parts of the verbal event needed to 
understand and evaluate the part already introduced.30 I will refer to this 
27. See, e.g., State v. Savage, 290 A2d 221, 223 (Conn. 1971) (holding that trial court 
properly precluded defendant's effort to introduce remainder of statement part of which was 
first elicited by defendant in cross-examining police officer); Kuhn v. Kjose, 248 N.W. 230, 
231-32 .(Iowa 1933) (holding that trial court properly refused admission of that part of 
defendant's out-of-court admission that indicated his insurance coverage); Commonwealth v. 
Henry, 640 N.E.2d 503, 505-07 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (holding no error in trial court's 
exclusion of that part of defendant's out-of-court statement which denied wrongdoing). To be 
sure, many of the cases have concerned the prosecution's attempt to introduce portions of a 
defendant's admission or confession which relate to other crimes the defendant may have 
committed, and those decisions are somewhat in conflict. Compare People v. Loomis, 70 N.E. 
919, 919-21 (N.Y. 1904) (holding that parts of confession relating to other crimes was 
impropedy admitted), with McRae v. People, 281 P.2d 153, 153-56 (Colo. 1955) (holding that 
parts of confession relating to prior incarceration was properly admitted). If the two parts of 
the statement are not conveniently separable, one must apply the usual balancing of probative 
value and prejudicial potential, and even when the result is that the remainder is admitted in 
order to help the trier of fact understand the admissible parts, limiting instructions are 
properly employed to minimize the risk of improper use of the former. See, e.g., People v. 
Hurry, 52 N.E.2d 173, 176 (lll. 1944); Bell v. State, 198 A2d 895, 897 (Md. 1964). Responsive 
or defensive uses of completeness are not properly subject to such limitations, occasional 
contrary statements notwithstanding. See infra Part ill.B. 
· 28. Of course, the opponent of an incomplete proffer can become the proponent of an 
incomplete remainder, thus generating a completeness right in the original proponent. See, 
e.g., Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Grim. App. 1974) (holding that defendant's 
introduction of part of remainder of confession allows prosecution to introduce residue of 
remainder). 
29. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2095. 
30. ld. §§ 2113-25 (quoted language appearing at 654). Some states have codified this 
rule. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code§ 356 (West 1967): 
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as fue rebuttal :rule. H is at once puzzling because it seems w1necessary: If 
the completing portion aids in assessing Lhe probative value of admittedly 
relevant evidence, it is itself necessarily relevant and tlms presumptively 
admissible. 31 Thus, the limitation of the rule to qualifYing portions of the 
same verbal event as that proffered by Lhe proponent seems too st;ici:. Why 
cannot the opponent present any evidence relevant to the material fucts? 
To be sure, fue doctrine could have meant no more than to 
emphasize the relevance of the completing evidence. Indeed, in many 
cases this seems to be the only identifiable purpose of :involdng the 
completeness principle.32 Thus, one might say that a distinct completeness 
function is that of demonstrating relevance. But of course such a function, 
though persuasively real, is not doctrinally distinct. The completeness 
principle is used here merely as part of an argument to est:~_bli~h 
admissibility under the rule of presumptive admissibility of relevant 
evidence. In a doctrinal sense, the latter rule does the work. Likewise, since 
the probative value of the completing evidence can be de minimis i.f not 
considered in connection '.vi.th the part it modifies, the completeness 
argument can serve to emphasize that the remainder is not subject to 
exclusion as a waste of time.33 Again, the latter rule does the work. In 
other words, the common-law rule would have been unnecessary, as a 
distinct docu-ine, were its only practical point that of emphasizing !he 
relevance or probative value of the remainder. 
Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by 
one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; 
when a letter is read, the answ~r may be given; and when a detached act, 
declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, decla.-ation, 
conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given 
in evidence. 
Id. See also Ga. Code Ann. § 24-2-4 (1981) (codifying rebuttal rule for completeness of 
documents or records), § 24-3-38 (codifying rebuttal rule for completeness of adrn!ss!ons). 
Several other states have codi.fied rebuttal rules that are now either superseded Oil augmented 
by versions of the federal rules. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 622.19-.20 (1950); La. Rev. Stat .. Ann. 
§ 15-450 (West 1950); Mont. Code Ann.§ 93-401-11 (1964); Neb. Rev. Stat § 25-1215 (1943); 
Or. Rev. Stat.§ 41.880 (1975); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 38.24 (West 1964). 
31. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 185, at 541-44 (articulating relevance as the existence 
of probative value with respect to a material proposition in the case). 
32. See, e.g.,]. Truett Payne Co. v. Jackson, 203 So. 2d 443, 445 (Ala. 1967) (discussing 
use of cross,-examination to elicit remainder of conversation surrounding transaction between 
agent of defendant and third party); State v. Hillesheim, 305 N.W.2d 710, 716-17 (Iowa 1981) 
(discussing rebuttal presentation of other portions of basis of expert opinion); Floyd v. 
Tewksburj, 129 Mass. 362, 353 (1080) (discussing rebuttal presentation of furtl1er terms of, 
and basis for, prior judgment of partition); Aaberg v. Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n, 173 
N.W. 708, 711 (Minn. 1919) (discussing rebuttal presentation of further terms of insurance 
contract). 
33. See McCormidc, supra note 5, § 185, at 544-46 (discussing counterweights to 
relevance, including judicial economy). See generally Richard D. Friedman, Conditional 
Probative Value: Neoclassicism vVlthout Myth, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 439 (1994) (explaining how 
conditional admissibility can result from the probative interdependence of different items of 
evidence). 
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1. The Timing Functian 
However, the common-Jaw doctrine has meant much more than this 
allows, and the problem remains to identify its doctrinally distinct function. 
One suggestion is that the rebuttal rule overcomes any otherwise 
applicable preference for limiting the scope of cross-examination to the 
subject matter of the direct examination.54 In this way, the doctrine serves 
what is essentially a "timing'' function, changing the point in the trial at 
which evidence is received, for if the scope limitation is the only difficulty 
in admitting the evidence, then by hypothesis it would be admissible 
without the aid of the completeness principle if offered at a later stage of 
the proceedings.55 Some modern commentators have treated this 
overriding of scope limitations as the principaL if not only, independent 
significance of the doctrine.56 But Wigmore disagreed, explicitly 
distinguishing the completeness doctrine from rules governing the timing 
f 'd . 57 o eVI ence presentallon. 
What should be made of this disagreement? While overriding 
otherwise applicable rules is the right general idea, overriding evidence 
sequencing rules certainly does not fully explain the completeness 
doctrine. In the first place, once again completeness would serve virtually 
no distinct doctrinal function. In jurisdictions that do so limit the scope of 
cross, the completing portions of a verbal event are almost inevitably within 
the subject matter of direct in that they qualify the evidence already 
offered with regard to the relevant subject matter thereof. Thus, the only 
relationship of rebuttal completeness to scope is that satisfying the 
34. See, e.g., 1 B.E. Witkin, California Evidence § 319 (3d ed. 1986); Note, The Scope of 
Cross-Examination, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 564, 572-73 (1939). Of course, not all jurisdictions so limit 
cross-examination, but the "subject matter of direct" test is the narrowest of restrictions 
commonly applied. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 21. 
35. The prosecution cannot call the criminal defendant to the stand, so it is ordinarily 
limited to whatever testimony it can elicit during cross-examination of a defendant who 
chooses to testify. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 130. Thus, if a defendant testifies to a part 
of an utterance made by someone else or by himself at another time, the timing function of 
completeness may have the effect of allowing the prosecution to admit evidence that it could 
not otherwise elicit from the defendant at a later time. However, this phenomenon applies 
more broadly than to verbal utterances and is a consequence of judgments about waiver of 
the defendant's privilege not to testifY and the extent thereof. Id. § 132. In principle, the 
prosecution could constitutionally call the defendant to the stand at a later time, provided the 
further examination were limited to the scope of the waiver. See Graham C. Lilly, An 
Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 4.11 (2d ed. 1987). 
36. See, e.g., Ronald L. Carlson eta!., Evidence in the Nmeties 104 (3d ed. 1991). While 
these authors at least raise the question of the existence of non timing functions, see id. at 105 
(problem 6-12), they dearly indicate their belief that the rule of completeness is primarily a 
rule altering the usual scope rules governing successive stages of the examination of a witness. 
See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Distinctions 14 (1993). 
37. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2114 ("Other principles discriminated"); (5) at 661-62 
("That the stage of reexamination or cross-examination is the proper time for putting in 
explanatory utterances is one of the rules for the order of evidence, and does not involve the 
tenor or limits of the utterance." [cross-references omitted; emphasis in original]). 
0<>0 
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.requirements for completeness entails saris:rying even the most restrictive 
limitations on the scope of subsequent ex3.lminations. Completeness serves 
as part of an argument that presentation of the .remainder satisfies such 
limitations, .rather than that the .remainder is admissible notwithstanding 
such limitations. No significant "override" is involved.38 
More importantly, other modalities of the rebuttal rule cannot be 
captured by reference to a timing function. This point can be shown 
indirectly in several ways. First, some jurisdictions do not limit cross-
examination to the subject matter of direct yet still fmd need of a rebuttal 
rule.39 Furthermore, many common-law decisions invoke the completeness 
principle for the opponent's presentation of the remainder at a stage of 
the proceedings following cross-examination of the witness sponsoring the 
original incomplete version, or in some other context where the scope 
limitation on cross does not apply.4° Finally, even when the remainder is 
presented on cross in a jurisdiction where cross-examination is subject to 
the usual scope limitation, the completeness doctrine does more ilian 
• 11 • 11 ... ,. • • .... • ~ ~ -· • • 11 
s1mp1y ovemae 1LTlaruy restrictive appllcallons ot the scope 1un1tatwn. 
38. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 21, at 53 (opining that completeness idea often 
invoked in applying scope limitation is "mere statement of the converse of the limiting rule" 
and is thus distinct fro:rn the generai compieteness doctrine). Once again, tl-1is is not to deny 
the rhetorical value of the completeness principle in this context: "The fuct that this is 
substantially a mere statement of the converse of the limiting rule itself does not detract from 
its usefulness as an added tooi for argument." Id. 
39. E.g., compare Blackington v. Johnson, 126 Mass. 21, 21 (1878) (holding cross-
examination allowed as to all issues in the case), with Commonwealth v. Britland, 15 N.E.2d 
657, 658-59 (Mass. 1938) (applying completeness principle by way of rebuttal). See also Paul]. 
Liacos, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence 66, 443 (5th ed. 1981). The codification of 
evidence law in Texas continues a similar, long-standing pattern. Compare Tex. R Crim. Evid. 
610(b) (allowing wide-open scope of cross), with Tex. R Grim. Evid. 107 (codifying rebuttal 
rule). See ge71erally Steven Goode et al., 33 Texas Practice: Guide to the Texas Rules of 
Evidence: Civil and Criminal 27-31, 451-52 (1988). 
40. While some such cases may entail no more than emphasizing the relevance of the 
remainder, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text, others cannot be so explained. Sec, 
e.g., Evans v. Multicon Constr. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 395, 402 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (applying 
rebuttal rule to responses to requests for admission); Albuquerque Nat'! Bank v. Clifford 
Indus., Inc., 571 P.2d 1181 (N.M. 1977) (applying rebuttal rule to answers to interrogatories); 
Clinch River Mine•al Co. v. Harrison, 21 S.E. 660, 663 (Va 1895) (holding that if part of 
defendant's answer to t.he complaint is used as evidence against it, exculpatory portions of the 
answer must be considered as well). 
41. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Wittenborn, 3 Cal. Rptr. 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (relying on 
codified completeness rule in rejecting proponent's objection to remainder on grounds of 
bot.h exceeding scope of cross and viob.ting hearsay mle). In State v. l\1enilla, 158 N.W. 645, 
653 (Iowa 1916), the court relied on the completeness rule in holding that refusal to allow 
the exculpatory remainder of defendant's statement, as "not proper cross-examination," was 
error made harmless by the fuct that defendant made no attempt to introduce the remainder 
in subsequent direct examination of the witness, the court explaining that the remainder 
would have been then admissible as "res gestae." 
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2. The Trumping Function 
So one must look further for the full practical import of the rebuttal 
rule. It can be found by observing that, in some situations, an exclusionary 
rule can potentially bar the opponent from presenting the completing 
portion. The following pages will offer examples of how this can occur 
without the original proffer being inadmissible under the same 
exclusionary rule. What is important here is to obsetve that this occurrence 
generates a predicament. On the one hand, the evidence in its incomplete 
form is, by hypothesis, misleading. In some such cases, the court could 
exclude it on that basis, but then probative evidence might well be lost, a 
loss that is especially problematic if the completing portion is available for 
presentation.42 On the other hand, admitting the original proffer as well 
as the completing evidence requires one to face the seeming conflict 
between the principle of completeness and whatever principle or policy 
underlies the exclusionary rule in question. Here, at last, could be real 
doctrinal meat in the completeness principle: Resolution of such- conflicts 
would be the main point of the common-law completeness rulings. 
In :fuct, courts have routinely used the rebuttal rule to override at least 
some admissibility rules.4~ The exclus_ionary rule most frequently 
encountered in this way is the hearsay prohibition.44 An illustrative, 
42. See generally McCormick, supra note 5, § 185, at 544-48 (discussing discretionary 
exclusion of evidence the probative value of which is outweighed by probative dangers). If the 
incomplete evidence has been presented to the trier of fact before thus being ruled 
inadmissible, one also has the fumiliar problem of trying to "unring the bell" of evidence 
already heard. This problem implicates the doctrine of curative admissibility. See infra Part 
III. B. 
43. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 56, at 146. We will take up the matter of which rules 
are su~ect to this override and why in Part III.C infra. 
44. The following cases provide a good historical and jurisdictional sampling covering the 
last century: Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 92 N.Y. 274, 284-86 (1883) (applying 
common-law rebuttal rule to letter written by insured to defendant insurance company); 
Morey v. State, 72 So. 490, 492-93 (Fla. 1916) (applying common-law rebuttal rule to criminal 
defendant's out-of-court declarations); Hendrickson v. International Harvester Co., 135 A 
702, 704-05 (Vt. 1927) (applying common-law rebuttal rule to letter written by defendant's 
agent to plaintiff); Commonwealth v. Britland, 15 N.E.2d 657, 658-59 (Mass. 1938} (applying 
common-law rebuttal rule to criminal defendant's out-of-court statement); Trammell v. State, 
167 S.W.2d 171, 174-76 (Tex. Crirn. App. 1943) (applying codified rebuttal rule to criminal 
defendant's out-of-court statements); Pierce v. Heusinkveld, 14 N.W.2d 275, 280-81 (Iowa 
1944} (applying codified rebuttal rule to civil defendant's out-of-court statement); West v. 
State, 37 S.E.2d 799, 800-01 (Ga. 1946) (applying codified rebuttal rule to criminal 
defendant's out-of-court oral statements); Spani v. Whitney, 110 N.W.2d 103, 105-07 (Neb. 
1961) (applying codified rebuttal rule to civil plaintiffs out-of-court written statements); 
People v. Williams, 531 P.2d 778, 781-83 (Cal. 1975) (applying codified rebuttal rule to 
criminal defendant's out-of-court statements); Albuquerque Nat. Bank v. Clifford Indus., Inc., 
571 P.2d 1181 (N.M. 1977) (applying rebuttal rule to answers to interrogatories); Rokus v. 
Bridgeport, 463 A2d 252, 256 (Conn. 1983) (applying common-law rebuttal rule to civil 
defendant's out-of-court oral statements); McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835, 839-40 (Ind. 
1990} (applying common-law rebuttal rule to criminal defendant's out-of-court oral 
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modem decision from a common-law jurisdiction is Rokus v. The City of 
Bridgeport."l5 In that personal i~lliy case, the plaintiff offered and the trial 
court adrr.tltted part of the defendant's out-of-court statement to the witness 
concerning the cause of the accident. This, of course, was allowable 
pursuant to the hearsay exception for a.."l opponent's admissions. However, 
when the defendant proposed to cross-examine the witness concerning the 
remainder of the statement, the trial court excluded such testimony as 
hearsay.46 The Supreme Court of Connecticut held this exclusion to be 
error under Lhe doctrine of completeness. In so ruling, the high court 
agreed with the trial court that the remainder of the defendant's statement 
was hearsay when offered by the defendant, but nevertheless held that 
When a portion of a party's out-of-court admission is placed in 
evidence by an opponent, the party has a right to introduce other 
relevant portions of the conversation from which it was excerpted, 
irrespective of whether it is self-serving or hearsay.47 
Indeed, the court emphasized that "[t]he principle announced :in [prior 
Connecticut decisions] ... is an independent exception to the rule against 
hearsay.~ 48 Thus, the completeness principle has what may be called a 
"trumping'' function, in that il. trumps the operation of a_n otherwise 
applicable exclusionary rule.49 
To be sure, in sorne corllexts the opponent may use fue completing 
matter for a purpose that does not :full within the hearsay prohibition at 
all. \!\Then, for example, a party's out-of-court statement is admitted, 
statements made by others in the same conversation or correspondence 
may be introduced by either side as necessary to understand the 
significance of the admitted statement, without running afoul of the 
statement). A similar rule obtained in the federal courts before the adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., United States v. McCorkle, 511 F.2d 477, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1974), 
,-<U'd on ;-elwaring, 511 F.2d 482, 4S5-B7 (en ba.nc), ce-ri. de-nied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975) (opining 
that prosecutor cannot introduce portions of defendant's statement and then object on 
hearsay grounds to defendant's presenting completing portions; remainder properly excluded, 
however, for failure to meet relevance tests for completeness). 
45. 463 A2d 252 (Conn. 1983). 
46. ld. at 255-56. The statements were made to, and reported in court by, a police officer 
who investigated the accident Id. 
47. ld. at 256. 
48. ld. Accord, California Law Revision Commission Tentative Recommendation and Study 
Relating to Uniform Rules of Evidence, Article VIII, Hearsay Evidence 599 (Aug. 1962) ("To 
the extent that this section [upon which California's codified rebuttal rule was based] malces 
hearsay admissible, we may regard the section as a special exception to the hearsay rule."). 
49. The appellate court, however, went on to hold that the trial court's error in denying 
the cross-examination at issue was rendered harmless by the fact that the defendant 
subsequently testified not only to the material facts but also that he gave the same account 
thereof in the out-of-court statement from which plaintiff selectively quoted. Rohus, 440 N.E.2d 
at 256. Cf Commonwealth v. Britland, 15 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 1 938) (rejecting harmless 
error argument when defendant's completeness questions had been ruled out on cross-
examination, even though defendant subsequently had testified to remainder of statement to 
police). 
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hearsay rule.50 Similarly, if the proponent uses the opponent's out-of-court 
statement for some purpose other than proving its truth, then a suitably 
limited admission of the remainder equally circumvents any hearsay 
objection.51 In particular, when the original incomplete evidence is 
offered to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent statement and the 
completeness counter attempts to rehabilitate the witness by showing that 
the prior statement, taken in context, is not inconsistent with the witness's 
original testimony, both parts of the prior statement may be used to assess 
the credibility of the witness, without direct regard to their truth or 
falsity.52 In such cases, the completeness argument serves simply to 
demonstrate relevance to the rehabilitation pmpose.55 
50. See, e.g., United States v. Morello, 250 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that 
letter asserting unlawful acts is admissible under completeness to show meaning of a reply 
letter written by defendants' unindicted coconspirator); State v. Hilleshiem, 305 N.W.2d 710, 
712-13 (Iowa 1981) (relying on completeness principle in holding that statements of other 
party to conversation "may be admitted without regard to their truth or fulsity in order to 
show the context in which" the admission was made); Unity Tel. Co. v. Design Serv. Co., Inc., 
179 A2d 804, 807-08 (Me. 1962) (using completness doctrine to affirm admission of 
correspondence); Friedman v. United Rys. Co., 238 S.W. 1074 (Mo. 1922) (holding that 
proponent was properly allowed to introduce whole conversation in order to understand 
plaintiffs admission). 
51. See, e.g., People v. 'Neaver, 441.1 N.E.2d 112, 257, 259 (lli. 1982) (holding that, since 
defendant's out-of-court statements, elicited by prosecution, were inconsistent as to content 
with prosecution's theory of the case, but in their brevity might suggest inference consistent 
with prosecution's theory, exclusion of remainder as hearsay, which might create misleading 
impression that nothing further was said, was error under completeness idea). But the 
completeness principle may also be used in cases in which the proponent's use of the out-of-
court statement is arguably a hearsay use; invocation of completeness mutes the hearsay 
question as applied to the remainder. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 27 Ala. 37 (1855) (holding that, 
when part of defendant's out-of-court statement was admitted to show intent to conceal facts 
by stating falsehoods, exclusion of the remainder was reversible error). 
52. At common law, neither prior inconsistent statements nor prior consistent statements 
can, without coming within some exception to the hearsay rule, be used as substantive 
evidence of the matters asserted thereby, but only as evidence of the witness's credibility. See 
McCormick, supra note 5, § 251, at 744. It follows that, "When a writing or recording is 
admissible for impeachment purposes only, completing matter is admissible only to 
rehabilitate the witness and not as substantive evidence, unless the completing matter is 
admissible for substantive purposes independent of its admissibility under this [completeness 
rule]." N.Y. Code Evid. § 106 (Proposed Draft 1991). 
53. See, e.g., Hargress v. City of Montgomery, 479 So. 2d 1137, 1138-39 (Ala. 1985); Lowe 
v. State, 25 S.E. 656, 657 (Ga. 1896); People v. Hicks, 192 N.E.2d 891 (III. 1963); Price v. 
Commonwealth, 172 S.W.2d 576 (Ky. 1943); State v. Robertson, 328 S.W.2d 576, 581-82 (Mo. 
1959); People v. Barker, 244 N.E.2d 323, 239-40 (N.Y. 1968). For pre-Rules federal decisions, 
see Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Lev, 276 
F.2d 605, 608-13 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 363 U.S. 812 (1960); Cefasso v. Penn. RR Co., 169 
F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. Smith, 328 F.2d 848, 850 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 936 (1964); Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7-8 (8th Cir. 1944). In this context, 
a quasi-doctrinal function may remain, for the admissibility of the portion of the prior 
statement consistent with the declarant's testimony is sometimes described as an exception to 
the general rule that prior consistent statements are not admissible to rehabilitate the witness. 
See also 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2114(4), at 661 (noting that in such cases "putting in of 
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This sort of analysis, if applicable in an completeness cases, would 
substa..ntially reduce t..h.e need for a trumping function. Indeed, in many 
cases, even when the original incomplete evidence is offered as 
(admissible) hea.-say, a completing portion uttered by the same person on 
the same occasion need not be used by t.h.e opponent for a hea.-say 
purpose, since it can be used to attack the credibility of the declarant 
without endorsi..1g !he truth of the completing part .A_n exa..lflple is 
provided by ou:r hypothetical Case 3: Evidence that defendant said, "I 
killed him, as I would kill any invader from Mars." In such a case, the 
italicized :remainder impeaches the testimony lby undermining the 
declarant's credibility. Alternatively, the .remainder evidence may impeach 
the credibility of the witness by casting doubt on the accuracy of the .report 
of the hearsay declaration. Thus, the omission of !he words "may have" 
from hypothetical Case 2 ("I may have lulled hixn."), casts doubt on the 
·witness's report without necessa..rily crediting the omitted qualification. 
However, in the usual case, the .fuct of omission does not seriously impeach 
the testimony un.less the .remainder is taken as a credible qualification, in 
which case the hearsay status of the :remainder is manifest. Otherwise, its 
omission is actually a service to the tribunal, eliminating superfluous 
language, and does not adversely affect the credibility of the witness o.r the 
5·1 proponent. 
In a..ny event, as fue Rokus case illustrates, ilie completing evidence 
o:rdlnariJy is not lLvnited in such cases to credibility inferences~ The 
completeness response accepts arguendo the accruacy of the witness's 
report, as .fur as it goes, as in om hypothetical Case 4 and Case 5. The 
opponent invokes completeness lby way of saying, "If you are going to use 
what you claim to be my out-of-court statement, fo.r whatever purpose, then 
you must at least use the entire statement .relevant thereto." One might 
argue that this conditional hearsay use does not come within the hearsay 
prohibition, that the remainder is used me:rely l:o malte the original part 
"understood." 55 This appears to have been Wigmore's view, for 
example.56 Most subsequent commentary, however, has found this 
the exculpatory parts is justifiable equally on two principles," apparently meal""Jing verbal 
completeness and relevance to rehabilitation). 
54. Part III.CJ, infra, illustrates how Lhe Lrumping function is not limited to the hearsay 
rule. In most other contexts, there is not even an analogue of the nonhearsay use argument 
for admitting the remainder. 
55. A standard definition of hearsay is "an assertion by an out-of-court declarant, offered 
to prove the truth of the assertion." Carlson eta!., supra note 36, at 568. Cf Fed. R Evid. 
80l(c). One might try to say, for example, that such a definition does not include statements, 
or p;J.rts of st:ltements, that a party is forced by a.< opponent lo include. But there is no 
warrant in the usual language for such a construction. More importantly, all the hearsay 
dangers, concerning the memory, narrative ability, sincerity, and perception of the declarant, 
are as applicable to the remainder as to the incomplete portion originally offered, perhaps 
more so since the remainder will generally be self-serving. See grneraUy Edmund M. Morgan, 
Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Hmv. L. Rev. 177 ( 1948). 
56. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2113, at 659-60. Curiously, the exa;nple used by 
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argument unconvincing, and even Wigmore expressed doubts about it.57 
The present elaboration supports the latter View. To be sure, there is 
nothing improper or inconsist~nt in the opponent exercising the 
completeness option while yet arguing that the completed hearsay 
statement is inaccurate because, for example, it was given under duress or 
in ignorance of other fucts or even because the statement was wrongly 
attributed to the opponent. This would not mean that the remainder is 
used for some purpose other than establishing the truth thereof, but only 
that it is used for such a purpose argued in the alternative: "Don't believe 
the offered statement; but if you do, believe only the complete version of 
it." 58 
This analysis yields an important conclusion with respect to the 
relevance test Observe that the proponent's use of a party opponent's 
prior statements can be either substantive, insofar as the making of the 
Wigmore to support this view is a case in which the out-of-court statement was offered as a 
"verbal act," a statement that has direct legal significance without its being considered 
evidence of its own truth. See id. at 527 (discussing the Algernon Sidney seditious libel case 
and the use of incomplete statements allegedly constituting the offense). Such statements, 
offered by either side, are not within the hearsay prohibition at all. See, e.g., Aaberg v. 
Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n, 173 N:W. 708 (Minn. 1919) (rebuttal presentation of 
further terms of insurance contract; hearsay not discussed). Wigmore was certainly aware of 
this distinction; elsewhere he noted the admissibility of verbal acts beyond the range of the 
completeness doctrine. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2114(1). 
57. See Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 106.1, at 55 n.12 (2d ed. 
1986); McCormick, supra note 5, at 146 n.S. Wigmore's doubts are expressed in John H. 
Wigmore, A Student's Textbook of the Law of Evidence 322 (1935) (acknowledging that the 
nonhearsay theory rests on a distinction that is "an artificial doctrine tending to a quibble"). 
58. Florida's version of Federal Rule 106 emphasized this point by adding a caveat about 
the significance of the remainder: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an 
adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other 
writing or recorded statement which ought in :fuirness to be considered contempora-
neously. An adverse party is not bound by evidence introduced under this section. 
Fla. Evid. Code § 90.108 (emphasis supplied). Professor Graham argues that this caveat is 
misworded, that it should state, "The party required to introduce the evidence is not bound 
by its introduction." Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Florida Evidence§ 108.1, at 47 n.6 
(1987). And some cryptic legislative history supports that view. See Fla. Evid. Code § 90.108, 
Law Revision Council Note (Commentary on 1978 Amendment). Of course, Graham's caveat 
is correct as well, since neither party is "bound" by an admission of evidence that does not 
qualify as a 'Judicial" admission. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 262, at 776 (distinguishing 
evidential admissions from judicial admissions contained in pleadings or stipulations). Yet the 
caveat is more likely to be necessary to protect the opponent, since opinions differ on the 
question of whether a party's testimonial statements are binding on that party as judicial 
admissions, and this possibility could be extended to at least some out-of-court admissions. Id. 
§ 266 (describing three main approaches to the question and endorsing the view that no 
judicial admission should arise from a party's testimony). The caveat serves to emphasize that 
the remainder, though offered by the opponent, is not to be considered her judicial 
admission. In contrast, the proponent is already well protected by the nearly unanimous 
rejection of the old notion that a party is bound by the testimony of his witness. See Lilly, 
supra note 35, § 8.2, at 339 n.3; 3AJohn H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law§ 
897 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
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statement tends w prove its !Lruili (oilier than for a credibility purpose), or 
nonsubstantive, insofar as it impeaches the opponent's testi.rnony at trial, if 
a..ny. It can also be a hearsay or nonhearsay use, which is not the same 
distinction.59 The possibility of multiple pennissible inferences from the 
proponent's evidence :raises the question of whether the use of Lhe 
completing evidence should ibe limited to deflecting the inference 
explicitly argued by the proponent. In fact, an occasional judicial opinion 
seems to suggest that the use of the remainder is limited and admissible via 
completeness only if it qualifies or explains an inference argued by the 
proponent. For example, :if the incomplete portion :is used merely to 
impeach the opponent's testimony, then the proffered remainder is 
admissible, under this view, only if it connters the impeachment effect; it is 
not enough that the putative remainder qualifies a legitimate substantive 
inference that the uier of fact might permissibly draw from the original 
part6o 
However, Lhe better reasoned cases reject this limitation, since 
evidence admissible on either of tvm theories may be used by the t.-ier of 
fact for either or bo!Lh.61 Correction of the misleading impression may lbe 
59. The point, although often missed, is easily illustrated. Opponent's out-of-court 
adiP..issions c.1.n be used to prove tl::e tnJ.U~ tb.ereof (thus hearaay), which in turn is used to 
attack his credibility (thus, in one sense, nonsubstantive): For example, the opponent may 
have made an out-of-court admission of lying under oath. Conversely, the opponent's out-of-
court statement can be used t.o establish that the statement was made, irrespective of its truth 
(thus nonhearsay), which may itself be part of what the proponent must prove or probative 
thereof, such as a libel or contractual agreement (thus substantive). Thus, the substan-
tive/nonsubstantive distinction, as so understood, is not congruent to the hearsay/nonhearsay 
distinction. 
60. In People v. Ramos, 500 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), by a 3-2 decision, the 
appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction over a challenge to the trial court's 
refusal to admit the putative remainder of the defendant's statement The majority 
emphasized that the original portion was used solely for impeachment and the offered 
remainder did not show that the prior statement was consistent with Lhe defenda.11t's 
testimony, even though the remainder did tend to counteract a distinct substantive inference 
against defendant Id. at 66twi9. Significantly, the majority indicated its concern to preserve 
the jury's verdict by noting that the most likely substantive inference from the statement 
involved uncontested matters, id. at 669, and by adding that any error in rejecting the 
completeness motion would have been hai"Tnless. Id. at 670. The dissent thought the eJ>dusion 
was reversible error. I d. at 670-71. The decision was affirmed in a short memorandum opinion 
that unfortunately suggests the kind of narrow limitation on completeness criticized in the 
text. People v. Ramos, 512 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 1987) (holding completeness motion properly 
n:jected in absence of showing of relevance to rehabilitation by affecting understanding of 
prior inconsistent statement). 
61. See, e.g., Spani v. "Whitney, I 10 N.W.2d 103, 105-07 (Neb. 1 961) (applying common-law 
rebuttal rule to civil plaintiffs out-of-court written statements, specifically rejecting the 
defendant-proponent's argument that the use of the plaintiff's prior statement was solely for 
impeachment purposes); People v. Gallo, 186 N.E.2d 399, 400-01 (N.Y. 1962) (holding it error 
for trial court to deny admission of remainder of defendant's out-of-court statement, noting 
substantive admissibility of the statement despite prosecution's apparent impeachment use of 
the originally admitted part). The matter is different, of course, if the entire statement is 
substantively i7'.edmissibl-e en behalf of tlu: proponent SU? e.g., State v. Srnilh, 81 So. 320 (La. 
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necessary even if the proponent does not specifically argue the theory as to 
which fairness demands the remainder. Understandably, research has 
uncovered no case in which the propone:nt requested a limitation on the use 
of his evidence to only one of several legitimate purposes. 52 Only if such a 
restriction is requested by the proponent, allowed by the court, and made 
dear to the jury, should the completeness response be similarly limited.6g 
Thus, when the original incomplete statement may be used by the trier of 
fact for a hearsay purpose, completing statements made by the same 
person and satisfYing the relevance standard may, but need not, be used 
qua hearsay as well. The completeness doctrine assures the admissibility of 
the remainder for this purpose. 
But how it does so remains somewhat puzzling. One way to view the 
situation is that the proponent is thereby compelled to indude the entirety 
of the verbal event as the admission. The statement, as qualified by the 
remainder, is then available as substantive or nonsubstantive evidence, 
depending on how the original proffer may be used.64 If the original 
hearsay is admissible by virtue of the party opponent admissions exception, 
then ipso facto any such use of the remainder should also qualifY for the 
admissions exception since it is being offered by the proponent, in 
principle if not in practice. However, this conception is understandably 
difficult to accept, given the identity of the party demanding admission of 
the re-m:rindeL How can the opponent be seen to make use of the 
admissions exception to the hearsay rule in presenting her own out-of-
1919) (holding it error to deny defendant's rehabilitative completeness motion even though 
the whole of the statement was substantively inadmissible for the prosecution because of a 
failure to comply with statutory restrictions on confessions). 
62. Limitations as among multiple purposes are commonly imposed at the request of the 
party opponent when one of the purposes is impermissible. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 59. 
63. A further subtlety should be noted for jury cases: If the original part is inadmissible 
for one purpose but rightly admitted for another, without an appropriate limiting instruction, 
the remainder ought to be admissible to qualify the former use, since the jury will not know of 
the limitation. In other words, in a jury trial the remainder should be admissible to qualify 
any relevant use of the original part, unless the jury has been instructed that some particular 
use is prohibited. Unlike judges, one cannot rely on the premise that the jury will use 
evidence only for the purposes as to which it is technically admissible. Cf. id. § 60 (articulating 
appellate rule that the trial court in a bench trial is presumed to have relied only on 
admissible evidence in reaching its decision). 
64. A distinct question arises concerning which party may use the various parts of the 
completed statement as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. Since a party's 
admissions are not admissible for this purpose on behalf of that party, arguably they are not 
affirmative evidence for that party even when properly introduced by an adverse party. In the 
context of party admissions, however, it has long been settled that the self-serving parts of the 
complete statement, once admitted, can be used substantively to support the declarant party's 
case. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 4 F. Cas. 356 (C.C.D.RI. 1846) (No. 1,994); Bristol v. Warner, 
19 Conn. 7, 18-19 (1848}; Perkins v. Lane, 82 Va. 59, 60-62 (1886). See generally I Greenleaf, 
supra note 16, § 201 (concerning admissions},§ 218 (concerning confessions). For a modern 
case reaffirming the trier's freedom to accept substantively the exculpatory portions of the 
admission, see People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155, 1162 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that jury may 
reject exculpatory portion ifit·is contradicted or rendered improbable by other evidence). 
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court statementst5 Thus, the completeness doctrine sets to rest doubts 
about admissibility that arise from this special form of evidence 
presentation. In this sense, the comment made in the Rokus case and 
elsewhere, that the remainder comes in by way of "an independent 
exception to the rule against hearsay," 66 is somewhat misleading. 
Although the completeness doctrine provides independent authority for 
the substantive admission of hearsay, it's authority is inherently tied to, and 
derivative of, the existing hearsay exception. 67 
Alternatively, if we do not viewthe completeness idea as, in principle, 
forcing the proponent to present the whole of a statement, then we must 
instead view the responsive presentation of the remainder in the usual 
adversarial way, and the trumping effect must be more explicit The 
doctrinal force of completeness is then not simply a matter of removing 
doubts engendered by the more unusual procedural conception explained 
above. It must be premised ultimately on the claim that under certain 
circumstances the usual goals of the hearsay prohibition are muted or 
outweighed by the need for the responsive presentation of the remainder. 
Indeed, the risks of misleading inaccuracies usually associated with a 
party's presentation of her own out-of-court statements for the truth 
thereof, even when that party does not testifY, are overwhelmed by the 
likelihood of distortion accompanying the proponent's selective 
presentation of portions of the opponent's statement Moreover, that the 
proponent has already chosen to inject the statement into the trial of the 
issue assures the tribunal that the proponent has the wherewithal to 
challenge the opponent's version of the complete statement, an important 
check upon total fabrication of self-serving hearsay.68 One may reasonably 
65. Occasionally, this confusion causes misleading statements in judicial opinions. See, e.g., 
Black v. Nelson, 424 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Or. 1967) (rejecting a completeness argument for 
failure to meet the relevance te5t, but adding, "It is, moreover, as we have characterized it, a 
mere opinion, and, while an admission against interest in the form of an opinion is 
competent evidence against the declarant, [citations omitted], this is not true of a self-serving 
declaration, such as the statement in question"). It is unclear whether the quoted argument is 
intended as saying that the evidence is not admissible if the standards for completeness are 
not met, or as an independent reason to reject the remainder even though fulling within the 
reach of the completeness rule. One might try to avoid the confusion by thinking of the 
remainder as introduced by the court, albeit at the opponent's suggestion. See McCormick, 
supra note 5, § 8 (discussing court's authority to introduce evidence). However, it is doubtful 
that the remainder would thereby qualify for the party-opponent hearsay exception. See, e.g., 
id. § 262 (defining admissions as "words or acts of a party-opponent ... offered as evidence 
against him"). 
66. See supra note 48 and accompanying text 
67. Later we will generalize this observation by illustrating how the completeness doctrine 
is applicable in connection with inclusionary authority other than the hearsay exception for 
admissions of a party opponent See infra Part ill. C. 
68. See Roger Park, The Rationale of Personal Admissions, 21 Ind. L. Rev. 509, 514 
(1988). One might argue that trumping the hearsay rule is unnecessary in view of the 
opponent's opportunity to testify directly to the issues, one of the fuctors that seems to 
warrant the asymmetry in the admissions exception in the first place. See id. at 516-17. This 
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conclude, therefore, that in most cases the ultimate purposes of the 
hearsay prohibition are not served by the exclusion of the remainder. 
However the trumping function is conceived, it forms a crucial part of 
the common-law rebuttal rule. The test used to determine wholeness is 
critical, for the broader the standard, the more otheiWise inadmissible 
evidence is rendered admissible. Relatively expansive versions or 
applications of the standard may result from intuitions that the system 
would otheiWise- be too restrictive in its admission of hearsay, especially 
hearsay from a party declarant. This and other implications of trumping 
may depend on how the rebuttal rule is conceived, as between the two 
alternatives described above. Further attention will be given to this issue 
after we fill out the common-law pattern by examining the second 
common-law completeness rule. 
C. The Interruption Rule 
In some circumstances the opponent of the original proffer may insist 
that the completing portion of the utterance be presented together with 
the original proffer without waiting for the opponent's turn to present the 
remainder on cross-examination or even later.69 I will call the rule 
permitting this contemporaneous completion the interruption rule. An 
examination of this second part of the completeness doctrine entails a 
reconsideration of the timing and trumping functions already identified. It 
also involves the identification of a third function, that of achieving 
discovery of evidence, especially tangible evidence, in the hands of the 
proponent. This identification yields insights into the historical 
relationship of this aspect of the doctrine to the rebuttal rule discussed 
above. 
1. Timing and Trumping Functions Revisited 
The interruption rule not only allows overriding some admissibility 
rules which would otheiWise hinder the opponent's response, but also 
allows the opponent to modifY the normal sequence of presenting 
evidence by interrupting the proponent's chosen proffer.70 This is done 
in the interest of presenting the trier of fact the more complete evidentiary 
package in a more understandable way. Contemporaneous completion 
opportunity, however, will often be inadequate, since a trier of fact ignorant of the true tenor 
of the hearsay is likely to discount the in-court, self-serving testimony in fuvor of the out-of-
court, adverse admission. See supra note 49. 
69. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, §§ 2097-11. 
70. See, e.g., Cody v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 535 So. 2d 82, 85-86 (Ala. 1988) 
(applying common-law completeness rule to answers to interrogatories); State v. Mallar, 508 
A2d 1070, 1071-72 (N.H. 1986) (applying common-law completeness rule to out-of-court 
statement of nontestifying witness); People v. Gallo, 186 N.E.2d 399, 400-01 (N.Y. 1962) 
(applying common-law completeness rule to criminal defendant's out-of-court statement to 
allow apparently contemporaneous completion). 
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avoids an inconvenient and potentiallly pe:tnicious gap in time between the 
presentation of the incomplete part and the presentation of the 
remainder. Thus, Lhe interruption rule operates essentially as an 
accelerated rebuttal. 
As described, the intenuption rule requires that the remainder "be 
presented" contempora.neously. This phrasing is deliberately ambiguous 
regarding which party is to do the presenting. The answer to this question is 
important, both in theory and in practice, though the variety of trial 
situations requires the flexibility to use both procedures. 
AB for practice, the opponent surely knows better w:h.irh additional 
portions she thinks need to be introduced, but if the opponent presents 
the remainder then a significant disruption of the proponent's control 
ove.r ilie presentation of his case will .result. This consequence argues for 
allowing the proponent to do Lhe contemporaneous presenting designau.ed 
by the opponent and required by the court. Indeed, the common-law 
h1terruption rule typically takes the form of requiring the proponent to 
present the remainder, at least if the opponent validly insists on 
completeness.71 
As fo.r theory, requiring the proponent to present th.e remainder has 
the advantage of obviating the trumping function, since the hearsay rule 
would not bar the proponent's presentation of the complete version of the 
opponent's admission. F.~plidtly forcing the proponent to introduce L.lJ.e 
remainder, on pain of losing the admission entirely, thus confrrms a 
conception of the trumping function that allows the opponent to piggy-
bade. on the indusi.onary authority utilized by the proponent i.n the first 
instance. What is essentially inclusionary in function takes on a conditional 
l . c 7" exc uswnary ~arm. -
71. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2095. Since, as already noted, Wigmore distinguished 
the completeness doctrine from timing issues, he ignored the possibility of contemporaneous 
completion by the opponent's presentation of the remainder. He would view this as merely a 
sequencing issue under the rules governing such, provided the opponent has the right to 
present the l-emainder at a later time under what we have called the rebuttal rule. Wigmore 
did not specifically address LlJis issue, however, and appears to have assumed that any 
presentation by the opponent will be done on cross or later. Thus, for Wigmore the 
interruption rule is coextensive with the requirement that the proponent introduce the whole 
of the verbal event, whereas the rebuttal rule is coextensive with the option of the opponent 
to introduce the remainder, regardless of when that occurs. !d. My distinction between the 
rebuttal rule and Lhe interruption rule does not, Lherefore, correspond precisely to Wigmore's 
distinction between "optional" and "mandatory" completeness. My reformulation both allows 
for the expanded range of options empirically encountered and facilitates comparison of the 
common law with the fede.-al rule. 
72. Wigmore obsen~ed that the exclusionary rule is conditional. 7 Wigmore, supra note 
10, § 2095(1), at 607 (referring to the proponent being "met by the objection that he can 
offer no part unless he offers the whole"). It is unclear, however, whether exclusion is 
necessarily the remedy in case the proponent refuses to introduce the whole. Not surprisingly, 
no case has been discovered in which the proponent, after introducing the incomplete 
statement and being met by a completeness objection, has tried to withdraw Lhe original 
proffer, so it is difficult to say whether trial courts have been thought to have the authority to 
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Clearly, the interruption rule has practical significance quite apart 
from overriding otherwise applicable exclusionary rules. Being able to 
interrupt the proponent's presentation and insist on contemporaneous 
completion is itself significant. Indeed, cases arise in which the completing 
evidence is otherwise admissible on behalf of the opponent, the 
completeness rule being invoked in aid of the opponent's demand that the 
completing portion come in simultaneously with the original proffer.7s 
While the trial judge's discretionary control over timing of evidence 
presentation should be adequate to achieve this result without the need of 
a distinct completeness doctrine in cases where the opponent will present 
the remainder, it would be a hard stretch to say that such authority could 
require contemporaneous presentation by the proponent. Even an opponent's 
contemporaneous presentation is a sufficiently dramatic alteration of the 
ordinary process of proof, entailing a serious curtailment of the 
proponent's ordinary control of his case, that it is not surprising for the 
effect in question to be sanctioned by a distinct doctrine.74 Practically 
speaking, one cannot say that the interruption rule is unnecessary as a 
distinct rule without the potential to override otherwise applicable 
exclusionary rules. Nevertheless, the functions of timing and trumping are 
sometimes conjoined in common-law cases, as well as cases arising under 
codifications pre-dating the Federal Rules of Evidence.75 
The important limitation on the common-law interruption rule arises 
because of the difficulty of forcing a possibly hostile witness to recount 
portions of an event or transaction without the benefit of extensive cross-
examination. There is also the possibility that a complete oral rendition of 
an out-of-court document or conversation might require several witnesses. 
These possibilities threaten to undermine the ability of the proponent to 
put on an organized, coherent case and present strategic opportunities for 
the opponent to exercise contemporaneous completion to precisely that 
end. Consequently, it is understandable that the interruption rule is less 
liberally invoked by common-law courts than the rebuttal rule. In 
particular, the former is generally applied only to incomplete proffers of 
writings or other tangible verbal records, the context of which keeps the 
interruption to manageable proportions.76 
order the presentation of the whole or pursue some other nonexclusionary response to the 
situation. 
73. Typical cases involve jural act documents such as deeds, wills, and contracts, offered 
either as dispositive of the legal issue or as evidence relating to disputed factual issues. See, 
e.g., In re Brown's Estate, 15 P.2d 605, 610 (Idaho 1932) (holding that trial court properly 
required all of will to be admitted); In re Mann's Estate, 189 N.W. 991, 996 (Mich. 1922) 
(same). 
74. See generally 6 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1882 
(Chadbourn rev. 1976) (describing general practice that rejects the idea of an opponent 
interrupting the proponent's direct examination of a witness). 
75. See cases cited supra note 70. 
76. See, e.g., the cases cited supra notes 70 and 73. See generally 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, 
§§ 2099-2100 (reporting that the interruption rule is not generally applied to incomplete 
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This correlation of the interruption rule wifu .,,vritings must be 
distinguished from the usual limitation of the :rebuttal rule to verbal 
events, events which may be either oral or written. ln the context of the 
rebuttal rule, the limitation concerns the nature of the event being 
evidenced, not the fonn of the evidence employed. The additional 
liwitation on i.nterruption, on the other ha.."1d, concerns the form of the 
evidence offered in court. Presentations that mix documents with 
testimony present the hard cases. For example, an incomplete testimonial 
account of the contents of a document not presented in court will 
ordinarily permit invocation of the rebuttal rule, not the interruption rule, 
even though the constriction of scope inherent in the :reference to a 
document serves to limit the extent of the interruption more so than if the 
underlying verbal event we:re conversational.77 Certainly, in such cases the 
proponent should not be subject to a conditional exclusion that forces him 
to examine the witness so as to introduce the remainder. The opponent 
may introduce the completing portion on cross-examination. or later, and 
in some cases contemporaneously, a presentation nnencumbe.red by many 
exdusiona..--y rules that might otherwise apply.78 
OLher factors ente:r into the decision whethe.r to m:mdate the 
testimonial proffers); §§ 2102-04 (reporting that interruption rule is often applied to 
documentary evidence). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4) ("If only part of a deposition is 
offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require him to introduce any other part 
which ought in fairness to be considered with the part introduced, and any party may 
introduce any other parts."); Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(e) ("If only part of a deposition is offered in 
evidence by a party, and adverse party may require him to offer all of it which is relevant to 
the part offered and any party may offer other parts."). Of the many versions of the Federal 
Rules adopted by the states, this pattern is most clearly codified under Texas law. See Tex. R. 
Grim. Evid. 106 (codifying interruption rule for writings or recorded statements as evidence); 
Tex. R. Grim. Evid. 107 (codifying rebuttal rule for both written and oral evidence of 
statements); Tex. R Civ. Evid. 106 (codifying interruption rule for writings and recorded 
statements as evidence); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 106 advisory committee's note (indicating retention 
of rebuttal rule for both written and oral evidence of statements). 
77. Understandably, Wigmore notes some significant judicial divergence from the 
conclusion stated above in the context of verbal act documents, such as contracts, wills, and 
deeds. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, §§ 2105-07. The divergence may be explained in part by 
the tendency in such rulings to conflate admissibility questions with sufficiency questions. 
78. Although the so-called "best evidence" rule generally requires the use of the 
document to prove its contents, the posited example could arise in situations where the use of 
the document is excused. See McCormick, supra note 5, §§ 237-40. How a completeness rule 
could be needed to authorize rebuttal in such cases is explained infra, in Part Ill. C. Moreover, 
documents are often introduced only by being read by an authenticating witness, and even 
here the oral nature of the use may be considered adequate reason to deny interruption, 
leaving the opponent to subsequent rebuttal. In most cases, however, the better rule would be 
to allow interruption, provided the remainder passes the relevance test Compare People v. 
Gallo, 186 N.E.2d 399, 400-01 (N.Y. 1962) (holding that trial court improperly denied defense 
counsel's request to read rem<llnder contemporaneously, after stenographer read into record 
selected parts of defendant's pre-trial statement), with People v. Perry, 499 P.2d 129, 148-49 
(Cal. 1972) (affirming a ruling limiting rebuttal under relevance standard, after trial court 
had denied interruption in favor of opportunity for rebuttal on cross-e.xa.lTiination afte;r part of 
a written statement had been used to impeach a witness). 
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proponent's presentation of the whole or to allow only responsive 
introduction by the opponent If a document or other recording is cut into 
fragments and presented in such a redacted form, the opponent's 
presentation of the remainder in complementary redacted form would be 
very inconvenient for the trier of fact, who would have to try to piece the 
record back together. The opponent's responsive presentation of an 
integrated document, which would certainly be allowed if the completing 
portions satisfY the relevance standard for the rebuttal rule, would warrant 
exclusion of the proponent's redacted version simply on grounds of being 
confusing and unduly cumulative. To avoid the confusion and waste of 
time inherent in first admitting and then excluding the redacted version, 
admission of the proponent's offer of the redacted version may, in 
anticipation of the completing response, be conditioned on the 
simultaneous "introduction of the remainder. And absent a dispute about 
the authenticity of the remainder, the court may insist on simultaneous 
introduction in an integrated fonn.79 
A fairly dear picture emerges from these observations. In most 
contexts, the interruption rule is rightly seen as subsidiary to the rebuttal 
rule. The significance of the completeness doctrine rests primarily on the 
trumping function. The interruption rule comes into play only in the 
relatively unusual cases when delayed completion is considered inadequate 
and simultaneous completion is considered practicable, primarily cases 
-involving tangible records of statements. In such cases, the trumping 
function carries over to contemporaneous completion.80 Of course, the 
79. In a case of serious dispute over the authenticity of the putative remainder, the court 
obviously should not compel an integrated presentation by the proponent; to do so would risk 
confusion by suggesting to the trier of fact that the proponent does not challenge the 
remainder's authenticity. In such cases, the better practice is to relinquish the opponent to 
the usual responsive presentation, possibly assisted by the trumping function of the rebuttal 
rule. Only rarely do the reported cases shed any light on this issue, since the overwhelming 
majority of such cases involve remainders that are undeniably as genuine as the part 
introduced by the proponent. Cf. McBrayer v. Walker, 50 S.E. 95 (Ga. 1905) (holding that 
opponent can, without further authentication, introduce and rely on entries made on the 
back of a deed introduced by proponent, when the entries on the back purport to reveal that 
the deed on the front was given as security for a usurious loan). 
80. Wigmore's presentation is organized temporally: He addresses interruption first 
because that is the first issue that will come up in the litigation process. Only if the proponent 
chooses, or cannot avoid, presenting evidence in a misleadingly incomplete form, and the 
opponent is unable or unwilling to invoke the interruption rule, does the question of delayed 
rebuttal arise as a strategic option. That Wigmore's sequencing of the discussion does not 
reflect any sense of the relative importance of the two rules in the modem common-law is 
confirmed by his report that the rebuttal rule is more clearly and predictably established. 7 
Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2095, at 607 (noting that interruption rule is "the stricter effect of 
the principle, and indeed is not enforced invariably or for all classes of utterances"). 
Wigmore's view of the relationship between the two branches of the doctrine is summarized 
as follows: 
It has been seen, in the foregoing sections, that there is much opportunity for 
difference of opinion whether the proponent in the first instance must put in the 
whole. But there is and could be no difference of opinion as the opponent's righ~ if a 
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trial court's choice about whether to mandate contemporaneous 
completion, even in the case of tangible proffers, will rarely be reversible 
since the opponent retains the option to make a completing presentation 
under the rebuttal rule.81 
2. The Discovery ~<i'unction Disinterred 
The foregoing analysis of the modem completeness doctrine does not 
fully reflect its historical development. In order to see why, one must 
consider the profound changes in procedural rules that have occurred 
since the doctrine first emerged. 
In early English crim1nal trials there were severe limitations on the 
defense's ability to present evidence at all. 82 In such a context, it is not 
surprising that the completeness principle would be invoked in tenns of 
controlling or modifYing the evidence presented by the prosecution, rather 
than in terms of the defense presenting completing evidence.83 Even in 
Llle seventeenth century, as defend~nts began to can their own witnesses 
and cross-examine prosecution witnesses, there still was no glimmer of 
discovery :rights.8·1 This remained true thwugh the development of truly 
adve:rsarial procedures i.Il lhe eighteenth century.85 Sh-ni1arly, although 
part oniy has been put in, himself to put in the remainder. Indeed it is the very fact of 
this later opportunity and right which (as already seen) has frequent bearing upon 
the question whether it is worth while to require it from the proponent in the first 
instance. 
I d. § 21 13, at 653. 
81. The discretion of the trial court in this regard is routinely emphasized. See, e.g., 
Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Adams, 86 So. 737, 742-43 (Ala. 1920) (affirming trial court's 
rejection of interruption in favor of rebuttal presentation of completing portions of insurance 
contract). See generally 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2099, at 618 (concerning discretion in 
regard to testimonial evidence), a..11d § 2102, at 630 (concerning discretion in regard to 
documentary evidence). More specifically, a trial court's judgment about conditional 
exclusion will be virtually immune from challenge on appeal. lf the court denies the 
opponent's motion for conditional exclusion, the opponent will still have a completing 
response and it will be very hard to show that any error was prejudicial. Conversely, if the 
court grants such a motion, the proponent will likely introduce the whole, in which case the 
proponent will have a hard time showing prejudice in view of the fact that the opponent would 
have had an opportunity to present the whole on rebuttal anyway. (Of course, the matter is 
entirely different if the proponent's claim is that the remainder does not satisfy the relevance 
standard applicable to both rebuttal and interruption.) 
82. In the sixteenth century, "The defendant was not allowed to call witnesses, conduct 
any real cross-examination, or develop an affirmative case." Stephan Landsman, Readings on 
Adversarial ] ustice: The Arneri can Approach to Adjudication 13 ( 1988). 
83. See, e.g., Algernon Sidney's Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 818 (KB. 1683), in which the 
defendant complained of selective reading from documents seized by the prosecution and 
claimed to be treasonous. Id. at 853-54. The Sidney case also illustrates an argument in the 
alternative, since Sidney argued that the documents were not authored by him and, in any 
event, were not treasonous if taicen in their entirety. Id. at 878, 905. 
S".L See generalry John H. Lat"Jgbein, The Criminai Triai Before the Lawyers, 45 U. C.'li. L. 
Rev. 263 (1978). 
85. See generally Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary 
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there had long been greater opportunities for each side in a civil case to 
present evidence, there was no broadly effective system of discovery by 
which the opponent could obtain evidence in the proponent's possession 
to use in subsequent rebuttal.86 Again, in such procedural contexts, the 
conditional exclusionary form of the interruption rule would obviously 
retain considerable importance; especially as to incomplete documentary 
evidence, which cannot be cross-examined by the opponent to elicit the 
completing portions.87 
Thus, until at least the mid-nineteenth century, when civil discovery of 
documents began to expand considerably, and even later in criminal 
cases, 
88 
an important function of the completeness rule was to effectuate 
discovery and presentation of documents introduced only in part by one's 
adversary. Once again, it was a conditional form of discovery, since the 
proponent could avoid it by not introducing even part of the document. 
The rule nonetheless served as an important check on the defects of a 
system lacking discovery and presentation rights as we know them.89 On 
the other hand, the development of the exclusionary rules, along with the 
emergence of adversarial procedures in the eighteenth century, 
increasingly presented occasions for cross-examination of witnesses and 
admission of completing parts of documents that would run afoul of such 
rules were it not for trumping.90 Hence, during this period, the trumping 
function emerged alongside the discovery function as of central 
Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 497, 506 (1990); John H. 
Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 
U. Chi. L Rev. 1 (1983). 
86. See, e.g., Hill v. Aland, 91 Eng. Rep. 192 (K.B. 1707) (stating that when the writing in 
one party's possession is evidence only, and not the basis of the action, the other party cannot 
demand a copy); Attorney-General v. Coventry, Bunb. 290, 145 Eng. Rep. 677 (Ex. Cb. 1730) 
(same). See generally Fleming James, Jr .. et al., Civil Procedure §§ 5.1, 5.2 (4th ed. 1992). 
87. See, e.g., Read v. Hide, Coke's Third Institute 173-74 (1613): 
It was resolved that no exemplification ought to be of any part of a Letters Patents, 
or of any other Record, or of the inrolment thereof, but the whole Record or the 
inrolment thereof ought to be exemplified, so that the whole truth may appeare, 
and not of such part, as makes for the one party, and nothing that make against 
him, or that manifesteth the truth. 
88. See generaUy 6 Wigmore, supra note 74, §§ 1859-60 (discussing development of duty to 
produce documents before trial). 
89. With regard to testimonial evidence, the absence of the right to depose witnesses 
could inhibit the opponent's ability to know of a completing portion of the utterance in 
question. However, this would be of relatively little moment in the most common 
completeness context, that of proponent's incomplete presentation of the opponent's own 
admissions. A more significant problem arose from the fact that as late as the end of the 
eighteenth century a criminal defendant's witneSses could not testify under oath. See 
Landsman, supra note 85, at 498-99, 506. Consequently, testimony as to the remainder of a 
defendant's out-of-court statement could be much more valuable coming from the 
prosecution's witness than from a witness offered by the accused. 
90. See Landsman, supra note 85, at 564-72 (discussing emergence of hearsay rule during 
eighteenth century). See also 5 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1364 
(Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
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importa..D.ce in the completeness doctrine.91 
Of course, the situation is radically different today. AH parties have 
Lhe right to present evidence not excluded by some particular rule.92 
Discovery, especially discovery of tangible evidence m:.e documeni:s, is the 
norm in boLh civil and criminal cases.93 To be sure, even under modern 
discovery regimes, occasions will arise in which the opponent has no access 
to i:he full text of a document and will, therefore, be unable to utilize 
delayed rebuttal of a misleadingly incomplete proffer.94 One still 
encounters an occasional case in which the completeness doctrine is 
invoiced in aid of a requirement that the proponent not use part of a 
document when the whole is neither admitted nor made available to the 
opponent for possible rebuttal.95 Nevertheless, it is dear that the rationale 
behind the completeness nues has shifted substantially away from the 
discovery function toward a mix of the timing and trumping functions. As 
it did, invocation of i.he completeness doctrine shifted its emphasis from 
91. The need for trumping was especially pronounced in regard to reports of out-of-court 
statements of a party opponent, for until the mid-nineteenth century parties were 
incompetent to testify under oath, thus dramatically limiting their ability to provide even the 
substance of the remainder by their own in-court assertions, mucb less by testifying to the 
remainder of the out-of-court statement See also 2 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law § 577 (discussing the abolition of disqualification of civil parties), § 579 
(discussing the abolition of disqualification of accused .in crimina! cases) (Chadbourn rev. 
1979). See generally Joel N. Bodansky, The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualification: An 
Historical Survey, 70 Ky. LJ. 91 (1981-82). 
92. Indeedl the right has constitutional dimensions in criminal cases, and perl--~ps in civil 
cases as well. See generally Edward ]. Imwinkelried, The Case for Recognizing a New 
Constitutional Entitlement: The Right to Present Favorable Evidence in Civil Cases, 1990 Utah 
L. Rev. 1 (contrasting constitutional right in criminal and civil cases). 
93. See, e.g., Fed. R Civ. P. 34; Fed. R Crim. P. 16. Failure of the prosecution to divulge 
the remainder of a document, proffered in part at trial by the prosecution, should violate the 
prosecution's constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. See generaUy Charles H. 
Whitebread & Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure §§ 24.02-.06 (2d ed. 1986). 
Conversely, discovery of documents in the possession of a defendant does not violate the 
defendant's constitutionai privilege against self-incrimination unless the document records tbe 
defendant's own statements. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). Although 
discovery only means being able to inspect and malce a copy of the document in question, the 
subsequent admission of a part of tbe document by its possessor is subject to responsive 
introduction of tbe copy of tbe remainder since the opponent's compliance with the original 
document rule is excused, provided the opponent gives notice to Lhe proponent to produce 
the whole of the original at trial. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 239. 
94. Cj Edward W. Cleary Be John W. Strong, The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in 
Context, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 825, 837-45 (1966) (discussing limitations on discovery mechanisms 
that may warrant an original document rule). 
95. See, e.g., Arthur v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Ky. 1957) (holding it error 
for prosecutor to malce reference to written confession that prosecutor refuses to malce 
available to defense); Elyv. State, 141 S.W.2d 626,628-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940) (suggesting 
error for a party to make use of an alleged admission for impeachment purposes without 
making the whole of the statement available to the opponent for a possible completeness 
motion). Of course, restrictions long imposed on the use of prior statements of a witness for 
impeachment purposes entail malcing available to tbe opposing side tbe substance of the prior 
statement See generaUy McCormiclc, supra note 5, § 37. 
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the interruption rule to the rebuttal rule.96 
D. "Wholeness" Contextualized 
The foregoing elucidation .of the common-law completeness doctrine 
emphasizes the relative doctrinal importance of the rebuttal and 
interruption rules. But it also shows that the subject can be analyzed from 
an orthogonal direction. Instead of focusing on the two branches of the 
doctrine, as did Wigmore, one can organize one's thought according to 
the three doctrinally distinct functions involved. In order of importance, 
they are: first, the overriding of otherwise applicable exclusionary rules 
(the trumping function); second, the overriding of otherwise· applicable 
rules on the order of presentation of the completing evidence (the timing 
function); and third, the overriding of otherwise applicable limitations on 
a party's power to obtain evidence from an adversary (the discovery 
function). Each of the first two functions is present to some extent in each 
branch of the common-law rule, but neither is involved in every application 
of the completeness doctrine. The third function inheres almost entirely in 
the exclusionary form of the interruption rule, and its significance has 
been eclipsed by the expansion of discovery rights. 
One consequence of this isolation of function is the opportunity to 
examine the question of whether the concept of "wholeness" is function-
dependent. In: other words, the meaning of wholeness and the boundaries 
of ihe verbal utterance in question may depend upon which function is in 
play. These ramifications cannot be exhaustively explored here, but a few 
important examples should be noted. 
First, observe that as between the two most important modem 
functions, trumping and timing, there is reason to expect a divergence in 
their respective tests for wholeness. When trumping is at stake, the courts 
should determine the whole with reference to the legitimate goals of the 
exclusionary rules. When only timing is implicated, the courts should shift 
the focus to the goals served by regulating the sequence of evidentiary 
presentations. As has already been shown, the added significance of the 
timing function constricts the range of the completeness doctrine under the 
interruption rule. By limiting interruption to tangible proffers, the 
determination of wholeness is rendered less problematic in a context 
where that kind of simplicity is important In a different way, the 
interruption rule may employ a more expanded concept of wholeness when 
the trumping function is not in issue than when it is. If the efficacy of 
otherwise applicable exclusionary rules is not at stake, the concept of 
wholeness can be extended to embrace related tangible things with little 
adverse effect. Application of the interruption rule may then involve a 
96. Interestingly, Wigmore made no reference to the discovery function or its 
attenuation. However, he does rightly suggest that a consideration in deciding whether to 
invoke the exclusionary form of the completeness rule is the relative availability of the 
document to the parties. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2095(3). 
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concept of wholeness more inclusive than even the pre-analytic concept of 
a single verbal utterance.97 
But when trumping is in issue, the cow-ts have gravitated toward some 
version of the relatively narrow, post-analytic relevance test discussed 
earlier.96 Such a limitation must be imposed, lest the admission of a single 
out-of-court statement by a declarant render admissible all out-of-court 
statements by that person about the subject matter of the suit or about 
some aspect of it, a result that would substantially modify the hearsay rule. 
If a declarant has made several distinct statements, prevailing practice 
allows the pwponenll: to pid( among those which are subsi:antively 
admissible, even if the opponent cannot use the others, as in the case of 
the opponent's out-of-court assertions. The completeness doctrine modifies 
this practice only to Lhe e..xtent of insisting that those statements selected 
by the proponent are more accurately portrayed. 
1. The Embedded Utterance Problem 
These themes are nicely illustrated by the decision in Gencarella v. 
Fyfe.99 In this automobile accident case, the plaintiff examined a police 
officer with respect to his ·written investigation report, as a prelude to 
offering the report i.J.to evidence. The plaintiff attempted to isolate those 
parts of the report that were based on the officer's personal observations 
from those parts reporting the statements of witnesses. The defendant 
objected, asserting on the basis of the completeness principle that tl1e 
entire report should come in if any part of it did, and the trial court 
agreed. 100 The report was apparently introduced, and the defendant 
subsequently examined the officer, as wen as the defendant himself, with 
regard to witness statements contained therein. The defendant thus 
successfully invoked at trial what has here been called the intenuption 
rule, and ultimately recovered a favorable judgment 
On appeal, however, the First Circuit reversed the judgment, 
conducting that the completeness doct..-ine had been improperly applied. 
The fat--niliar limitation on hearsay exceptions for police reports, which 
admits records of the officer's personal observations but not of witness 
statements recorded in the report, meant that the plaintiff was pursuing a 
legitimate it-.quiry as foundation to admitting parts of the report The 
doctrine of completeness did not ovenide the othenvise applicable 
limitation because the reported statements were "severable" from the 
record of the officer's personal observations and had "no bearing to 
97. A common example is the application of the interruption rule to reply letters in a 
correspondence, when the proponent offers one letter thereof without offering the letter to 
which it replies. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2104, at 634-35. 
98. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text. 
99. 171 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1948). 
100. I d. at 421-22. 
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explain or qualify'' the latter.101 
This result is interesting in that the putative remainder very likely did 
qualify inferences to be drawn from the admissible parts.102 But unless we 
are to have a rule that police reports are either admissible in their entirety 
or not at all, it must sometimes -be possible to separate admissible portions 
from inadmissible portions and admit only the former. The sensible 
solution the court reached was to rule the two aspects of the report 
"severable," which is to say that the wholeness test is not satisfied as to the 
otherwise iruidmissible statements recorded in the report. Thus emerges a 
subsidiary wholeness principle to the effect that no "imbedded utterance" 
is embraced within the whole if no part of that embedded utterance (and, 
presumably, no misleading reference to it) is admitted by the proponent in 
the first instance.105 Yet, were the trumping function not at issue here, 
there would be no need to invoke this limiting- principle, and the entire 
report-including reported witness statements-could properly be 
considered the relevant whole and required to be presented under the 
interruption rule, at least if that would not seriously interrupt the 
' . f "d 104 proponent s sequenang o eVI ence. 
2. The Source Limitation Issue 
An even more important example of divergence in wholeness 
concepts concerns the issue of whether wholeness is measured not only 
with reference to the utterance in question, but also in reference to the 
source through which it is evidenced. The paradigm of trumping that 
appears repeatedly in the common-law cases is the offer of a remainder 
through the same witness or document utilized by the proponent in the first 
instance. Conversely, the paradigm in which trumping is not allowed is the 
attempt of the opponent to introduce a contradictory version of the 
utterance from a different evidentiary source.105 But what if the 
101. Id. at 422-23. 
102. At least portions of the remainder consisted of reports of the defendant's statement 
to the investigating officer, statements that would have been admissible for the plaintiff had 
the plaintiff chosen to offer them. Significantly, this is the very part of the remainder that the 
defendant most wanted to introduce, and did. See id. at 422. 
I 03. Compare this result with the Rdms case, by which the trumping function was first 
illustrated, supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. There, the proponent introduced part 
of the opponent's out-of.court statement by the testimony of the investigating officer; the 
same trumping would have occurred had the vehicle for presenting part of the statement 
been a written accident report that would be admissible, at the first level of hearsay as a 
business record or prior recollection recorded, and at the second level as an admission of a 
party opponent. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 324.3. 
104. Imagine, for example, that the only witness statement contained in the report was 
admissible at the second level of hearsay under some exception available to both parties, such 
as the excited utterance or dying declaration exception. See McCormick, supra note 5, §§ 297, 
283. 
105. However, the conventional understanding in such a case is that the opponent can still 
introduce the contradictory account through the second source for the limited purposes of 
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opponent's distinct source provides a further portion of the utterance, thus 
reporting a version that is consistent with, but more inclusive than, the 
proponent's account? This looks like "completeness" in terms of the words 
of the utterance itself, but it involves a different evidentiary source. How 
then should the issue of trumping be decided? 
A possible clue to the resolution of this issue comes from the 
wholeness concept applicable under the discovery function, out of which 
the modem completeness doctrine has evolved. For in terms of discovery, 
the completeness rule covered only the proponent's particular evidentiary 
source, or rather the particular version of the utterance derived from that 
source. The completeness doctrine in effect protected the right to cross-
examine the proponent's c_hosen witness with regard to the remainder of 
the utterance; and it mandated that the whole of the proponent's chosen 
documentary evidence be revealed to the, opponent and the court If this 
inherent source restriction is applicable to the trumping function, that 
constitutes a significant limitation on the reach of trumping. On the other 
hand, it has just been demonstrated that the wholeness concept applicable 
to one function may not necessarily be right for another. 106 
The case law on this facet of the trumping function is surprisingly 
meager. The vast majority of trumping cases involve remainders elicited 
from the proponent's source, by cross-examining the proponent's witness 
or by introducing, or demanding the introduction of, the remainder of the 
document upon which the proponent has relied. This suggests at least a 
tacit convention that the trumping function is subject to a same-source 
limitation. On the other hand, no decision has been found explicitly 
imposing such a restriction on trumping. And in at least one reported 
appeal where the question of trumping from a distinct evidential source is 
seriously implicated, the decision confirms the applicability of the 
completeness doctrine. 
In People v. Williams/07 the defendant made video-taped statements 
to police officers in investigative interviews. The officers testified at trial 
about the defendant's admissions and were subject to cross-examination 
using transcripts of the taped statements. The defendant subsequently 
attempted to introduce the tapes to be played for the jury, but they were 
impeaching the proponent's account See, e.g., United States v. Bourne, 743 F.2d 1026, 1032 
(4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a "best evidence" argument for excluding an oral report of 
defendant's confession in fuvor of a tape recording, but indicating that the tape could be 
used by the defense to impeach the prosecution's witness if the two accounts were at 
variance); State v. Worthy, 123 S.E.2d 835, 841-42 (S.C. 1962) (articulating same distinction). 
106. In particular, it is clear that a same-!lource limitation is not applicable to determina-
tions solely concerned with the timing function. Frequently, these determinations concern 
whether one letter in a correspondence should be coupled with another going in the opposite 
direction and, therefore, certainly constituting a different evidentiary source. Admission of 
one is sometimes conditioned .on admission of the other pursuant to the interruption rule. See 
7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2104, at 634-35. 
107. 487 N.E.2d 613 (Ill. 1985). 
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excluded by the trial court primarily on the grounds that playing the tapes 
would be cumulative and possibly confusing to the jurors, in view of an 
extensive direct and cross-examination of the officers.108 The defendant 
appealed his conviction, and -the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed. The 
high court identified two sources of incompleteness: (1) possibly s!gnificant 
verbal · parts of the out-of-court statements omitted in the officers' 
testimony, 109 and (2) inflections and other speech characteristics lost by 
testimonial recounting of the confession.no Exclusion of the tapes was 
held error under the rule of completeness, with the following clarifications 
on the source issue: 
To comply with this "rule of completeness," the trial court should 
have allowed all that the defendant said, which pertained to the 
events at issue, to be placed before the jury through cross-
examination of the officers or through defendant's own witnesses . ... 
In the instant case, defense counsel was not restricted in his cross-
examination of Officers Moss and Strohm. In fact, utilizing a 
transcript of the tapes, he extensively cross-examined both 
officers. However, we do not believe that a defendant is limited in his 
right to oral cross-examination regarding a conversation. When one 
party offers oral testimony regarding a conversation, a tape 
recording of that conversation may have independent relevance. 
Demonstrative evidence may be dearer and more persuasive that 
oral testimony covering exactly the same points, . . . Since the 
veracity of the statements was dearly in issue, the defendant's 
demeanor and voice inflections, as recorded on the tapes, was 
[sic] relevant wholly independent of the actual words spoken.m 
To be sure, this is only one decision, and there are several avenues by 
which one might attempt to explain it away.112 Moreover, the choice to 
I 08. Id. at 6I6. The hearsay rule was apparently not considered by the trial court, 
presumably because it was thought that some portions of the tapes could be used to impeach 
the officer's testimony without violating the hearsay rule, just as the transcripts had been used. 
I 09. The court noted that on several occasions the officer "could not remember or was 
unsure of statements made by the defendant." Id. at 617. 
IIO. The reasonable extension of the rule of completeness to nonverbal aspects of verbal 
events explains why the hearsay rule would constitute no bar to the substantive use of the 
tapes apparently contemplated by the court's opinion. At least some of the nonverbal aspects 
of the statements would otherwise be precluded by the application of the hearsay rule to 
assertive conduct. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 250, at 736-37. 
111. Id. at 616-17 (emphasis supplied). The court's reference to demonstrative evidence 
was no doubt an analogy; the tapes were not offered as demonstrative evidence in this case. 
112. One might try to construe the decision as simply using the notion of completeness to 
support the high court's reversal of the trial court's "cumulative and confusing" judgment. To . 
that extent, the extension of the trumping function would not really be at issue. Cj supra 
notes 32-33 and accompanying text. However, in view of the rule that a trial court's exclusion 
of evidence should be sustained on appeal on any proper ground that might have been used 
by the trial court, see McCormick, supra note 5, § 52, at 131, the appellate court should be 
seen as speaking to the potential hearsay objection as well. Similarly, one might try to 
characterize the tapes as concerned solely with inferences as to the credibility of the witnesses 
at trial, including the defendant; there certainly are references in the opinion to issues of 
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extend trumping to distinct evidential sources for the remainder is not 
without costs. H means that, once a party offers evidence of an out-of-court 
verbal utterance, the exdusiona..-y rules may be severely undermined in 
their application to other versions of the utterance, versions that would not 
be admissible by the opponent if the proponent had not broached the 
subject113 This is an important issue to which we must return after 
delving deeper into the rationale of the completeness doctrine and its 
distinct functions. The next Part will examine both the range of 
exclusionary rules affected by the trumping function and the limits that 
should properly be placed upon it. 
III. COMPLETENESS AND THE BEST EVIDENCE PRINCIPLE 
This Part looks at the natt.ue of completeness as a constituent 
principle in the body of evidence jurisprudence. It shows that complete-
ness derives from the more fundamental principle that parties should 
present the epistemically best evidence available to them on litigated issues. 
The three procedural functions identified above are analyzed with 
reference to this "best evidence" principle. The investigation clarifies the 
problems that necessitate a completeness doctrine and yields valuable 
insights on Lhe othe!Wi..se mysterious question of which exclusionary rules 
are appropriately subject to being trumped by the completeness 
principle.11 ·l 
A. Completeness as a Component of the Best Evidence Principle 
In a previous article, I argued that within the law of evidence is a 
principle that serves to explain, and to some extent to justifY, many of the 
existing rules. With deference to eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
judges and evidence scholars, I called this the "best evidence principle" 
and articulated it as the principle that a party should present the best 
evidence reasonably available on any given litigated issue. "Best evidence" 
credibility of the witnesses, including the defendant. See 487 N.E.2d at 61 '7-18. But the high 
court's references to the credibility of the defendant's taped statements as such serve to 
emphasize the substantive hearsay use of the tapes being suggested by the defendant and 
condoned by the court. Seeid. at 616-18. 
113. A same-source limitation would also reduce the frequency with which the court must 
resolve the often difficult question of whether the opponent's evidence "completes" or simply 
"contradicts" that of the proponent. Coming from the same source, the remainder is unlikely 
to deny the part originally introduced by the proponent, though it may well qualify its 
significance, even to the point of reversing it. On the other hand, such a limitation would 
complicate matters by necessitating determinations of whether a particular piece of evidence 
is in fact from the "same" source, as when the putative remainder is written on the back of 
the proponent's documentary evidence. 
114. A word about authorities: Until now, in order not to confuse the common law with 
practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence, little reference has been made to the latter. In 
this Part, more frequent citation to practice under the Federal Rules will serve to illustrate 
how the problems giving rise to the completeness doctrine exist under those rules and their 
state counterparts as well. 
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was defined in terms of epistemic value, that is, in terms of what a 
reasonable trier of fact, whether lay or expert, would find most helpful in 
the rational determination of the issue in question.115 I further argued 
that this principle is not absolute; it is subject to at least one pervasively 
important qualification based on the existence of an adversarial system of 
adjudication. This qualification is not easy to state with precision, but in 
rough terms it may be expressed as follows: A litigant is privileged not to 
present the best available evidence if the opponent will have a reasonable 
opportunity to present that evidence.116 Thus, a judicial application of the 
best evidence principle is identifiable as: 
[A]ny judicial use of a rule, decision, or argument that proceeds 
by identifying some set of potential evidentiary items, call it P, 
which is rationally of greater probative worth than that set which 
is or might be offered, call it S, and that either (i) enforces a 
preference for P because of its superior probativity, or (ii) 
recognizes such a preference but Rermits the use of S because of 
some countervailing tonsideration.117 
The most significant countervailing considerations internal to the theory 
are: (1) the practical infeasibility of the proponent presenting P without 
placing incommensurate burdens on the resources of the parties and the 
tribunal, and (2) the practical capacity of an opponent to present P in a 
not substantially less understandable or more costly way. 118 
In demonstrating the significance of this principle, I analyzed a wide 
variety of evidentiary doctrines, ranging from discovery rules to witness 
sequestration rules, from "substantive" legal rules like statutes of frauds and 
statutes of limitation to what we think of more traditionally as the heart of 
evidence law, the rules of admissibility.119 In particular, I argued that 
commitment to the best evidence principle provides a better interpretive 
account of most admissibility rules than the usual alternative theory based 
on distrust of lay jurors. Among the rules briefly mentioned in that analysis 
115. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 230-34, 240-42. 
116. Id. at 234-39, 242-43, 263-70. In the indicated passages, I gave an even narrower 
articulation of the adversarial privilege, one that requires presentation of the episternically 
best, reasonably available evidence unless the party reasonably believes that another party will 
present the better evidence omitted by the former. In a later article, I worked with the 
broader privilege described in the present text See Dale A Nance, Missing Evidence 
[hereinafter Missing Evidence], 13 Cardozo L Rev. 831, 859-60 (1991). Although I have stated 
the more conservative version here, nothing significant for present purposes turns upon the 
difference. 
117. Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 245-46. 
118. The indicated considerations are "internal" to the theory in that both are based, at 
least to some extent, on the goal of obtaining the best reasonably available evidence for use 
by the trier of fact ''External" countervailing considerations include limitations arising from 
extrinsic social policies like the preserving of confidential relationships under privilege rules. 
To the extent that adherence to an adversarial system is premised on litigant autonomy, 
rather than accuracy of adjudication, it constitutes an "external" countervailing consideration. 
Cf. id. at 241-42. 
119. Id. at 270-94. 
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is the common-law completeness rule.120 This section elaborates on ithe 
daim lhat lhe completeness rule is a manifestation of tlb.e best evidence 
principle. 
On its face, the preference for the whole of a verbal event or 
utterance is easily seen as gene:rated by the best evidence principle. The 
whole of the event, insofu as necessary to understand the significance of 
some relevant part, is better evidence than the part alone. Tnis is true 
regardless of the nature of the trier of fact, whether lay or professional, 
expert or otherwise, so the rule is not attributable to special concerns 
about misleading a lay jury. Nor is there any other obvious explanato:r1 
candidate available with respect to this preference. One might be tempted 
to say that simple fairness motivates the completeness idea, rather than the 
concern for accuracy that motivates the best evidence principle. But 
fai_mess is one of those conduso.ry terms that calls out for explanation. The 
unfairness involved in the selected presentation of only parts of an 
utterance is that it poses a threat to accuracy of the judgment This 
concern with accuracy arises not only because accuracy is an end in itself, 
but also because accuracy is important in doing substantive justice. It is 
that aspect of justice that warrants taldng and evaluating evidence at alt 
Remove the risk of inaccuracy, and there would be no plausible daim of 
unfairness in this context. 
Thus, in understanding completeness as a consequence of the best 
evidence principle, fue only difficulties that require attention he in the 
countervailing considerations. In fact, the qualifications of the best 
evidence principle explain the more precise contours of fue completeness 
rule. Out of deference to history, we start by examining the discovery 
function. 
1. The Discovery Function 
As already discussed, the conditional exclusionary form of the 
interruption rule offsets limitations on fue opponent's ability to discover a 
document in the proponent's possession. The adversa:r1 privilege fails to 
out:.veigh the best e·vidence principle LV} this context for the simple :reason 
that the opponent does not, without the assistance of the rule, have the 
opportlLnity to present the remainder, at least not through the same 
evidential source. On the other hand., if the proponent also does not have 
access to the remainder, conditional exclusion would simply result in the 
loss of valuable evidence. Thus, one would expect the completeness .rule, 
like other best evidence rules, to display an excusable preference structure 
in which the proponent can excuse the presentation of the part on the 
ground that the whole is not available to the proponent or that the 
remainder is available to the opponent 
The cases are.often difficult to penetrate in this regard because most 
120. Id. at 284-85. 
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opinions provide little information about the relevant context of the trial 
court's decision. Nonetheless, some evidence suggests that, unless the 
proponent's proffer is so incomplete as to be obviously unhelpful in the 
case, such an excusing structure exists. Perhaps the most important piece 
of evidence is the tendency not to invoke exclusion in response to 
unavoidably incomplete testimonial accounts of verbal events. Consider, for 
example, the appeal in the case of People v. Adamson.121 Defendant alleged 
error in the admission of testimony recounting only part of a conversation 
in which he participated. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the 
conviction, noting the well settled rule "that a witness may testify to a part 
of a conversation if that is all that he heard and it appears intelligible." 122 
What is significant about this result is that the witness who was the source 
of the account was subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. 
Had the witness heard the remainder and yet refused to reveal it on cross-
examination, the court should, and under conventional doctrine would, 
have stricken the direct testimony on motion.125 Thus, the unavailability 
of the missing information from this witness insulated the testimony from 
exclusion.124 Moreover, the common-law pattern generally encountered in 
the testimonial proof of extrajudicial statements of a party does not even 
require the witness, on pain of exclusion, to state in the first instance all 
121. 165 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1946) (prosecution for murder and burglary). 
122. Id. at f>.7. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the incompleteness was 
such as to render the evidence irrelevant Id. To the same effect, see also Lynn v. State, 79 
S.E. 29, 33 (Ga. 1913); Mays v. Deaver, I Iowa 216, 222-23 (1855). Confessions are sometimes 
suJ:9ect to statutes requiring the whole thereof. Cases interpreting such statutes typically allow 
the use of unavoidably incomplete reports of the confession, although they may also require 
the witness to be able to state the "substance" of the whole confession. See, e.g., State v. Jugger, 
47 So. 2d 46, 54 (La. 1950) (allowing witness to testify to substance of defendant's admissions 
even though he could not remember all that was said). An exception should also be noted in 
the understandable reluctance of some courts to allow unavoidably incomplete testimonial 
accounts of lost or destroyed documents having in themselves legal effect, such as deeds, 
contracts, and wills. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, §§ 2105, 2106. 
123. See McConnick, supra note 5, § 19. See also Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 
282-84 (analyzing the requirement that a witness submit to cross-examination, and the 
exclusionary rule that is activated by a refusal to so submit, as a best evidence rule). 
124. Of course, there is the remaining potential for collusion between the proponent or 
some other person and the witness to manufacture or feign a loss of hearing or memory as to 
the remainder, but the Adamson court was obviously not impressed by this possibility in the 
context of the case. One line of authority excludes confessions when the defendant's 
statement was interrupted after the admission of the act but before an explanation could be 
given. Compare William v. State, 39 Ala. 532 (1865) (holding defendant slave's partial 
· confession to master improperly admitted when master prevented defendant from completing 
the confession), with United States v. Wenzel, 311 F.2d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1962) (affirming 
admission of defendant's confession to officer even though it was interrupted by arrival at jail, 
where defendant showed no inclination to qualifY statements already made). In such cases, 
exclusion may be based upon the presumptive unreliability of the statement, but may also 
represent a confusion between admissibility and sufficiency. In the former cited case, for 
example, the court in reversing the conviction makes reference to the presumption of 
innocence and the possibility that the defendant might have gone on to provide a justification 
for the killing, such as self.Uefense. William, 39 Ala. at 535. 
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tl'lat was perceived; because of the availability of this i.nfonnation to the 
opponent by way of cross-examination, elicitation of !:he re:m..alnder is 
generally left to the opponent.125 
In the context of incomplete tangible proffers, the a priori 
improbability of the proponent having access to only part of an important 
document, coupled with the difficulty of detecting false dai.ms of 
unavailability, should lead the courts to adopt a rather skeptical attitude 
toward the proponent's daim that the remainder is unavailable. Still, in 
some contexts the unavailability of the remainder is uncontroversial, and 
the appropriateness of the exclusionary response then turns on whether 
the incomplete proffer is so incomplete as to be simply a distracting waste 
of time, or perhaps on the likelihood of tampering.126 As for the 
argument that the tangible remainder is available to the opponent, the 
cases do not invariably accept this excuse either. But at least the reason for 
this tendency is not difficult to discern within the framework provided 
here. Certainly, both case law and commentary confirm the proposition 
that availability of the remainder to the opponent is a relevant factor in 
deciding whether to invoke the exdusiona.~;/' response. 1 ~7 Yet even when 
125. See 7 Vflgn1ore, supra note 10, § 2099, at 620-21, a.nd § 2100, at 622-23 (noting some 
judicial ambivalence in cases of criminal confessions). Stricter applications in tt'-le context of 
confessions given under custodial interrogation are understandable as prophylactic measures, 
since the government generally has adequate control to assure the availability of an admissible 
account of the whole of the confession. 
126. See, e.g., Harrison v. Henderson, 12 Ga. 19, 22 (1852) (affirming admission of a letter 
written by a defendant and acknowledging debt, despite Lhe mutilation of a postscript). One 
can observe this pattern particularly well in the context of the recurrent modem problem of 
partially inaudible tape recordings. Compare Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 54-55 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956), wherein the court stated: 
Partial inaudibility is no more valid reason for excluding conversations than the 
failure of a personal witness to overhear all of a conversation should exclude his 
testimony as to the portions he did hear. Unless the unintelligible portions are so 
subs~'1tial as to render t..l-te recording as a whole unt.n1stwoJu'ly the recording is 
admissible .... 
with Hunter v. Hunter, 83 A2d 401 (Pa. Super. Ci.. 1951) (holdiBg it error to admit, in 
divorce proceeding, incomplete tape recordings of conversations between husband and wife 
surreptitiously made by son at husband's request; admission also held to violate privilege for 
confidential communications). Numerous federal cases are cited in 1 Jack B. Weinstein & 
Margaret A Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 'i[ 106[01], at 11-12 (1991) (concluding that 
"federal courts have generally admitted inaudible or incomplete tape recordings if it seemed 
clear that inaudibility was not created deliberately by the proponent"). Cj State v. Dills, 416 
P.2d 651, 655-56 (Or. 1966) (affirming admission of partly inaudible tape in conjunction with 
testimonial account of remainder of defendant's statement, the court noting that no 
tampering claim had been made). 
127. See, e.g., Cannister Co. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 904, 909 (CL Cl.), cert. denied, 332 
u.s. 830 (1947): 
Whether or not a part only may be introduced depends to some extent on the facts. 
It is improper, we think, to receive in evidence only a part of a document unless the 
remainder of it is available or is m~de available to the other party .... The original 
of the bill of sale, a copy of which was introduced, was in plaintiffs possession. If 
plaintiff thought the omitted portion material to the issue, it was available to it and 
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the opponent's possession of the remainder is readily verifiable, the timing 
function may provide an independent reason to reject the proponent's 
excuse for partial presentation. 
2. The Trumping Function 
An examination of the trumping function is even more revealing. 
Assume, for simplicity, that the discovery function is not also at issue; that 
is, assume that both parties have reasonable access to the evidence of the 
remainder.128 Here the adversarial privilege fuils, not because the 
remainder is unavailable to the opponent, but because an exclusionary rule 
bars the opponent from presenting the remainder evidence to the trier of 
fact As illustrated in the previous Part, the most common problem of this 
sort occurs when the proponent has used substantively damaging parts of 
the opponent's out-of-court admission; without the aid of the completeness 
doctrine, the opponent cannot fully utilize the completing out-of-court 
statements in response without running afoul of the hearsay rule. The law 
has responded by honoring the opponent's demand that if the statement is 
to be used for the hearsay purpose, it must be used as a whole. This 
illustrates the affinity of the completeness rule to the very rule it is 
trumping, since the general point of both rules is to prescribe that if a 
declarant's knowledge is to be brought to bear on the case, it should 
ordinarily be done in the more reliable form. In the hearsay context, this 
means in the form of in-court testimony; in the completeness context, it 
means in the form of a complete utterance.129 
It is important to recognize that the failure of the adversarial privilege 
in such a context renders the proponent's duty to present the whole 
absolute, provided of course the parties have reasonable access to the 
remainder and no countervailing considerations of extrinsic social policy 
could have been introduced by it. 
See also 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2095(3) (noting the mandatory requirement of entirety 
of parts may be dispensed with when whole of document is produced in court for possible use 
by t..h.e opponent). 
128. Once again, if neither party has such access, we have only a problem of the 
excusability of the preference for the whole in the face of an inability to obtain the whole. By 
hypothesis, trumping is not at issue. 
129. Several scholars have explored the connection between the hearsay rule and the best 
evidence principle, and all have concluded that substantial reform of the rule is necessary to 
bring it into complete harmony with that principle. See George F. James, The Role of Hearsay 
in ·a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 788 (1940); Nance, Best. Evidence, supra 
note 3, at 281-83; Dale A Nance, Understanding Responses to Hearsay: An Extension of the 
Comparative Analysis, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 459 (1992) [hereinafter Understanding Responses to 
Hearsay); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay 
Rule, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 893 (1992). Other recent proposals for reform bear some affinity to a 
best evidence approach. See Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-
Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992); Roger Park, A Subject Matter 
Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 51 (1987); Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact 
Approach to Hearsay, 75 Cal. L. Rev 1339 (1987). 
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preempt such a result130 Thus, the best evidence principle leads to the 
conclusion that :invocation of the trumping function should be viewed as a 
forced presentation by the proponent, thereby resolvi..ng the ambiguity we 
encountered in the common-law doctrine.131 Under this interpretation, 
the completeness doctrine allows the opponent to piggy-back on the 
indusionary authority used by the proponent. That does not mean, 
however, that the actual physical introduction of the remainder must be 
performed by the proponent. Reasons of convenience and clarity dictate 
that it is often better to allow the opponent to introduce those portions 
needed for the sake of completeness, whether contemporaneously or later, 
especially in cases where the proponent does not concede that the 
:remainder was uttered as the opponent claims. Indeed, a negotiated and 
mediated adversary process may properly determine the whole of the 
verbal event and precisely how it is to be presented to the trier of fact. 132 
One may even say, with a civiJity that is not entirely counterfactual, that the 
opponent assists the proponent to perform his duty to the tribunal. 133 So 
the trumping function, seen as a consequence of the best evidence 
principle, is entirely compatible with both mandated presentation under 
the interruption rule and optional presentation of the remainder by the 
opponent under either the interruption or rebuttal rule. 
To be sure, one might object that an exclusionmy response, the 
traditional form. of ihe conunon-Iaw interruption mle, is an odd -vvay to 
ensure that the whole of the utterance comes in. There is truth in this 
complaint134 It reflects a paradox that is ubiquitous in the law of 
130. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
131. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. 
132. See, e.g., United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 574-77 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 484 U.S. 
844 (1987) (affirming trial court's compromise acceptance of defendant's completeness 
motion so as to allow substance of remainder of defendant's statement into evidence without 
jeopardizing confrontation rights of co-defendant). 
133. One commentator, drawing on language found in many case reports, accurately 
stated t...l)e functional relationship in t..l)e cqntext of confessions, where the law is pa.rtJcular!y 
well developed: 
When a confession is admissible, t.l)e whole of what t..he accused said upon the 
subject at the time of making confession is admissible and should be taken together, 
and if t.he prosecution Sits to prove the whole statement, the accused is entitled to 
put in evidence all that was said to and by him at the time which bears upon the 
subject of controversy, including any exculpatory or self-serving declarations 
contained therewith. 
29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 535, at 586 (1967), formerly 20 Am Jur. Evidence § 488, at 425, 
quoted in United States v. Wenzel, 311 F.2d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1962). This language has been 
cited as an example of the ambiguity of the rules in confession cases in that it does not 
"distinguish between the prosecutor's having to introduce the whole confession and the 
accused right to call for the rest." 1 Weinstein 8c Berger, supra note 126, 'i! 106[01], at 8-9. 
The discussion in the text shows why this ambiguity actually selVes to relate the two kinds of 
rules. 
134. One might respond that the simple explanation of the common-law division between 
rebuttal and interruption lies in the answer to the question of whether the incomplete proffer 
is so misleading as to be excludable without regard to a completing response. This, however, 
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evidence. Evidence law is thick with exclusionary rules more intended to 
encourage presentation of additional evidence than to eliminate from 
consideration the evidence excluded. Exclusionary rules may thus have 
what I have elsewhere described as an "expansionary'' purpose.155 On the 
other hand, some exclusionary rules serve not only to encourage the 
presentation of other evidence, but also to eliminate the evidence excluded 
for that purpose. The most conspicuous rule of this sort is the hearsay rule; 
presentation of the declarant for testimony in court does not ordinarily 
render her out-of-court statements substantively admissible.156 Such rules 
are "substitutionary'' in that their object is to replace the offered evidence 
with the preferred evidence.15~ 
The completeness doctrine, in both itS inclusionary and exclusionary 
forms, is of the expansionary kind. That is just what is meant by the 
conditional nature of the exclusion enforced under the common-law 
interruption rule. For if the remainder is introduced, the original is no 
longer subject to exclusion for its incompleteness. Generally speaking, 
exclusion is no worse an option in this context than it is elsewhere in the 
law of evidence.158 In any event, the sense of paradox does not arise in 
suffers from two serious problems: (1) It does not explain the tendency not to employ 
exclusion in the context of testimonial incompleteness, even though such incompleteness can 
be as extreme as any tangible incompleteness; and (2) It does not explain the tendency to 
employ exclusion in the context of tangible incompleteness even though the incompleteness 
does not create a seriously misleading impression. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying 
text. Tliat is, this explanation of the exclusionary response is both overinclusive and 
underinclusive relative to the empirical patterns. 
135. See Nance, Best Evidenne, supra note 3, at 281-85 (discussing, inter alia, the exclusion 
of testimony when the witness refuses to submit to cross-examination; the exclusion of 
incomplete verbal utterances under the completeness rule; and the exclusion of proffered 
evidence in the absence of other evidence with respect to which the former is inaccurately 
said to be "conditionally relevant"). 
136. ·The Federal Rules make some noteworthy exceptions, representing a laudable shift 
toward a more expansionary version of the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(1). 
137. The original document rule-the paradigmatic "best evidence" rule-may be thought 
to be the clearest example of this phenomenom. See, e.g., Model Code of Evidence Rule 602 
(1943) ("As tending to prove the content of a writing, no evidence other than the writing 
itself is admissible unless" failure to introduce original is excused.). There is authority, 
however, for the proposition that this rule excludes secondary evidence of contents only by 
way of encouraging the use of the original; if the original is used, the rule is satisfied, whether 
or not secondary evidence is also used. See 4John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common 
Law § 1190 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) (opining that a copy may be used in addition to an 
original, although it may be excluded as superfluous). The Federal Rule is surprisingly precise 
on this point, as it does not explicitly exclude secondary evidence, but rather mandates the 
use of the original-a mandate implicitly backed by an exclusionary rule. Compare Fed. R. 
Evid. 1002 (requiring original) with Fed. R. Evid. 1004 (allowing use of other evidence of 
contents under fairly broadly stated conditions of unavailability of original). See Nance, Best 
Evidence, supra note 3, at 273-74. 
138. To be sure, there are reasons not to employ exclusion of relevant evidence as the 
means of encouraging the presentation of other evidence. This is a difficult matter taken up 
more generally elsewhere. See Nance, Missing Evidence; supra note 116, at 835-38, 845-46, 866, 
872-81. Suffice it to say that the principal factor counting against exclusion is the availability of 
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connection with optional completion by t.he opponent or with completion 
chosen by t.he proponent in contemplation of the opponent's otherwise 
inevitable and embaJ.TTaSsi.l'!g rebuttall. 139 - -
3. The Timing Function 
Finally, consider briefly the timing function. Assume that both sides 
have reasonable access to the .remainder and that no otherwi...se applicable 
exclusionary rule bars the opponent from a response in rebuttaL In such 
cases, there remains the problem of timing. Though this problem is a 
relatively minor one when compared to problems of access to and 
admissibility of the remainder, it is nonetheless worth addressing. When 
introduction of the remainder is moved to a point earlier in the trial than 
would otherwi...se occur, the subsequent presentation is rendered 
redundant Thus, invoking tl1e timing function effects the substitution of 
one fonn of presentation-one more nearly contemporaneous-for 
another. The purpose, one. entirely compatible with the best evidence 
principle, is to provide the i..~fonnation in a manner most readily usable Toy 
the trier of fuct. Not only do we worry that the misimpression cannot be 
corrected by delayed response, but also we see no good reason to impose 
the additional TDurden on the trier of fuct necessary to malce the 
connection.140 Once again, the limitations on contemporaneous 
the remainder for presentation by the opponent, against which must be balanced the need 
for contemporaneous completion and the failure-where it occurs-to recognize the 
trumping function when that is necessa.y to allow the opponent's response. 
139. Nevertheless, as with all remedial invocations of the best evidence principle, one 
should give careful attention to the range of possible responses. For example, when the 
opponent cannot offer completing evidence without regard to the completeness doctrine, one 
might argue that a missing evidence instruction, such as the following, is appropriate: 
If a party fails to produce evidence which is under his control and reasonably 
available to him and not reasonably available to the adverse party, then you may 
infer that Lhe evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have produced it and 
did not. 
3 Edward]. Devitt el al., Federal jury Practice anti Instructions§ 72.16 (4th ed. 198'7). This, 
however, would be an unusual application of U~e quoted instnJction, vv1hich is n-1ore typically 
employed when the missing evidence would be admissible on behalf of Lhe adverse party, if 
only it were available to that party. If one interprets the language "not reasonably available to 
the adverse party" as covering situations where the evidence is inadmissible by the adverse 
party, that would be setting up inferences outside the completeness context favoring a party 
in precisely those situations where the law has chosen not to allow that party to present 
certain evidence. It would be a bizarre and intolerable situation, forcing each party to present 
any admissible evidence that is not admissible by an adverse party, just to avoid the adverse 
inference. One could limit the use of an adverse inference to the subset of these cases that 
involves incomplete proffers by the proponent, but even then the vagaries of an adverse 
inference from unlmown information are much worse than the uncertainties associated with 
the evaluation of actual evidence of the remainder. Thus, the adverse inference is a plausible 
response to incompleteness only in cases where the content of a remainder known once to 
have been available has been lost by the proponent's negligent or intentional spoliation. 
l '!0. There is also an occasional resource savings should the earlier presentation of the 
VERBAL COMPLETENESS 869 
completion arise from concerns that this form of response may actually 
confuse matters by making the proponent's presentation di~ointed.141 
In sum, an examination of the three functions of the common-law 
completeness doctrine reveals straightfonvard connections to the best 
evidence principle. In a moment, we will see what can be inferred from 
this in terms of the reach of the important trumping function. Before doing 
so, however, we pause to consider the relationship between the trumping 
function and the doctrine of curative admissibility. This examination will 
deepen our understanding of the role of the best evidence principle in this 
context. 
B. Completeness and Curative Admissibility 
It has been argued that the trumping effect is, or can be, simply a 
consequence of the application of the notion of "curative admissibili-
ty."142 Curative admissibility refers to the idea that one party's 
presentation of inadmissible evidence, which for some reason is admitted, 
may be met by the introduction of other inadmissible evidence insofar as 
necessary to remove any induced prejudice.143 As applied in the present 
context, the argument is that admission of incomplete portions of a verbal 
event gives license for the opponent's introduction of the otherwise 
inadmissible remainder. 
The difficulty with this assimilation of the two doctrines is that the 
premise of each is, or is usually thought to be, different. Curative 
admissibility applies only when the original evidence is properly inadmissible 
upon objection, whereas the original proffer to which a completeness 
response is made is typically considered admissible, even though 
incomplete.144 To bridge the gap, the suggested explanation of the 
remainder so undermine the strength of the proponent's case as to make it appropriate to 
direct a verdict without the necessity of responsive evidence. 
141. One might argue that the reluctance to intrude upon the proponent's presentation is 
a consequence of the concern for litigant autonomy, independent .of any concern about 
accuracy of the judgment. Although superficially attractive, this expla.."1ation is implausible 
except in the rule-consequentialist sense of wanting to maintain litigant autonomy even at the 
cost of accuracy in a particular case for t.ile sake of maintaining accuracy in the long nm of 
cases. In any event, here the point matters not, since the best evidence principle obviously 
does not assume that all legitimate competing demands must somehow be traceable to the 
best evidence principle itself. 
142. The commentator who has pressed this connection most consistently is Professor 
Michael Graham. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, Evidence: Text, Rules, Illustrations and 
Problems 595 (2d eel. 1988); Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence, § 106.2, at 38 
(4th eel. 1984). The fourth edition of McCormick's hornbook, the editors of which now 
include Professor Graham, has picked up on this idea. See Charles T. McCormick, McCormick 
on Evidence § 56 (4th ed. 1992). To be precise, Professor Graham does not deny the 
trumping function of the completeness doctrine; rather, he asserts, without elaboration, that 
even if such a function is not part of the completeness doctrine, as some federal courts have 
opined, essentially the same effect can be achieved by invoking curative admissibility. 
143. See McCormick, supra note 142, §57. 
144. See 1 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 50, at 369 
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tnunping effect presupposes that the original proffer must be so 
misleading on account of its incompleteness as to be excludable were the 
opponent to object.145 Although there will be cases where the original 
incomplete proffer would be properly excludable upon objection, there 
will also be cases where the trial court reasonably concludes that admitting 
the incomplete proffer, without regard to a possible completeness motion 
by the opponent, would be less detrimental to accurate fact finding than 
excluding the incomplete proffer. Most conspicuously, the significance of 
the remainder, or even the fact of its utterance, may be seriously disputed, 
and the trial court may entertain sufficient doubts on that score as to 
preclude a finding that the proponent's proffer is too misleading to be 
admitted.146 
Even if the court is confident of both the occurrence and the 
significance of the remainder, it might not conclude that the original part 
is inadmissibly incomplete. Ordinarily, judges and commentators tend to 
think about exclusions of evidence as misleading without regard to the 
availability of other evidence. If, however, one extends the rubric of 
"misleading'' to include situations in which other important, context-
providing evidence is known or even believed likely to be available, then 
such an incomplete proffer should be held excessively misleading relative to 
the complete version, even though the same evidence would not be so 
misleading as to be excludable if the remainder were unavailable.147 
(1977). 
145. There is considerable disagreement in judicial opinions and academic commentary 
over the question of whether the opponent must object, or must not object, to the 
proponent's proffer in order to be able to take advantage of the opportunity to present 
curative evidence. See generally 1 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law§ 15, at 
731 (Tillers rev. 1983). In sharp contrast, completeness cases do not even address the issue of 
an objection to the admissibility of the original part as a precondition of the response, which 
suggests that typically no one has thought the original pwffer inad.uissible, except in t.'le 
special, conditional way associated with the interruption rule. See, e.g., People v. Gambos, 84 
Cal. Rptr. 908, 909-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (rejecting curative admission, emphasizing 
opponent's waiver by failure to object to proponent's evidence; separately rejecting 
opponent's completeness argument because of failure to show relevance to understanding 
proponent's proffer). 
146. For example, Fed. R Evid. 403 provides in pertinent part: "Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of ... 
misleading the jury .... " (emphasis supplied). Under such a rule an incomplete proffer may 
have relevance that is not "substantially outweighed" by its misleading character. See, e.g., 
United States v. Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the admission of 
certain evidence was within court's discretion ·under Fed. R Evid. 403, and rejecting 
defendant's argument that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 106, stating, 
"First, the record shows that Soulard failed to object timely to the evidence as being 
'incomplete.' Second, even if Soulard had objected timely, rule 106 would not have required 
exclusion of the exhibits-it would merely have allowed Soulard to compel the Government 
to introduce evidence as to the other subfranchises on a showing that the new evidence 
"ought in fairness ... be considered contemporaneously .... "). 
147. The drafters of Rule 403 stated, "The availability of other means of proof may also be 
an appropriate fuctor" to consider in determining whether to exclude evidence under that 
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Though probably still perceived as unconventional, this is not an 
unreasonable extension. Indeed, that is the upshot of a best evidence 
analysis of many long-established exclusionary rules. 1 -~a 
However, there is yet another difficulty for the assimilation of the 
trumping function under curative admissibility: It presupposes that the 
jurisdiction in question recognizes the latter doctrine. In reality, some 
jurisdictions are reluctant to employ curative admission, while no such 
reluctance is evidenced with regard to completeness.149 As a practical 
matter, therefore, if courts reject the trumping function as an inherent 
part of the completeness rule, curative admissibility might fail as a 
substitute. On the other hand, situations in which the completeness 
principle applies may be among those in which a general reluctance to 
allow curative admissibility would be overcome. When the proponent has 
incompletely evidenced a verbal event, granting a motion to strike may 
leave significant pnjudice to the opponent, and the curative admission of 
the remainder will remain subject to relevance restrictions that serve to 
keep the curative admission :from getting out of hand. The remainder thus 
tends to satisfY the generally prevailing restrictions on curative admis-
• !50 
S10n. 
Whether one views the trumping function as an integral part of the 
completeness rule, or as a special application of curative admissibility, one 
must recognize its distinctive character. Ordinarily, in cases where curative 
admissibility is explicitly applied, the preferred situation would have been 
that neither party's evidence be presented.151 The responsive evidence 
rule. See Fed. R Evid. 403 advisory committee's note. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 7I3 
F.2d I066, 1071-72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. I001 (1983) (excluding prior consistent 
statements of defendant under Rule 403 partly on grounds of incompleteness thereof). It is 
hard to see how a jury could be affected in its inferences from the evidence by the availability 
or unavailability of evidence that is not presented, unless the jury is aware of the relevant 
circumstances. The point, of course, is that though their evaluation of the two situations 
might and should be the same if they are not so informed, all things considered it ought not 
to be the same. The traditional response to problems of available evidence not presented, 
when they are not covered by some best-evidence exclusionary rule, is to allow the opponent 
to request a "missing evidence" jury instruction, which entails bringing the availability of the 
missing evidence to the jury's attention. See Nance, Missing Evidence, supra note 116, at 856-
57, 866. For reasons already noted, this makes no sense in cases where the reason for 
unavailability to the opponent is an exclusionary rule. See supra note 139. 
148. See supra note 134 and accompanying text 
149. Compare, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code§ 356 (West I967) (codifying completeness rule; quoted 
supra note 30) with 3 B.E. Witkin, supra note 34, § I 993 (summarizing general reluctance of 
Califomia courts to employ curative admissibility). 
150. See I Wigmore, supra note 145, § 15, at 740 (describing the so-called "Massachusetts 
rule" that curative admissibility is allowed only to the extent necessary to cure prejudice). 
Note that the usual though not invariable context of an incomplete proffer, especially an 
incomplete testimonial proffer, makes it unlikely that the opponent will have a meaningful 
opportunity to object prior to its introduction. This tends to undermine the usual argument 
against curative admissibility, namely that the opponent is adequately protected by the right to 
object and should therefore be viewed as waiving the objection if it is not made. ld. at 746 
(articulating this explanation of cases rejecting curative admissibility entirely). 
151. Rare exceptions may occur when the parties have stipulated to the admission of the 
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"cures" the situation only in that it balances or negates the prejudice 
otherwise resulting from that to which it responds, or at least so it is 
hoped. Curative admission does not remove the feature that made the 
original evidence inadmissible.152 Thus, curative admissibility reflects the 
law's judgment that the preferred rank ordering of evidentiary 
presentations, from best to worst, is: (1) that neither proponent's nor 
opponent's evidence be presented, (2) that both be presented, or (3) that 
only proponent's be presented. The law settles on the "second-best'' 
solution because the theoretically optimal solution has become impossible 
to achieve, practically speaking.155 Thus, for example, the introduction of 
the responsive evidence under curative admissibility does not ordinarily 
waive the opponent's right to challenge the original admission on 
appeal.l54 
In contrast, no case has been found in which the opponent 
successfully challenged on appeal, as prejudicially misleading, the 
admission of only a part of a verbal event when the opponent was able to 
put in the remainder.155 And this is as it should be, since the introduc-
two parts as a package. In that event, the parties' choice to override otherwise applicable 
exclusionary rules should ordinarily be respected according to their agreement. See, e.g., 
Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 197-205 (1909) (holding that trial court erred in 
excluding defendant's inadmissible reply to prosecution's inadmissible accusatory letter to the 
defendant, where parties apparently had agreed before trial that the prosecution would 
present both). 
152. Typical cases involve: otherwise irrelevant evidence used to rebut irrelevant evidence, 
e.g., St. Clair County v. Bukacek, 131 So. 2d 683, 689-90 (Ala. 1961); inadmissible hearsay used 
to rebut a distinct inadmissible hearsay, e.g., Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Bryan, 252 P. 
1012, 1015 (Ariz. 1927); or, otherwise inadmissible cl!acacter evidence used to counter 
inadmissible cl!aracter evidence, e.g., United States v. Whiting, 308 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cic. 
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963). The same waiver idea may be employed when the 
rebutting evidence would otherwise be inadmissible for constitutional reasons, such as 
violation of searcl! and seizure llinitations. See, e:g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 
(1954) (affirming admission of extrinsic evidence of drug possession after defendant 
volunteered that he had never possessed drugs). 
153. The ineffectiveness of an objection to, or motion to st.-ike, the original inadmissible 
evidence appears often as one of the crucial fuctors to be considered in making a ruling on 
curative admissibility. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 5, §57, at 147-48. 
154. See 1 Wigmore, supra note 145, § 15, at 748 (noting, however, that the curative 
admission may make the original admission harmless error). 
155. In the oft encountered problem of redacted confessions, for example, the 
incompleteness of the prosecution's proffer is not considered subject to cl!allenge on appeal 
as long as the defendant had the opportunity to invoke a suitable completeness response, 
whether exercised or not. A series of Texas cases has made this point well. See, e.g., 
Harrington v. State, 547 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex. Crim App. 1977) (rejecting appeal where 
rebuttal right exercised); Pineda v. State, 252 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. I 952) 
(rejecting appeal where rebuttal right not exercised). The same result obtains even when the 
prosecution's omissions are so serious that, were the remainder not available for introduction 
on a defense motion, the original proffer would surely be inadmissible, assuming the fact of 
incompleteness could be shown. See, e.g., Reece v. State, 772 S.W.2d 198, 202-04 (Tex. App. 
1989) (rejecting appeal even though prosecution redacted confession by omitting the word 
"not" from defendant's statement, "I did not kill Mr. Smith ... "; case arising under Texas's 
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tion of the completing portion eliminates, by hypothesis, the misleading 
character of the original proffer, although some residual confusion may 
remain due to the timing of the completeness response. Given the assumed 
(not insubstantial) relevance of the complete utterance, the admission of 
both parts is to be preferred to the admission of neither.156 Here, the 
law's general preference order is: (1) that both be presented, (2) that only 
proponent's be presented, or (3) that neither be presented. To be sure, 
the second- and third-ranked solutions may be reversed in priority if the 
incomplete proffer is especially misleading, as the assimilation argument 
supposes, but each remains subordinate to the first157 
This means that the status of the two parts in a curative situation is 
different from that of the two parts in a completing situation. The former 
may not have the status of substantive evidence, in the sense of supporting 
a request for particular jury instructions, opposing a motion for directed 
verdict, or supporting a verdict in a post-trial motion.158 This is obvious in 
a case where admitted irrelevant evidence is met by curative irrelevant 
evidence: By definition, neither can support a verdict on the appropriate 
merits or a jury instruction relevant thereto, except possibly a jury 
instruction· admonishing the jury to ignore irrelevancies or limiting the 
jury's use of the curative evidence to negating the significance of the 
proponent's original irrelevancy. Arguably, prejudicial or incompetent 
evidence used to counter prejudicial or incompetent evidence should be 
limited in the same way.159 Indeed, some commentators have argued that 
version of the Federal Rules). . 
156. It may, ofcourse, tum out that the completed utterance is of de minimis probative 
value, the remainder offsetting whatever significance the original part appeared to have. But 
that can be known only after the remainder is considered, at which point exclusion of the 
whole will usually not save court time or otherwise serve any useful purpose, unless the 
evidence contains otherwise prejudicial elements. 
157. In the interruption rule context the law may settle on exclusion of the original proffer, 
which seems to adopt solution (3), but that will be more as an incentive to move the 
proponent from (2) to (I) than as an expression of a preference for (3) over (2). See supra 
PartiDA 
158. It is important to distinguish between two fundan!entally different aspects of the 
curative admissibility doctrine that are often conflated. On the one band, there is a doctrine 
which the opponent invokes at trial claiming that the proponent's introduction of what the 
trial court recognizes as inadmissible evidence warrants the opponent's introduction of 
responsive inadmissible evidence. This branch of the doctrine, which is the one most seriously 
questioned, is raised on appeal by the proponent if the responsive introduction is allowed, or 
by the opponent if it is disallowed. On the other hand, there is a purely appellate doctrine 
that arises from the appellate court's recognition that the trial court failed ·to exclude the 
proponent's evidence when it should have done so. Here the argument is that, given the 
opponent's responsive introduction, the error in admitting the proponent's evidence is 
harmless. In the former category of cases, the opponent usually has not made an appropriate 
objection; in the latter, an appropriate objection has been overruled. In the former, the trial 
court should not consider the evidence substantive in the sense described; in the latter, the 
trial court's erroneous application of the exclusionary rules usually means that the evidence 
was considered substantive by that court. 
159. In many ways this is analogous to the limited admissibility of prior inconsistent 
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curative evidence should be allowed only for the purpose of deflecting 
immaterial inferences.160 
Completion evidence is different Since it eliminates the defect of the 
incomplete proffer, both parts can and should be considered substantive in 
the sense described here. When taken together as the principle demands, 
both are relevant evidence not subject to exdusion.161 While the 
remainder becomes admissible only by virtue of the proponent's 
presentation of the incomplete part, the net effect of the whole ought not 
to be limited in a way that it would not have been if offered by the 
proponent in the first instance. Thus, the use of the remainder is not 
rightly limited to nullifying the effect of the incomplete part. The net 
probative effect of the whole utterance may favor the opponent.162 
Of course, a single proffer may contain both kinds of defects, 
incompleteness as well as some {other) reason for ina<L-nissibility. 
Numerous cases of this type can be found in which the tompleteness 
statements of a witness: At common law, they can only have the effect of negating the 
witness's testimony. See supra note 52. By noting the analogy, I do not mean to endorse the 
concept of limited admissibility in either context My tentative view is that, all balancing for 
prejudice having been done, evidence admissible for any legitimate purpose ought to be 
admitted for all purposes as to which it is relevant, although cautionary instructions may be 
appropriate in some contexts. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 292-93. However, 
defending this position is not necessary to the present topic. It is certainly not the 
conventional view. See McCormick, supra note 142, §59. 
160. See 1 Wigmore, supra note 145, § 15, at 750. 
161. The New York Court of Appeals expressed the point, not without ambiguity, in a 
classic completeness opinion approving the fully substantive use of the remainder: 
The rule appears to be firmly settled, both as to a conversation or writing, that the 
introduction of a part renders admissible so much of the remainder as tends to 
explain or qualify what has been received, and that is to be deemed a qualification 
which rebuts and destroys the inference to be derived from or the use to be made of 
the portion put in evidence .... [H]ere the declarations of the letter were not 
admissible in behalf of the plaintiff at all, because she was the personal representa-
tive of the deceased [declarant]. The defendant could waive that difficulty by putting 
such declarations, or a part of them, in evidence, on its behalf, but when it did so, 
must also make equally evidence that which tended to explain or qualify the portion 
which was used. 
Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 92 N.Y. 274, 282-86 (1883) (holding that self-serving 
parts of a letter written by an insured could be used by the jury to infer that the insured had 
not lied in his application for insurance, even though other undisputed facts strongly implied 
that he had). 
162. Wigmore's claim, discussed supra note 56 and accompanying text, that the 
completing evidence is limited in use, may have been intended to mean more than that it 
avoids the hearsay rule; he may have meant that the completing evidence is not substantive in 
the sense discussed here, even if it does trump the hearsay rule. This is not, however, the way 
his argument reads, and the cases he cites are better explained in other ways detailed above. 
There are occasional statements by other commentators to a similar effect See, e.g., Graham, 
supra note 142, at 596 (completing statements "may be admitted substantively only if 
otherwise admissible"). Note, however, that Professor Graham makes this statement in the 
context of his explanation that the trumping effect can be achieved by the use of curative 
admissibility, which theory may well be subject to the nonsubstantive use limitation. 
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rationale is used to support the responsive introduction of evidence.165 In 
such cases, however, though the completing evidence cures the first 
defect-the incompleteness-it does not cure the second defect-the 
inadmissibility, although it may negate the prejudice that arises from the 
latter. Consequently, admission of the remainder must be limited in 
character-not supporting a verdict or jury instructions-in the same way 
as other curative admissions.164 In other cases, it is diffirult to know 
whether the principle of curative admissil:iility is at work and whether, 
therefore, a limitation on the use of the remainder is in order, yet the 
doctrine of completeness is clearly employed.165 -
Curative admissibility, then, is not an adequate explanation of the 
trumping function at work in the common law of completeness, nor is it a 
fully adequate substitute for that function. The two doctrines are related, 
in that each may be seen as an example of a "constructive waiver" of the 
proponent's otherwise valid objection. The waiver is "constructive" because, 
although it is not intended by the proponent, the circumstances entitle the 
court to treat the situation as if it were. But they are not co-extensive, since 
the nature of the proponent's action and its consequences for the scope of 
the waiver are different in the two contexts. Nevertheless, in those 
jurisdictions, if any, where the courts wrongly insist that trumping is not 
part of the completeness rule, curative admission may be the best available 
163. See, e.g., R.C. Bottling Co. v. Sorrells, 275 So. 2d 131, 133-34 (Ala. 1973) (applying 
completeness to otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement offered by proponent); State v. 
Lovely, 517 P.2d 81, 81-82 (Ariz. 1973) (en bane) (applying completeness to otherwise 
inadmissible portions of complaining witness's hearsay statement); State v. Hinkle, 229 N.W.2d 
744, 749 (Iowa 1975) (using completen·ess and curative admissibility as alternative reasons to 
affirm the introduction of the remainder); Stewart v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, 
Inc., 431 S.W.2d 205, 211-12 (Mo. 1968) (applying completeness to hospital records 
containing otherwise inadmissible hearsay offered by proponent). In other cases, the court 
uses the completeness idea, but not by name. See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Magnuson, 
288 So. 2d 302 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1974) (allowing opponent to clarify contents of 
inadmissible hearsay through other testimony of same witness). 
164. Compare Grattan v. Metropolitan Ufe Ins. Co., 92 N.Y. 274, 282-86 (1883), discussed 
supra note 161 and accompanying text, with People v. Schlessel, 90 N.E. 44 (N.Y. 1909) 
(endorsing, in dicta, limited admissibility for curative and completing evidence, but clea'rly 
rejecting both theories as to the responsive evidence in question). 
165. See, e.g., Grobelnyv. W.T. Gowan, Inc., 151 F.2d 810, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1945), in which 
the trial court allowed the plaintiff to introduce the remainder of a medical report part of 
which was introduced by the defendant on cross-examination of the plaintiffs expert Since 
the whole of the report would have been inadmissible hearsay if offered by the plaintiff for 
the truth of statements contained therein (which included statements made by plaintiff not for 
pulposes of treatment), its partial presentation was presumably allowed in the first instance by 
way of indicating the basis and limits of the expert's opinion. If so, then the remainder is 
similarly limited in ·use. See supra notes 56-52 and accompanying text On the other hand, no 
limitation seems to have been placed on the introduction of the part Thus, it is possible that 
the part was available as evidence of the truth of the statements contained therein. If so, the 
remainder may also have been used substantively in this sense. In the latter case, whether the 
remainder was used curatively depends on whether an objection was made, and required to 
be made, in response to the plaintiff's original unlimited proffer. See supra note 145. 
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protection against truth-defeating unfairness :in the presentation of 
misleadingly incomplete evidence.166 This approach does not reproduce 
the "forced presentation" interpretation of completeness adumbrated 
above, and this could make a difference in some situations. Still, there may 
be no substantial loss in approaching the trumping function in this 
manner, pr(Jl)ided the distinctive cha..racter of completeness as a curative 
doctrine is kept firmly in view. 
C. Exclusionary Rules and the Reach of the Trumping Function 
We come now to the most important implications of the analysis. In 
this section, we take up the difficult question of the reach of the trumping 
function, that is, the delineation of those situations in which trumping is 
proper. We proceed by generalizing from the examples of trumping that 
have been used in the foregoing analysis, thereby obtaining a first-order 
approximation of the class of cases in which trumping is appropriate. 
Then, we refine the analysis by considering objections to the 
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the proposed class. 
1. Asymmetry and the Trumping Function 
Up to this point in the Article, abuse of the party-admission exception 
to the hearsay rule has been the sole example of the problem that gives 
rise to the trumping function. It is certainly the most commonly 
encountered example, but it is not the only one. For example, if the 
statement of a criminal defendant, part of which is used by the 
prosecution, is contained in the testimony of the defendant at a prior trial 
for the same offense, the problem becomes more complex. The 
prosecution can use the defendant's prior testimony either under the 
party-opponent admission exception or, if the defendant elects not to 
testify at the later trial, under the prior testimony exception. But the 
defend:mt can use neither exception. The prior testimony exception does 
not allow the defendant to present the remainder, for that exception 
depends upon· the declas.d..LJ.t being unavailable to the proponent of the 
hearsay. 167 And while the defendant is unavailable to the prosecution, he 
will not be considered unavailable to the defense.168 Therefore, if the 
166. In jurisdictions not governed by Fed. R Evid. 106, or state rules patterned on that 
rule, it is very hard to find decisions that clearly reject the trumping function. And the rare 
indications against trumping have been short-lived. For example, in Indiana, despite a long-
established trumping function, see Metzer v. State, 39 Ind. 590, 590-91 (1872), the law was 
confused in the 1980s by a decision in which a split court affirmed the tria! court's authority 
to exclude remainders because they were otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rule. See 
Duff v. State, 508 N.E.2d 17, 19, 21-22 (Ind. 1987). However, this rule was soon reversed, and 
the traditional trumping function was restored, in McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ind. 
1990) (holding that trial court erred in denying admission of remainder of defendant's 
statement). 
167. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 804(b) (1); see also McCormick, supra note 142, § 302, at 308. 
168. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 804(a)(l) (defining unavailability to include situations in which 
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doctrine of completeness modified only the party-opponent admissions 
exception, distortion of a defendant's statements could perhaps be effected 
by the prosecution's offering the partial statement only under the prior 
testimony exception. More generally, the prior testimony of a party or 
nonparty witness can be admissible on behalf of a proponent but not on 
behalf of his opponent, owing to differential application of the 
"unavailability" requirement 169 
Moreover, completeness can be important in this way well beyond the 
confines of the hearsay rule. Several such problems can arise in the 
context of the original document rule, which requires, unless excused, the 
use of the original to prove the terms of a document 170 Suppose, for 
example, that the original of a document is in the possession of a third 
person. Our proponent calls the adverse party as a witness and secures an 
admission from the opponent of only the portions of the writing's contents 
favorable to the proponent. In such a case, use of the original by the 
proponent is excused since its contents are acknowledged by the adverse 
party.171 But if, on cross-examination, the opponent is asked what further 
terms the writing contains, terms favorable to the opponent, the exception 
does not apply. Without the completeness doctrine, the opponent's further 
testimony would be admissible only if by chance some other exception to 
the original document rule applies or the opponent manages to subpoena 
the original mid-trial.172 If the proponent is willing to rely on the 
the declarant "is exempted by ruling of the court on ground of privilege from testifYing 
conceming the subject matter of the declarant's statement"); see also McCormick, supra note 
I42, § 353, at 132. 
169. For example, the federal rule specifYing hearsay exceptions conditioned on the 
unavailability of the declarant, after listing the various ways in which the declarant can be 
considered unavailable, qualifies the list as follows: "A declarant is not available as a witness if 
exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement 
or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness 
from attending or testifying." Fed. R Evid. 804(a). Such qualifications obviously can, indeed 
almost inevitably will, apply differentially to opposing parties. At common law, the 
completeness doctrine has been employed to trump the otherwise applicable hearsay 
exclusion when a proponent seeks to use such qualifications to block the opponent's 
introduction of the remainder of the declarant's utterance. See, e.g., King v. State, 287 S.W.2d 
642 (Tex. Grim. App. I956) (involving prior testimony exception as applied to testimony of 
defendant at previous trial). 
I70. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. I 002 (requiring original when writing, recording, or 
photograph used to prove contents thereof). See generally McCormick, supra note 142, § 230. 
In at least one context, the drafters of the Federal Rules specifically anticipated a complete-
ness issue in the administration of the original document rule. If there is no genuine issue of 
authenticity of the original from which a duplicate is made, the duplicate is to be treated as 
equivalent to the original unless "in the circumstances it would be unfu.ir to admit the 
duplicate in lieu of the original." Fed. R Evid. I 003. One circumstance identified as involving 
such unfairness is "when only a part of the original is reproduced and the remainder is 
needed for cross-examination or may disclose matters qualifying the part offered or otherwise 
useful to the opposing party." Fed. R Evid. I003 advisory committee's note (citing United 
States v. Alexander, 326 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. I964)). 
171. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 1 007; see also McCormick, supra note I42, § 242. 
I72. For example, Fed. R Evid. I 004 (2) provides that secondary evidence, like the 
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opponent's characterization of the documentary contents, he should at 
least be required to introduce the opponent's complete statement on the 
matter. 
Again, suppose the proponent offers the testimony of a nonparty 
witness to prove the contents of the document This time, the proponent 
invokes an exception to the original document rule that applies when the 
original is in the possession of an opponent who has been given reasonable 
notice to produce the original at trial.175 The opponent denies possession 
of the original, but the trial court fmds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the opponent has the original.174 Thus, the proponent is 
allowed to introduce secondary evidence, such as testimony of the 
document's contents. •However, the opponent claims that the secondary 
evidence is incomplete in omitting crucial passages of the document and 
proposes to add the remainder through further testimony. The proponent, 
however, now objects on the ground that the circumstances do not entitle 
the opponent to use the exception to the original document rule upon 
which the proponent relied, or any other exception recognized as part of 
the jurisprudence of the original document rule. The trial judge may have 
to agree, completeness aside, for by hypothesis the original is in the 
. f th 175 possession o e opponent. 
Alternatively, suppose the proponent's clainl, accepted by the trial 
court, is that the opponent destroyed the original in bad faith.176 The 
opponent admits the destruction but vehemently denies bad faith, saying 
the destruction was done pursuant to a regular business practice 
remainder of the proponent's secondary evidence, is admissible if "[n]o original can be 
obtained by any available judicial process or procedure." This exception could be invoked if 
the opponent obtains a stay in order to subpoena the original and demonstrates that the 
efforts to obtain the original, though reasonable, were ineffective. The exception might even 
be stretched to say that, because of time limitations at trial, the subpoena process is not 
reasonably available to the opponent. 
173. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 1004(3) (stating that original is not required if, "At the time 
when an original was under the control of the party against whom offered, that party was put 
on notice, by the pleadings or othecwise, that the contents would be a subject of pmof at the 
hearing, and that party does not produce the original at the hearing"); see also McCormick, 
suprn note 142, § 239. 
174. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), 1008; see also McCormick, suprn note 142, § 53. 
175. One might respond by noting that the opponent can always introduce the odginal. 
This is true, pwvided the trial court was conect in its judgment that the opponent has 
possession of the original. Given the standard of pmof on the issue, that judgment could be 
wwng in a significant number of cases. It is one thing to use the prepondecance of evidence 
standard to determine whether to excuse a pacty fmm presenting the original; it is another to 
use that same standard and determination as controlling the opponent's ability to present the 
remainder of secondary evidence introduced only in part by the proponent. There is also the 
possibility that the odginal was in possession of the opponent at a time when the pmponent 
secved notice of an intention to use secondary evidence but, with or without the fault of the 
opponent, it is not in opponent's possession at the time of trial. See suprn note 173. 
176. See Fed. R. Evid. 1004(1) (prescribing admission of other evidence of contents if "all 
originals ace lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad 
faith"); see also McComrlck, suprn note 142, § 237. 
VERBAL COMPLETENESS 879 
necessitated by the economics of information storage. In such a case, the 
opponent almost surely has no access to the original with which to counter 
the proponent's incomplete secondary evidence. One may say that such is 
the price the opponent must pay for her bad faith. But even putting aside 
residual doubts about the purpose of the admitted destruction, doubts 
which may be substantial, it is a dubious response to a litigant's bad faith 
to give a deliberately incomplete account of the document to the trier of 
fact, whose duty is to reach its best judgment of the truth on the merits. Is 
it not better to punish a procedurally miscreant party in some way other 
than skewing the evidence available to the trier of fact and thereby · 
knowingly interfering with the trier's effortS to perform its task?177 
The problem can be even more subtle than the previous examples 
would suggest. Consider, for example, the hearsay exception for statements 
against interest.178 Assuming the declarant is unavailable to both parties, 
this exception appears to be equally available to each side. However, there 
is a body of case law addressing when a statement not itself against interest 
is admissible in connection with a statement that is, usually because the 
former is closely connected with the latter.179 Now, what if the related 
statement not against the declarant's interest is against the interest of the 
proponent? One can expect the proponent not to raise the question of the 
bootstrap. Yet the incomplete statement thereby introduced may well call 
for a completing response by the opponent. Without the trumping 
function, this response is arguably precluded by the fact that the 
remainder is neither against the declarant's interest nor presented by the 
opponent together with against interest dedarations. 180 
These examples show that the need for a trumping function is not 
tied exclusively to the admissions exception to the hearsay rule, nor indeed 
to the whole set of hearsay exceptions. Rather, the trumping function is 
important in any context where the exclusionary rules are asymmetric, that 
177. See generally Nance, Missing Evidence, supra note 116, at 872-81 (arguing for caution 
in the use of punitive evidentiary sanctions). 
178. See Fed. R Evid. 804(b) (3) (prescribing admissibility of some such statements if 
declarant unavailable); see also McCormick, supra note 142, § 316. 
179. See, e.g., United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 629-31 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 447 U.S. 
926 (1980). See generally 5 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1465 
(Chadbourn rev. I 974). See also Model Code of Evidence Rule 509(2) (1942), which states: 
Subject to Rule 505 [governing criminal confessions], evidence of so much of a 
hearsay declaration is admissible as consists of a declaration against interest and such 
additional parts thereof, including matter incorporated by reference, as the judge 
finds to be so closely connected with the declaration against interest as to be equally 
trustworthy. 
A recent decision by the Supreme Court may have eliminated this possibility, at least in the 
federal courts. See Williamson v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (1994). 
180. Case law confirms trumping here as well. See, e.g., State v. Mallar, 508 A2d 1070, 
1071-72 (N.H. 1986) (affirming conditional exclusion of defendant's proffer of self-
inculpatory statements of a declarant unless completing statements inculpating defendant also 
admitted). 
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is, where the rules make certain evidence admissible if offered by one 
party, but inadmissible if offered by an opponent 181 The completeness 
doctrine is a "meta-rule" about admissibility, a rule about the use of other 
admissibility rules. More precisely, it is a rule to prevent the abuse of 
asymmetric exclusionary rules and asymmetric exceptions to exclusionary 
rules. This insight suggests a test for determining when trumping is 
appropriate, assuming the remainder satisfies the applicable relevance test: 
PRELIMINARY TEsT: Under the principle of completeness, evidence 
of the remainder should be admissible on demand of the 
opponent over an otherwise valid objection by the proponent to 
the same extent and for the same purposes as the combined 
evidence of the whole of the verbal event (original part plus 
remainder) would be admissible on behalf of the proponent 
This counterfuctual criterion attempts to respond directly to the defect in 
the adversarial presentation of evidence by correcting for the advantage 
that a proponent could otherwise gain by a partial introduction of the 
verbal event. As befits a meta-rule, it does not specify the purposes for 
which the remainder is admissible, but leaves that to be determined 
according to the counterfuctual consideration of the admissibility of the 
remainder by the proponent.182 The test responds to our sense of the 
unfairness involved when a proponent introduces only a pari of an 
utterance, when the opponent has no ability to respond with the 
remainder.183 The following subsection, however, will press this intuition. 
As is true more generally, the sense of fuirness cloaks other values that 
may, when made explicit, require us to qualify the Preliminary Test. 
181. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 266-67. This kind of asymmetry is a species 
of a broader genus that Professor Jonakait calls "biased" evidence rules. See Randolph N. 
J onakait, Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Judicial Analysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L. 
Rev. 67 (defining biased evidence rules as "those that permit one party to use a kind or class 
of evidence while prohibiting the other from using it"). 
182. In some cases, rules provide for admissibility of evidence without indicating the 
purpose for which admission is allowed. For example, if a witness uses a writing to refresh her 
memory, the writing may be admissible by a cross-examining party. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. fij 2. 
Rule 612 sets up an asymmetry because it does not allow the calling party to introduce the 
writing. See McCormick, supra note 142, § 9, at 33. Moreover, the rule does not specify for 
what purpose the writing is admissible; it does not specify what otherwise applicable 
exclusionary rules are being overridden. Under our Preliminary Test, an incomplete 
introduction of the writing by the cross-examining party could be met with a completing 
introduction of the remainder by the calling party. The purposes of both introductions must 
be worked out as part of the jurisprudence of Rule 612. See 3 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 
126, i 612[05], at 50-51 (opining that Rule 612 does not create exception to hearsay rule, use 
of the document under that Rule being limited to testing the credibility of the witness). 
183. This idea is briefly suggested in a recently published treatise: 
[I]f the initial statement fits ~ exception and the related statement would fit if the 
proponent offered it originally, the fact that the same exception would not be 
available to adverse parties should matter much less (or not at all) since the original 
proponent should not be able to misuse an exception in a misleading way. 
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 1.17, at 69 (1995) (footnote 
omitted). 
VERBAL COMPLETENESS 881 
2. Beyond Formal Asymmetry 
a. The overinclusiveness of asymmetry 
The test developed in the previous subsection is called "preliminary" 
because we must still consider whether it is overindusive or underindusive 
in its extension of the trumping function and its consequent admission of 
evidence. Consider first the question of overindusiveness: Should all 
asymmetric exclusionary rules be subject to trumping? We have already 
considered the hearsay rule and the original document rule in some of 
their many variations. Must we consider every other variation and every 
other rule separately, or can we make some useful generalizations? · 
i. Best evidence and other accuracy rules. - To begin with, trumping is 
surely appropriate when the asymmetric rule to be trumped is designed to 
facilitate accurate adjudication by assuring the presentation of the best 
reasonably available evidence on an issue. These are just those asymmetric 
rules based on the best evidence prin.ciple.184 This fact allows one to 
make sense of the otherwise cryptic remark made by Dean McCormick in 
describing the trumping function under the common-law rebuttal rule: 
This right is subject to the qualification that where the remainder 
is incompetent, not merely as to form as in the case of secondary 
evidence or hearsay, but because of its prejudicial character then 
the trial judge should exclude it if he finds the danger of 
prejudice outweighs the explanatory value.185 
In its ambiguous reference to "form," this passage suggests, but does not 
dearly articulate, the connection between the hearsay and original 
document rules. That connection is their mutual dependence on the best 
evidence principle.186 The trumping function is dearly appropriate in 
contexts where that principle is not being well served by a rule based upon 
it. 
The relative infrequency with which the trumping function arises in 
the original document rule context, in the modern· era of liberal discovery, 
results from the fact that the rule and its exceptions generally allow the 
opponent to present the remainder of the secondary evidence if either the 
original is also presented or it is unavailable to the opponent.1B'I As 
illustrated by the unusual character of the examples presented in the 
previous section, under such an excusing structure, trumping is rarely 
required. Substantial liberalization of the admissibility of hearsay, bringing 
that rule into greater harmony with the best evidence principle, would 
generate a similar excusing structure.188 Whether this would greatly 
184. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text. 
185. McCormick, supra note 5, § 56, at 146. This language appeared in all editions up to 
the current, fourth edition, where it is unfortunately dropped by the reviser in favor of the 
curative admissibility approach. See McCormick, supra note 142, § 56. 
186. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 286. 
187. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
188. See, e.g., Model Code of Evidence Rule 503 (1942) (prescribing admission of hearsay 
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:reduce the h1cidence of circumstances calling for the exercise of a 
!J--umping function depends on how the liberalization would affect the 
asymmetry of the admissibility of pri.o:r statements of parties.189 
At present, of course, the contours of the hearsay rule do not 
conform perfectly to the demands of the best evidence principle. Indeed, 
since the nineteenLh century, many have believed that the hearsay rule is 
motivated by a different truth-seeking rationale, that the probative value of 
hearsay is likely to be excessively credited by the trier of fuct, especially a 
lay jury.190 Although this theory is probably insufficient to support a 
general exclusionary rule for hea:rsay,191 its acceptance nonetheless almost 
certainly warrants trumping in contexts of asymmetry. Suspicions of jmor 
credulity cannot rationally be strong enough to malce acceptable the 
misleadingly incomplete admission of evidence under a hearsay exception 
gener<~Jly thought to obviate those suspicions. In the ove:nvhelming 
majority of cases, the omission will undermine the reliability thought to 
justify the exception. The same point applies as to other exclusionary rules 
similarly grounded,192 thus indicating a somewhat broader conclusion: 
if declarant testifies or is shown to be unavailable); Seigel, supra note 129, at 930-32 
(recommending admission of hearsay "if it is the best evidence available to the offering party 
from a particular declarant source, or if the best evidence has been or will be presented to 
the trier of fact"). 
189. See Seigel, supra note 129, at 938 (justifying party-opponent admissions exception 
under a best evidence approach to the hearsay rule). Although Professor Seigel does not 
address the issue, a theory of hearsay exclusion that rests on enforcing a preference for live 
testimony by the dec!ara.Tlt may render the exclusion of a nontestifying criminal defendant's 
proffer of his own out-of-court declarations unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege not to be compelled to testify, unless the declaration in question was 
generated just to avoid having to testify. That result would end much, but not all, of the 
asymmetry that necessitates the trumping function in criminal cases. Cf. Brown v. State, 450 
S.E.2d 821, 823 (Ga. 1994) (recognizing that trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
admit remainder of defendant's pretrial statement, on the ground that defendant was 
available to testify, could violate defendant's privilege); People v McLucas, 204 N.E.2d 846, 
847-48 (N.Y. 1965) (holding that trial court's limitation on use of exculpatory remainder of 
defendant's statement because it "does not take the place of sworn testimony from the witness 
chair" violates defendant's privilege). 
190. See Nance, Understanding Responses to Hearsay, supra note 129, at 460-64 
(distinguishing "taint" theories from "inducement" theories, the former excluding hearsay 
because of the truth-defeating effects of the hearsay itself, and the latter excluding hearsay as 
a means of inducing its proponent to present the "better evidence" testimony of the 
declarant). Not to be confused with such taint theories is one that prescribes the exclusion of 
hearsay when necessary in order to conserve the cognitive resources of the trier of fact for the 
evaluation of more important evidence. See Craig R Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 
47 Va..rJd. L. Rev. 43 (1994). The latter Lheory can be a_rticu!ated in a manner consistent with 
the epistemic best evidence principle. 
191. See Seigel, supra note 129, at 905-16 (rejecting what he calls the "misinformation" 
theory of excluding hearsay). 
192. An example would be the so-called Dead Man's Acts, which. commonly prohibit a 
party adverse to the interests of an estate from testifying to statements made by the deceased. 
See, e.g., Reeves v. Lyon, 277 N.W. 749, 754 (Iowa 1938) (invoking completeness doctrine to 
hold that estate's use of part of conversation allows adverse party to use remainder). 
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Trumping should generally apply in cases of asymmetry in any exclusionary 
rule that regulates the admission of evidence primarily in order to facilitate 
accuracy of adJudication. 195 . 
ii. Privilege rules. - Questions of privilege are only somewhat more 
troublesome, provided the privilege is held by the proponent. Of course, 
the concept of privilege competes with truth finding in its attempt to 
protect confidentiality or secrecy at the cost of adjudicative accuracy.194 
And it might seem that this would be the strongest argument for 
overriding the best evidence principle. However, in many cases, probably 
most, the very presentation of the original part will effect a waiver of the 
privilege under conventional privilege rules.195 Indeed, it has been 
argued that preventing a proponent from utilizing misleading incomplete-
ness is precisely the proper focus of the waiver rules. 196 But if no waiver is 
found, the court will need to make a further determination as to whether 
the interests of justice require the negation of the privilege to the extent 
necessary to correct the incompleteness of the proponent's proffer. A 
possible, though unusual, example is when the original incomplete 
193. Important asymmetric rules, to. which trumping readily applies, are those ordinarily 
symmetrical objections that are held not to apply to a party opponent's admissions. For 
example, the proponent offers part of a statement of an opponent that does not of itself 
indicate "personal" or first-hand knowl~dge of the facts stated. The usual personal knowledge 
requirement is dropped in such cases. See McCormick, supra note 142, § 255, at 144-47. 
However, if the opponent offers a remainder similarly devoid of evidence of personal 
knowledge, this exception would not apply without the help of the completeness doctrine. 
194. See McCormick, supra note 142, § 72. To be sure, some privileges may actually 
contribute to the flow of relevant information to tribunals. See Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive 
Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. Legal Stud. 359, 
361-62 (1990): 
In brief, our argument is that the attorney-client privilege and the work product 
doctrine offer two perspectives on a larger goal, which is to increase the amount of 
information about disputes available to courts and to work against the disincentives 
to the production of that information which would otherwise exist. 
195. See generally McCormick, supra note 142, § 83, at 305-06 (concerning marital 
privilege), § 93, at 344 (concerning attorney-client privilege), § 103, at 386-87 (concerning 
physician-patient privilege). A fair restatement of the Jaw is that 
A person upon whom t.hese rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the 
privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or 
consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter. This rule does 
not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged. 
Unif. R Evid. 510. See also Proposed Fed. R Evid. 51 I. An occasional case makes the 
connection between the doctrine of completeness and that of waiver of privilege. See, e.g., 
Struble v. Village of De Witt, 132 N.W. 124 (Neb. 1911) (invoking completeness doctrine in 
considering waiver of confidential communications between patient and physician). 
196. See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1605, 1607 (1986) (arguing that in analyzing attorney-client privilege waiver issues, "the 
focus should be on unfairness flowing from the act on which the waiver is premised. Thus 
focused, the principal concern is selective use of privileged materials to garble the truth, 
which mandates giving the opponent access to related privileged material to set the record 
straight."). Some decisions have narrowed the scope of waivers to countering only such 
misleadingly incomplete disclosures. See, e.g., In· revon Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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statement does not itself contain any portion of a privileged communica-
tion, but the necessary remainder does.197 If the privilege is neither 
waived nor trumped, the court should malce a final determination as to 
whether the original proffer should be admitted, or allowed to remain in 
evidence.198 Essentially the same analysis applies in the context of "quasi-
privilege" doctrines that exclude evidence in order to promote or protect 
certain kinds of conduct by actual or potentiallitigants.199 
iii. Prejudice rules. - Finally, objections to the remainder based on 
prejudice to the proponent are the most problematic because there is as 
yet no fully adequate theory of what prejudice is or why courts exclude 
evidence on account of it 200 Putting aside the simple risk of inaccu_rate 
evaluations of evidence discussed above, prejudice can be characterized as 
a "tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though 
not necessarily, an emotional one." 201 This, in tum, can be understood as 
197. The question would be whether the proponent has "consented" to disclosure even 
though he has not disclosed any part of the privileged matter. See Unif. R. Evid. 510 (quoted 
supra note 194). This presupposes that the privilege can extend to a part of the whole 
conversation in a way that the privileged part satisfies the relevance test for completeness with 
respect to the unprivileged part. See John K Baldwin, Note, Does the Attorney-Client Privilege 
Extend to a Confidential Part of a Non-Confidential Communication?, 32 S. Cal. L. Rev. 212, 
216-17 (1959) (noting t.he connection between completeness and waiver but doubting Lhat the 
privileged part will often satisfy the relevance test by qualifying the unprivileged part). 
198. See e.g., United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986) (''Rule 106 was 
not intended to override every privilege and other exclusionary rule of evidence in the legal 
armamentarium, so there must be cases where if <h'1 excerpt is misleading the only cure is to 
exclude it rat.her Lhan to put in other excerpts."). See also Graham, supra note 57, § 106.1, at 
55 n.l3 ("If the otherwise inadmissible evidence necessary in fairness to explain, modify, 
qualify, or otherwise shed light upon the evidence being offered is absolutely barred for 
constitutional or as [sic] other reasons, it is open to the trial judge to exclude the originally 
proffered evidence under Rule 403."). 
199. See McCormick, supra note 142, § 72.1 (distinguishing true privileges from rules 
excluding evidence of subsequent remedial repairs, offers of compromise, and so forth). For a 
codification of the notions of waiver and trumping, see Fed. R. Evid. 410(i) (allowing 
admission or remainder of statements made in plea bargaining). Cj Lindley v. Wabash Ry. 
Co., 233 N.W. 450 (Neb. 1930) (admitting remainder of events even though it included 
information about subsequent repairs). 
200. As a preliminary matter, one might object that exclusions for prejudice are not 
asymmetrical; any party may object to improper prejudice toward any party. But while the 
rules excluding evidence for prejudice, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 403, do not explicitly limit sta._nding 
to raise Lhe objection, a trial judge probably is obligated to accept a party's waiver of the risk 
of prejudice to that party. Add to that the a priori unlikelihood that an objection will be 
invoked by someone other than the adversely affected party, and one readily concludes that 
prejudice rules are essentially asymmetrical. 
201. Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note. See Richard D. Friedman, The Elements 
of Evidence 61-62 (1991): 
We may break [the danger of unfair prejudice] into two types. First, some evidence 
may bias the juror[s], effectively distorting the burden of persuasion that they apply; 
for example, proof that an accused is a native of a nation with which we are on 
unfriendly terms might encourage some jurors to convict him even though they are 
not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt about his guilt. Second, some evidence 
might be overvalued by the jury; for example, in some cases jurors might be inclined 
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the regrettable consequence of the admission of evidence before a trier of 
fact, willing to render a decision contrary to its own rational judgment of the 
facts under the applicable burden of persuasion. This sort of explanation 
may depend on a concept of juror irrationality or obstinacy causing less 
accurate results when certain evidence is presented than when it is not, 
even if tha.t evidence is epistemically the best aVailable.202 Alternatively, 
prejudice can be seen as improper litigant conduct in appealing to the 
baser side of the trier of fact, whether or not one predicts that the appeal 
will be successful in the particular case.203 In either event, a balancing of 
competing considerations is dearly necessary in order to decide whether 
the remainder should be admitted, although the nature of that balancing 
will depend on the theory of prejudice adopted. Without attempting to 
develop such a theory here, one can simply conclude that when 
proponents raise the issue of prejudice associated with the remainder, 
essentially the same procedure must be employed as in the case of 
privilege claims in which no waiver is found; trumping is not automat-
ic.204 
b. The underinclusiveness of asymmetry 
Consider now the issue of underindusiveness. Does the asymmetry test 
admit too little? In other words, does the Preliminary Test exclude from 
trumping cases that ought to included? Here the issue focuses on those 
situations in which the remainder, hypothetically considered, would be 
inadmissible if offered by the proponent. Obviously, such cases present an 
to give some evidence with an appearance of scientific complexity far more weight 
than it merits. 
202. See, e.g., Andrew K Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 220, 22fi..28, 235-37, 240-42 (1976); Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of EVidence 403: 
Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 Wash. L Rev. 497, 503-06 
(1983); Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021, 1036 (1977). 
203. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 291-92. The viability of controlling 
potential prejudice by the use of limiting or cautionary instructions may also depend on which 
theory of prejudice one endorses, being easier to justify under the latter theory. See id. at 292-
93. 
204. Compare In re Mann's Estate, 189 N.W. 991, 996 (Mich. 1922) (affirming trial court's 
requirement that all of will be introduced, notwithstanding the potential prejudice arising 
from the jury's exposure to the relative wealth of the contestants), with Derrick v. Rock, 236 
S.W.2d 726, 728-29 (Ark. 1951) (holding that putative remainder was erroneously admitted 
because it was irrelevant to the part introduced and contained prejudicial information about 
insurance), andJeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 18 N.W.2d 582, 585-89 (Minn. 1945) (same). 
Unlike privilege claims, however, if the remainder is admitted over a claim of prejudice, 
and the prejudicial aspect of the remainder is distinguishable from its completing uses, 
limiting or cautionary instructions are appropriate. CJ United States v. Apuzzo, 245 F.2d 416, 
420 n.4, 421-22 (2d ar. 1957) (holding no error in trial court's admission of remainder 
containing potentially prejudicial reference to defendant's prior arrest for similar offense, 
when trial judge instructed jury not to infer defendant's guilt from the fact of a prior arrest; 
affirmance based on waiver by invited response as well as verbal completeness). 
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obstacle to trumping under a theory that rests on the idea of m_andatory 
presentation by the proponent How GL1l the proponent be compelled to 
introduce that which he has no right to introduce?~05 Two genera] 
contexts should be distinguished. In each, the question is whether to allow 
trumping or to leave the opponent to other remedies that may be 
available. As discussed in the previous section, these remedies include: ( 1) 
disallowing the proponent's evidence on the ground that it is substantially 
misleading relative to its probative value and (2) involuiJ.g cu1-ative 
admissibility to introduce the remainder for the limited purpose of 
negating the proponent's evidence. This leads us into especially difficult 
problems of choosing the optimal institutional response, but we may 
console ourselves in the resulting ambivalence with the recognition that 
these situations are very unusual as compared to the completeness 
problems already discussed.206 
i. Complenu;ntary asymmetric rules. - First, in addition to ru"l asyrnumeu-ic 
rule blocking the opponent's response, the proponent's introduction of 
the remainder could be subject to an objection asymmetrically available 
only Ito the opponent, for example a privilege or quasi-privilege held by the 
opponent Of course, the opponent can waive the latter in choosing to 
introduce the remainder, thus leaving in place only the asymmetric 
objection favoring the proponent Indeed, the opponent is not :raising the 
secondary objection tworing her as to the remainder, so fue proponent :in 
fact could have introduced the remainder, and a functional asymmeuy is 
presented.207 Moreover, the opponent ought not to be in a worse 
position, a.>d Lhe proponent ought not to be in a better position, than if 
205. Recall the reluctance of common-law courts to accept completeness as a..r1 argument 
to allow the proponent to admit additional portions of an utterance that are otherwise 
inadmissible. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
206. Certain cases we may set aside. If the remainder is unavailable, then forced 
presentation obviously would mal'e no sense. It might seem that forced presentation also 
mal,es no sense when the remainder is available only to the opponent, but since the 
proponent probably could have obtained the remainder by discovert a.""Jd L.'le opponcat 
ultimately makes the remainder availa!)le to the tribunal, there is no reason to deny that it 
can, in principle or in practice, be made available to the proponent for presentation. 
207. One might suggest that such situations caii for exclusion of the proponent's 
incomplete evidence, even though the discovery function is not in play, because of the 
potential invasion of the opponent's privilege that admission represents. But there is generally 
no reason to prohibit the introduction of evidence simply because it will put pressure on the 
opponent to waive his right to keep out other evidence. See, e.g., Marcus v. United States, 86 
F.2d 854, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (holding defendant's confession, redacted to omit references 
to other crimes, admissible for the prosecution despite the alleged incompleteness); United 
States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (holding redacted testimony of 
defendant from former trial admissible for prosecution, even though remainder would 
include cross-examination concerning the defendant's exercise of Fifth Amendment rights 
which had been held unconstitutional in previous appeal, so long as redaction would not 
garble the sense of the former testimony). Of course, without recourse to the completeness 
doctrine, the trial court certainly has the di~cretion to eJl:clude a proffer of minimal probative 
value if the primary purpose of the proffer is to create a misleading impression that can only 
be eliminated by the opponent's waiving the privilege in question. See Fed. R Evid. 403. 
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no such additional objection, intended solely for the protection of the 
opponent, were available. So these cases should qualifY for trumping, and 
the Preliminary Test is underiilclusive.in this regard, unless it presupposes 
the opponent's waiver of such additional . asymmetric objections. This 
problem can be rectified by changing the counterfactual to allow trumping 
if the evidence of the whole utterance would - be admissible by the 
proponent over the same objection by the opponent 
ii(a). Judicial economy rules.- Second, there could be an objection to 
the remainder equally available to each of the opposing parties as against 
the other. This problem might also be superimposed on a distinct 
asymmetric rule favoring the proponent. The symmetric objection would 
not be trumped even under the expanded test just articulated. But should 
it be? In two subcategories the answer clearly is in the negative. The first is 
the symmetrically available objection that the probative value of the 
remainder, though extant, is so minimal in comparison to the time and 
effort nececessary to introduce and evaluate it that it should be excluded 
in the interests of judicial economy.208 Such objections obviously should 
not be subject to a completeness override. The contractionary dimension 
of the best evidence principle they instantiate is not rendered inoperative 
by the introduction of part of an utterance. On the other band, the 
unusual probative value of a completing remainder may help to establish 
that its consideration by the tribunal is not in fuct a waste of time under 
the rule that the proponent has invoked.209 
ii(b ). Third party privileges. - The second subcategory that should be 
immunized from trumping involves a valid objection to the remainder that 
renders it inadmissible on behalf of either party as a consequence of the 
need to avoid prejudice to a third party or violation of a privilege held by a 
third person.210 Here the interests of third persons argue against 
trumping; such persons are not responsible for the misleading proffer, 
though they may seek to take advantage of the opponent's incapacity to 
respond. 211 If the third person does not consent to the introduction of 
208. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 403 (allowing exclusion of relevant evidence if probative value 
substantially outweighed by Lhe danger of W"'..ste of time). The resulting exclusion of releva...>t 
evidence is not necessarily in conflict with the goal of truth finding. In some cases, exclusion 
may actually enhance the accuracy of adjudication by shepherding the unavoidably limited 
resources of the trier of facL 
209. See supra note 33 and accompanying texL As compared to a claim of prejudice to the 
proponent, the courts have a distinct and more significant interest in monitoring the issue of 
judicial economy, and- the objection cannot therefore be viewed as fully waivable by the 
proponent or as essentially asymmetrical. CJ. supra note 200. 
210. In addition to the usual rules of privilege, some rules protecting witnesses from the 
admission of impeaching evidence may be put in this category. See r.g., Fed. R Evid. 412 
(stating federal "rape shield" rule); State v. Miskell, 451 A2d 383 (N.H. 1982) (interpreting 
rape shield statute as creating a privilege for complainant). This example also illustrates how 
the proponent may have standing to raise the objection on behalf of the third person; 
otherwise, there would be nothing to trump under the Preliminary Test as worded. 
21]. Of course, if the remainder can be edited so as to achieve the explanatory function 
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the remainder, the court faces the decision whether to admit the 
incomplete utterance without the remainder, to admit the remainder for a 
limited use as between the proponent and opponent, or to exclude the 
whole of the utterance.212 The second option, moreover, seems plausible 
only in cases of potential prejudice to a third party, not those involving the 
privilege of a third person, since limited use would still entail disclosure of 
the privileged material. However, the completeness doctrine is implicated 
if the proponent, though not technically the holder of the privilege, is 
effectively in control of its exercise. In such a case, an effective asymmetry 
may exist because in practice the proponent can choose whether to admit 
the complete verbal event.m This contingency also requires recognition 
in a revised test for trumping. 
ii(c). Symmetric accuracy rules.- A third large subcategory of symmetric 
exclusionary rules poses perhaps the most difficult trumping issues. 
Suppose evidence of the remainder· is blocked by a symmetrical 
exclusionary rule that is intended to improve accuracy by inducing the 
presentation of better evidence than that offered, or by eliminating 
evidence that might be accorded excessive weight, or both.214 For 
without jeopardizing the legitimate interests of the third person, then the potential conflict 
between completeness and the protection of the third party's interest can be avoided. See, e.g., 
State v. Turecek, 456 N.W.2d 219, 225-26 (Iowa 1990) (affirming admission of taped statement 
by defendant in child abuse case, when defendant was allowed to testify to related 
conversation with victim in order to clarify meaning of defendant's apology to victim; 
remainder of conversation relating to prior abuse of victim by another excluded in 
accordance with Iowa's rape shield rule). 
212. Under the Federal Rules, the decision is at the interface of Rule 403 (discretionary 
exclusion) with Rule 105 (limited admissibility). See Fed. R. Evid. 105 advisory committee's 
note (advising that limited admissibility may be rejected in cases of undue prejudice). See, e.g., 
United States v. Bigelow, 914 F.2d 966, 971-72 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1077 (1990) 
(holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to admit marginally exculpatory 
remainder of defendant's statement that would strongly inculpate co-defendant in violation of 
latter's confrontation rights); United States v. Ford, 771 F.2d 60, 62-64 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding defendant's proffer of both 
complete and redacted version of co-conspirator's post-arrest statement offe1ed as a 
declaration against penal interest; confrontation rights of co-defendant implicated). Also 
available as a means to avoid prejudice to a co-defendant third party is the option to sever 
trials. Compare People v. LaBelle, 22 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that trial court erred in 
not granting motion to sever trials of joint defendants and then allowing prosecution to use 
redacted statement of one defendant that omitted exculpatory parts), with United States v. 
Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 650-51, 655-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1989) (finding no 
error in not granting motion to sever trials of joint defendants and then allowing prosecution 
to use redacted statement of defendant that omitted parts implicating co-defendant but 
included substance of defendant's exculpatory assertions). 
213. If introduction of the original part violated the same third-party privilege, then a 
mixed problem of curative admissibility and completeness results. The proponent cannot 
choose to raise the privilege bar without requiring the exclusion of both parts; even if the 
proponent cannot formally waive a third party's privilege, and even if the proponent is not in 
effective control of the third party's decision about waiver, the introduction of part of the 
privileged matter may be treated under an estoppel theory as a waiver of the proponent's right 
to invoke the privilege. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text. 
214. These are expansionary and substitutionary best evidence rules, such as the hearsay 
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example, suppose again that a partial confession is introduced by the 
testimony of a police officer who heard the defendant's oral statement 
This time, the defendant offers as rebuttal the testimony of a witness who 
says he was told by someone that the defendant also made an exculpatory 
explanation on the same occasion. Without regard to trumping, this would 
be excludable "double" hearsay when offered by either party, though the 
reason for its exclusion when offered by the prosecution is only the second 
level of hearsay that does not come within the exception for a party 
admission. 215 
It is hard to state a general conclusion about whether to allow 
trumping in such situations. Once again, to reconcile trumping with a 
forced presentation theory of completeness, one must rely on the not 
wholly satisfYing fact that the opponent would not in fact exercise her right 
to object to the remainder if it were offered by the proponent. One can 
make the further, admittedly abstract argument to support trumping 
generally. Any symmetric exclusionary rule can, in principle, be divided 
into two asymmetric exclusionary rules, one favoring the proponent and 
one favoring the opponent The former is exactly the kind of rule 
paradigmatically subject to trumping, whereas the latter is waivable by the 
opponent under the same reasoning applied above to cases involving the 
existence of a secondary privilege rule favoring the opponent. Why then 
should it matter that the exclusionary reasons applicable to both parties 
arise under distinct rules rather than the same rule? Moreover, the 
pmpose of symmetrical exclusionary rules is almost invariably. to facilitate 
accuracy of judgment without unwarranted expense in time or other 
resources,216 and once again, that is when trumping has its strongest 
appeal. 
· But not in every case. Consider the partial confession case 
hypothesized above. Certainly, there are occasions in which the opponent's 
responsive testimony is the best available evidence with respect to the 
content of the remainder; in the stated hypothetical, for example, the 
prosecution's witness may not have heard the entirety of the confession, 
and the "someone" who told the defense witness about the remainder 
rule, the original document rule, and the opinion rule, as well as other symmetric accuracy 
rules. See generally Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 278-94. 
215. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 805 (excluding hearsay within hearsay unless exceptions apply 
at each level). (Technically, in the federal scheme admissions of a party opponent are 
nonhearsay, so the prosecution faces only a single level hearsay problem; but the resulting 
issue is the same as under the conventional, double hearsay sclJeme of the common law.) 
Moreover, the analysis assumes that residual exceptions to the hearsay rule do not apply. See 
Fed. R Evid 803(24), 804(b)(5). The requirement of advance notice of the use of evidence 
under these rules would militate against their use for completeness purposes in situations 
where the proponent's introduction of incomplete reports of utterances cannot be 
anticipated. 
216. The only discemable exceptions are rules protecting third persons, rules that apply to 
both proponent and opponent but which cannot ordinarily be invoked by either of them. This 
matter is addressed supra notes 210-12 q.nd accompanying text. 
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might be a since-deceased officer who heard the remainder. This possibility 
seems to demand an expa...J.Sion of the test to allow trumping of symmetric 
rules. The risk of misleading incompleteness dwarlS any hearsay 
concems.217 On the od1er hand, a different case is presented if the 
second officer is still available to testify. Then, either the second officer 
would testifY favorably to defendant, in which case the defendant would 
have called ilie officer, and iliere would be no double hearsay problem; or 
the second officer would deny the qualifYing remainder or provide it in a 
form less favorable to defendant than that offered by the defense witness 
in the hypothetical, leading the defendant to offer the double hearsay. In 
tlJ.e latter case, arguably the defendant's proffer should be rejected: The 
second officer's testimony is presumptively better evidence of ilie 
remainder, as the hearsay rule implies. To this extent, the hearsay rule can 
be honored without precluding evideJq.ce of the remainder; indeed, 
application of the rule stands to improve the reliability of the evidence of 
t:he remainder.218 But the opposite conclusion should obtain if the 
second officer's declaration V.'<!S made under conditions reducing the 
probative dangers of hearsay, especially if the testimoniall report of the 
remainder is made by an apparently neutral or pro-prosecution witness.219 
One may conclude that the court should exclude the remainder 
unde:n: a symmetric rule to the extent that the objection .raised by the 
proponent is due to a defect in the opponent's evidence that -..ve can 
reasonably expect lhe opponent to be able to cure a...1d the curing of which 
will likely improve the quality of the evidence of the remainder of the 
utterance. The limited case law available tends to confi.nn such a view. 220 
217. Once again, the fact that the proponent can and has presented evidence of part of 
the utterance inherently reduces the risk of total fabrication by the opponent, since 
proponent's witness will very likely have knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the 
alleged remainder. Cj supra note 68 and accompanying text. The importance of such 
background information affecting the reliability of hearsay is emphasized by Professor Swift, 
supr2 note 129. 
218. Of course, one can argue that the assumption of the availabilit"f of the second officer 
renders the prosecution's objection unnecessary, since ihe second officer may be called by the 
prosecution if it considers tl1c hearsay account of his :report unacceptable. However, this 
argument is one that applies quite generally to all hearsay from an available but nontestifying 
declarant. The same reasons for excluding hearsay from such a declarant, whatever Lhey are 
and however convincing they may be, apply here. (The best evidence principle is the most 
coherent reason to exclude such hearsay, if exclusion is justifiable at all.) And in this context, 
deference to those reasons does not present an inescapable conflict with the completeness 
principle. 
219. This ungainly qualification would be unnecessary if the hearsay rule were reformed in 
the direction of greater conformity to the best evidence principle, as that would certainly 
allow the opponent to present the hearsay of the second officer's statement as long as the 
second officer also testifies, see supra note 188, and perhaps even if not, given Lhe officer's 
identification with the prosecution. See Seigel, supra note ] 29, at 938 (best evidence hearsay 
rule should admit hearsay statements of a person strongly identified with an opposing party). 
220. See, e.g., State v. Ryder, 348 A2d 1, 3-5 (Me. 1975) (holding remainder evidence 
rightly excluded as improper in form on account of witness's use of unnecessary opinion; 
remainder could have been introduced by properly phrased questions). Note that in Ryder the 
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In this respect, the brief formula suggested by Dean McCormick221 is just 
backwards: Objections like hearsay .<Uld secondary evidence should be 
applied to the remainder evidence precisely,when they are objections only 
"to form," if by that one means curable 9bjections to the manner of 
evidencing the remainder as opposed to objections that, if sustained, would 
preclude the opponent's evidencing the remainder at all Conversely, an 
incurable admissibility defect should not stand in the way of eliminating 
the greater defect of incompleteness, unless of course the former is the 
unlikely circumstance that introduction of the remainder evidence would 
cause an inordinate consumption of time or money relative to the 
significance of the issue in question. 
To be sure, the problem with this scheme is that the substitution of 
the curable defect standard for rules symmetrically excluding the 
remainder amounts to a significant modification of the hearsay rule and 
other symmetrical rules in accordance with the best evidence priiiciple. 
Some may consider this too radical in liberalizing admissibility. But when 
limited to evidencing a verbal event that has already been broached by the 
proponent, it is hard to see how this is undesirable.222 
3. The Problem of a Source Limitation Revisited 
Notice, however, that the confession hypothetical just discussed is 
ambiguous as to the testimonial source of the remainder: The witness who 
is to report the hearsay version of the remainder might or might not be 
the witness through whom the prosecution offered the original part. As 
discussed at the end of Part II, nearly all reported trumping cases involve a 
remainder evidenced by the proponent's chosen source, whether a witness 
defect of the opponent's response was avoidable by the opponent. Also, the .court endorsed 
earlier decisions, from Maine and from other states, allowing trumping in the more typical 
contexts. Id. at 4 (citing, inter alia, Storer v. GoTen, 18 Me. 174, 176-77 (1841) ). 
221. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
222. Among the most pervasive symmetric exclusionary rules are the authentication and 
identification Tequirements for tangible evidence. See gen .. i•mlly McCormick, supra note 142, § 
212, at 7-9 (discussing identification of real evidence), § 218 (discussing authentication of 
documents). Since authentication of a portion of a document will usually entail authentica-
tion of the whole of the same document, the opponent's completeness motion will rarely be 
impeded by authentication concerns, and the same point applies to identification. Moreover, 
to the extent that these requirements are interpreted flexibly, in accordance with the best 
evidence principle, they should only rarely present an occasion for exclusion on account of an 
.incurable defect in the foundation for the remainder. See Dale A Nance, Conditional 
Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L Rev. 447, 484-88, 492-97 (1990) (rejecting the 
"conditional relevance" explanation of authentication and identification requirements and 
arguing for an excusable preference structure). However, a less flexible interpretation has not 
been uncommon, and the occasional case in which a problem arises does seem to allow for 
trumping. See, e.g., McBrayer v. Walker, 50 S.E. 95 (Ga. 1905) (holding that opponent is not 
required to offer evidence authenticating entries on back of deed introduced by proponent, 
even though proponent relied only on information on the front). 
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or document.223 If this pattern suggests a rule, then the opponent may 
introduce a Temainder pursuant to the completeness :rule, over an 
otherwise valid objection, only to the extent that the remainde>: can be 
elicited from ilie proponent's witness, or from lhe complete version of lhe 
document only part of which the proponent has introduced. On ilie other 
hand, if there is no same-source limitation, as apparently was held in the 
Williams case, then the opponent is free to use other sources to complete 
the utterance and stiH take advantage of the trumping function. 224 In the 
earlier discussion, this issue was left unresolved. Can we now give a more 
defmitive answer? 
If the "forced presentation" theory of completeness :is taken as the 
starting point, a same-source limitation might seem proper. One way to 
express the adversarial privilege is that a litigant should generally be free 
to choose evidential sources, though he need not and should not be free 
to distort what a given source has to offer the tribunal.. Mter all, the 
witness's oath, with which we started our discussion, requires only that 
witnesses tell the whole truth as they know it. That requirement pennits a 
witness to give an incomplete account, as long as the information needed 
to make it complete is not lmown by the witness. As to other sources, it is 
at least plausible that the usual. exclusionary rules should apply. 
However, one must not confuse the 1-vitness's duty with the litigant's 
duty. Even though a given witness cannot be expected or even encouraged 
to tell more than he or she lmows, the proponent is in a di_fferent sirnation 
when he has lmowledge that the witness's accormt is incomplete. Thus, 
while it may be true that the proponent is free to choose his evidential. 
sources, and it may also be true that he should not be free to distort what 
a given source has to offer the tribunal, it may further be true that the 
proponent should not be free to use a complete account of what one witness 
knows (or is willing to reveal) in order to distort the evidence of a verbal 
utterance by omitting information available from a different source that 
cannot be introduced by his opponent So we must look further in order 
to resolve this issue. 
Consider what a sa..vne-source li..vnitation means for the typical case in 
which the opponent's remainder is blocked by the asyr11metric party-
opponent exception to the hearsay rule. Under such a regime, the 
opponent can c.ross-e:xami.ne the proponent's mtness concerning the 
remainder; if the wiLness admowledges the remainder it can be used 
substantively just as i.f the proponent had presented the remainder on 
direct If, however, the witness denies the utterance of a remainder, that 
ends the completeness motion as such. Independent evidence of the 
remainder can still be used, but only for impeachment purposes, or more 
precisely, only if otherwise admissible. And if the mtness denies knowledge 
of the remainder, but admowledges the possibility of its utterance (say 
223. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text 
224. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text 
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because the witness did not hear all that the opponent may have said on 
the occasion), then even impeachment of the witness is barred, at least in 
theory, since evidence of the remainder is in no way inconsistent with the 
witness's truthfulness. Nevertheless, the incompleteness of the witness's 
knowledge will at least appear on cross-e:xamlnation and serve to alert the 
trier of fact to the dangers of relying on the proponent's version of the 
utterance.225 
Now this scheme presents some fairly serious difficulties, given what 
has already been argued. For example, it would mean that a video-taped 
remainder, like that involved in the Williams case, would ·not be 
substantively admissible, even though the tape is undeniably superior 
evidence of the defendant's confession than the officer's testimonial 
account introduced by the prosecution.226 Yet paradoxically, if the video-
tape were no longer available to be introduced, and the proponent's 
witness were aware of its contents, the opponent could admit substantively 
the witness's account of the remainder derived entirely from the 
unavailable tape. This follows from the claim of the previous section that 
an incurable symmetric objection to the remainder is subject to trumping 
combined with the fact that in this case the trumping would come from 
the same source. But how can it be tbat an available video-tape is 
substantively inadmissible, while secondary evidence of the contents of an 
unavailable video-tape is substantively admissible? This kind of inconsisten-
cy can be avoided only by retreating to a scheme in which symmetric 
exclusionary rules are not subject to trumping at all, even if the defect that 
they address is incurable. 
A more fundamental, if more abstract problem is that a same-source 
limitation has the effect of turning completeness into a kind of "voucher" 
rule, whereby the proponent vouches for the particular evidentiary source. 
To be sure, this is not the same as the traditional notion that a proponent 
is estopped from controverting the testimony of his own witness, a 
restdction which has been 1ightly rejected in modern evidence iaw.227 
225. A similar regime would apply to documentary proof. ff the proponent introduces part 
of a documentary record of the opponent's admission, the opponent can cross-examine the 
sponsoring witness with regard to other parts, or otherwise introduce the remainder that will 
have been subject to discovery. ff the document relied on by the proponent reveals a 
qualifying part, it may be introduced and used substantively just as if the proponent had 
presented the remainder together with the original proffer. ff, however, no qualifying 
remainder appears from the document from which the proponent has drawn his proffer, then 
the opponent will be unable to use the completeness motion to introduce independent 
testimonial or documentary evidence of a claimed remainder. Such evidence will be limited to 
impeachment uses. 
226. One may be accustomed to this perversity in the form of the routine ruling that the 
testimony is not excludable in favor of the tape by virtue of a "best evidence" objection. See 
Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 227-29. However, the issue here is not whether to 
exclude the testimony, but whether to admit the tape as well. 
227. See generally 3A John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law §§ 896-99 
(Chadbourn rev. 1970). The application of this rejection of voucher to evidence presented by 
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Nonetheless, a same-source limitation seems to rely on the idea that the 
proponent must at least vouch for the admissibility of the remainder, 
precisely because he has introduced a part of what that source has to offer 
the tribunal. This source-based voucher draws on the same discredited 
moral intuition as the traditional voucher rule. Moreover, if the theoretical 
account of completeness offered here is correct, it arises from the demand 
· for the best available evidence, applied within an adversarial structure of 
rules that incorporates that idea as a heavilly weighted, but not exclusive 
principle. Neither a same~source restriction nor its implicit voucher 
concept speaks to such a theory of completeness. 
On the other hand, different problems must be addressed if trumping 
is not confmed to what can be elicited from the proponent's source. The 
most important issue arises from the fact that, when the remainder is 
evidenced from an independent source, there is a much greater chance 
that the proponent will plausibly dispute the utterance of the putative 
remainder or claim that any such remainder was different from that 
asserted by the opponent 228 Of course, the fact that one side disputes 
events evidenced by the other is ordinarily no cause for alarm; but in the 
context of a completeness motion, the question is whether forced 
presentation is theoretically appropriate. It is hard to infer that the 
proponent should have presented evidence of a remainder that the 
proponent believes was not uttered. 
This suggests that before allowing trumping, especially from a distinct 
evidential source, the trial court should make a preliminary fmding that 
the remainder was uttered as claimed. More precisely, upon the 
proponent's challenge to either the occurrence or the content of the 
remainder utterance, the court should make a conditional finding that if the 
way of completeness is mentioned supra note 58. 
228. When trumping involves a remainder elicited from the same source, the proponent is 
hard pressed to maintain that the remainder was not uttered as the opponent claims. In the 
case ~f testimonial evidence, the proponent must argue that his witness is telling the truth 
about part of the utterance but a falsehood as to the remainder. The possibility is somewhat 
more realistic in the case of documentary evidence, since the proponent can claim, for 
example, that only part of a document is a forgery. Interestingly, in the only such cases 
encountered in this research, trumping of the otherwise applicable authentication 
requirement was endorsed. See McBrayer v. Walker, 50 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. 1905); see also Dagleish 
v. Dodd, 172 Eng. Rep. 955 (KB. 1832) (admitting for defendant writing by plaintiff's 
insolvent on back of defendant's letter already admitted for plaintiff). However, these cases 
also rely, more or less explicitly, on a distinct and understandable exception to the 
requirement of authentication, one that does not depend upon the completeness rule as 
such, namely that "a person's possession of documents purporting to be made by himself and, 
particularly, of documents used and acted on by him in the ordinary conduct of his business, 
is sufficient evidence of their genuineness to justify their reception." 7 Wigmore, supra note 
10, § 2160, at 777 (emphasis omitted). Even in the Williams case, where the court applied the 
completeness rule to mandate the admission of evidence of the remainder from a distinct 
source, that source was a video-taped version of the defendant's confession created and 
possessed exclusively by the police and prosecution. Obviously, the proponent was in no 
position to contest the utterance of the remainder. 
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original part was uttered as the proponent claims, then the remainder was 
uttered as the opponent claims.:129 If this conditional fact is established, 
one may reasonably infer that the proponent should have revealed the 
evidence of the remainder to the trier of fact. If not, the opponent is 
subject to the same regime that would apply if ,there were a same-source 
trumping limitation. This, moreover; is not simply a matter of conditional 
relevance, but rather a matter of determining the applicability of the supra-
relevance exclusionary rule, usually the hearsay rule, the trumping of 
which is at issue.2g° Consequently, under conventional practice, the 
required preliminary fmding should be made by a preponderance of the 
evidence, just as would a factual issue conditioning the application of an 
. ch rul 251 exception to su a e. 
The difference between these two completeness regimes lies in the 
degree to which they allow expression of the refo:n:llative power of the best 
evidence principle in terms of liberalizing the admissibility of evidence. 
This power is given greater sway if a same-source limitation is not imposed. 
Granted that one should not find in the completeness doctrine authority 
229. A conditional form reflects the filet that the opponent may well deny the asserted 
occurrence of the utterance as a whole or the asserted identity of its speaker or author. See 
supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. While it might be theoretically more precise to 
pose the question of whether the proponent was aware of the utterance of the remainder, that 
awareness will depend on the evidence, and the evidence might only come to the proponent's 
attention at trial. Thus, the preliminary question is more practically posed in terms of what 
the evidence shows than in tenns of what the proponent knew or believed before trial. 
230. Among other implications, this means that the trial court is not bound by 
exclusionary rules, other than privileges, in making its preliminary determination. See Mueller 
& Kirkpatrick, supra note 183, § 1.12, at 51-53. Note that to the extent an authentication or 
identification requirement is the objection to the remainder at issue, the opponent can gain 
admission by either (a) producing sufficient admissible evidence to support a finding that the 
remainder is what the opponent claims it to be (i.e., the ordinary route in which trumping is 
not employed, see id. § 9.2), or (b) producing sufficient evidence that the trial judge finds 
conditionally that the remainder is what the opponent conditionally claims it to be (i.e., the 
route in which trumping is employed). 
231. See id. § 1.12, at 50-51. Of course, there are several other candidates for a 
requirement, including: (I) a finding that the proponent concedes the utterance as claimed; 
(2) a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the remainder was uttered as claimed; (3) a 
finding that the evidence would support a finding that the remainder was uttered as claimed; 
or ( 4) a finding that there is some significant evidence that the remainder was uttered as 
claimed (i.e., that it is not beyond reasonable doubt that it was not uttered as claimed). In 
each case, the finding would be conditional, in the sense described in text. Standard (I) is 
obviously too demanding on the opponent, since it would allow the proponent to block any 
truJ;Dping. Arguably, standard (4) is insufficiently demanding under a forced presentation 
theory of completeness, since it would mean the proponent is obligated· to present any 
significant evidence of a remainder utterance not otherwise admissible for the opponent, 
which by definition will be true under a completeness motion that survives the relevance test 
and raises the issue of trumping. Standard (3) is plausible, since the trier of filet is likely to 
ignore a remainder that does not satisfy such a test, but it is nonetheless too weak a 
requirement in that it places a theoretical moral burden on the proponent to present 
evidence he disbelieves just because he might have believed it. And standard (2), also 
plausible, makes the opposite mistake. 
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to reform the whole of admissibility law, two fuctors favor the more 
expansive view of trumping. First, the vast majority of the troublesome 
cases, involving symmetric exclusionary rules premised on improving 
accuracy, will concern the hearsay rule, and there is reason to believe that 
hearsay is not as great a danger to accuracy as once thought.252 Second, a 
same-source limitation pushes one to limit trumping too narrowly to cases 
of formal asymmetry, while the concerns that are introduced by the 
trumping of symmetric rules ate dramatically reduced by requiring a 
preliminary finding in any case where the utterance of the remainder is 
disputed.255 On balance, the Williams case is correct in its apparent 
conclusion that the better choice is not to impose a same-source limitation 
on trumping, at least when the utterance of the remainder as claimed by 
the opponent is conditionally probable.254 
4. A Revised Test for Trumping 
We thus obtain the following revised version of the test for 
determining when trumping should occur, assuming once again that the 
proffered remainder passes the relevance test for wholeness. 
REviSED TEsT: Under the principle of completeness, evidence of 
the remainder should be admissible on demand of the opponent, 
for the same purposes as to which the original proffer is 
admissible, over an otherwise valid objection by the·proponent if 
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
remainder was uttered as the opponent claims, assuming for this 
purpose that the original part was uttered as the proponent 
claims, unless: 
(a) the objection to the remainder is based on a defect that is 
reasonably curable by the opponent, the curing of which will 
232. See, e.g., Peter Meine et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay 
Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683 (1992) (reporting results of empirical study to the effect that 
jurors do not overvalue hearsay evidence). Note also that, according to the analysis of the 
previous subsection, the problem will only arise when the hearsay objection represents an 
incurable defect, since a curable defect objection can be asserted despite the completeness 
argument. Theories of hearsay that emphasize the conservation of the trier's cognitive 
resources do not lead to a different result, since remainder evidence that is extraordinarily 
weak need not be admitted under the analysis of the previous subsections. See supra notes 207-
08 and accompanying text. 
233. For example, in the double hearsay confession hypothetical of the previous 
subsection, if the trial court's finding is not in favor of the opponent's (perhaps conditional) 
claim that the remainder was uttered, then trumping is not allowed, but the evidence of the 
remainder may nonetheless be admis5ible for nonhearsay purposes such as impeachment, 
which do not require such a finding. 
234. A complete analysis of this issue would require consideration of the problem of 
"nonverbal completeness," that is, the possibility of a trumping function with a wholeness 
criterion that is not even limited to verbal events, but rather demands complete evidence of 
the often underlying nonverbal events. Unfortunately, that examination must be postponed 
until another occasion, so the conclusions reached here with regard to a source limitation 
must be considered subject to revision. 
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improve the quality of the evidence of the remainder, or 
(b) the public interest in acc:uracy served by admitting the whole 
of the utterance in question is dearly outweighed either by the 
proponent's interest in excluding the reinainder under a rule of 
prejudice or an (unwaived) rule of privilege or quasi-privilege or 
by the public's interest in reasonably efficient trials, or 
(c) admission would violate a right held by a third person, not 
lawfully waived by the proponent, under rules of privilege or 
prejudice. 
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Of course, if the remainder falls into one of the three exceptional 
categories of the Revised Test, it remains open to the trial court, in an 
appropriate case, to exclude the original part as excessively misleading or 
even to invoke the doctrine of curative admissibility to admit the 
remainder for the limited purpose of offsetting the probative effect of the 
original part.235 The former response, excluding the incomplete proffer, 
ought not be available with regard to remainders falling into the first 
exception since by hypothesis the opponent has the ability to redress the 
incompleteness.236 And the latter response, invoking curative admission, 
will almost certainly be precluded when the reason for the inadmissibility 
of the remainder is an unwaived privilege rule. However, if the privilege is 
one protecting the proponent, the likelihood that the proponent's rights 
under such a rule would not be waived is exceedingly small.237 
Note that we started with a Preliminary Test based on asymmetry, but 
we have concluded with a Revised Test that is not explicitly dependent on 
that concept This is a consequence of the shift from formal to functional 
asymmetry and of the emphasis on accurate adjudication as the principal 
goal underlying our sense of unfairness in the situations that call for 
trumping. Nevertheless, the vast majority of trumping cases have occurred 
in the context of formal asymmetry, where the demands of fairness and 
accuracy are most clearly complementary. 
N. CONCLUSION 
The advers~-.ial common law has always contained -norms that serve to 
assure the presentation of the best reasonably available evidence on a 
litigated issue. That is not to say that the courts have invariably achieved 
such a goal, but only that serious pressure is applied to move things in that 
direction. One such norm has been the doctrine of completeness, a 
general indusionary doctrine judicially crafted to forestall several 
mechanisms of truth-defeating unfairness. In its early development, before 
the advent of modern discovery rules, the most significant of these was the 
differential availability of the evidence to the parties. Under modem 
procedure, most significant is the existence of exclusionary rules that are 
235. See supra Part III.B. 
236. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. 
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fonnally or functionally asymmetric when applied to a given item of 
evidence. Of secondary importance is the ability to control the timing of 
the presentation of the remainder in order to facilitate its understanding 
by the trier of fact. 
Recent decades have seen an unfortunate tendency to deemphasize 
this important common-law doctrine. The most conspicuous evidence of 
this tendency is the seemingly narrow version of the doctrine that emerged 
out of the federal codification, quoted in the Introduction to this Article: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is 
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the 
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or 
recorded statement that ought in fairness to be considered 
contemporaneously with it. 238 
Aside from the lack of significant guidance inherent in the vague "fairness" 
standard, this version suggests that the doctrine of completeness applies 
only to "writings or recorded statements," thus apparently leaving 
untouched the enormous category of incomplete testimonial recountings of 
conversations, statements, or documentary contents. Stated in a form that 
is easily recognized as the modem counterpart of what has here been 
called the interruption rule, it also risks a narrow interpretation as 
concerned only with the timing· function. Unfortunately, these narrowing 
connotations are endorsed by a substantial body of poorly reasoned judicial 
dicta as well as supporting academic commentary.239 It is not surprising, 
238. Fed. R Evid. 106. Earlier evidence is the fact that the common-law doctrine does not 
appear at all in the American Law Institute's Model Code, except in connection with the 
more narrowly applicable doctrine of waiver of privilege. See Model Code of Evidence Rule 
231 (1942). 
239. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 959 F.2d 1371 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that trial 
court did not err in excluding certain exculpatory hearsay statements made by defendant, 
where they were not within Rule 106 because they were neither relevant to qualify any 
statements elicited on direct examination of t.i-}e witness nor part of a writing); United States 
v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 314 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983) (stating in dictum that 
"Rule 106 does not render admissible evidence that is otherwise admissible," but holding 
remainder of oral statements in question admissible under state of mind exception to hearsay 
rule); United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that trial court 
erred in admitting portions of document containing hearsay upon prosecution's request after 
defendant had introduced portions relevant to testimony of witness and upon which witness 
relied to refresh memory, where portions offered by prosecution irrelevant to witness's 
testimony; dictum that Rule 106 governs only order of proof); United States v. Burreson, 643 
F.2d 1344 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981) (holding that the trial court did not 
abuse discretion in denying admission of irrelevant, hear5ay remainder). For similar academic 
commentary, see Graham, supra note 57, § 106.1; Stephen A Saltzburg & Michael M. Ma.rtin, 
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 57 (5th ed. 1990); 1 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 126, 
1106[01], at 13, and 1106[02] (noting common-law antecedents but then simply asserting 
that Rule 106 "merely regulates a detail of the order of proof'). To be sure, there are 
competing opinions more in line with the common-law understanding. See, e.g., United States 
v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that completeness trumps hearsay 
objection to evidence of remainder of defendant's out-of-court declaration); Louisell & 
Mueller, supra note 144, § 49. 
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therefore, that' the doctrine receives little or no attention in many modern 
textbooks on evidence law, a fact which no doubt contributes to a lack of 
understanding and appreaation of the doctrine in the practicing bar.240 
The present study ·has begun th~ process of redressing this 
unfortunate state of affairs. In later work; I will address the question of 
whether the Federal Rules of Evidence are compatible with the 
understanding of the completeness doctrine developed here. I will also 
consider what amendatory language would more readily achieve the 
laudable functions that evolved at common law. If the indicated narrowing 
constructions are in fact placed on the Rules, such amendment may be 
necessary in order to avoid injustice. 
240.. No significant discussion can be found in the following standard texts: Ronald J. 
Allen & Richard B. Kuhns, An Analytical Approach to Evidence: Text. Problems, and Cases 
(1989); Eric D. Green & Charles R Nesson, Problems, Cases, and Materials on Evidence 
(1983); John Kaplan, Jon R Waltz, & Roger Park, Evidence: Cases and Materials (7th ed. 
1992); Richard 0. Lempert & Stephen A Saltz burg, A Modem Approach to Evidence (2d ed. 
1982); and Leon Letwin, Evidence Law: Commentary, Problems and Cases (1986). Only brief 
discussions can be found in the following standard texts: Edward W. Cleary, John W. Strong, 
Kenneth S. Broun, & Robert P. Mosteller, Evidence: Cases and Materials 407 (4th ed. 1988); 
Paul R Rice, Evidence: Common Law and Federal Rules of Evidence 346, 781 (1986); and 
Jack B. Weinstein, John H. Mansfield, Norman Abrams, & Margaret A Berger, Cases and 
Materials on Evidence 172-75, 577-78 (8th ed. 1988). Texts devoting at least some significant 
attention to the doctrine include: Ronald L. Carlson, Edward J. Imwinkelried, & Edward J. 
Kionka, Evidence in the Nineties: Cases, Materials and Problems for an Age of Science and 
Statutes 10405 (3d ed. 1991); Charles T. McCormick, John F. Sutton, & Olin Guy Wellborn 
ill, Cases and Materials on Evidence 388-93 (7th ed. 1992); Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Evidence Under the Rules: Text. Cases, and Problems 88-90 (2d ed. 1993); and 
Paul F. Rothstein, Evidence: Cases, Materials and Prob!e.tns 1285-92 (1986). 
